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Abstract
My thesis consists of three essays investigating the existence, causes, and mitigation of
profit cycles at an industry level. The first essay examines profit cycles by proposing
that the industry-specific features of how competition acts on a firm are important
determinants of how mean reversion manifests in firm earnings. The evidence suggests
that because competition has inertia, caused by the time to build productive capacity
specific to each industry, earnings do not smoothly revert to the mean, but instead
cycle around it. Since these findings affect research that uses expected earnings
models, lags of capital expenditure are used as a proxy for competition in a regression
model of firm earnings and are shown to be significant determinants of the earnings
reported.
The second essay seeks to explain why aggregate airline industry profits have
displayed cyclicality since deregulation in 1978. In order to better understand the
causes of these profit cycles, I build a large-scale model of the airline industry that
includes more endogenous feedbacks than previous models, as well as formulations
for several strategies that have been employed by airlines to mitigate the cycles.
While I find that, consistent with earlier research, the delay in acquiring capacity is
an important determinant of the behavior of airline profits, I also show that multiple
negative feedback loops are involved in the intensity and periodicity of the profit cycle
in the airline industry. Specifically, analysis of my model suggests that the growing
reliance on yield management as a tool for determining ticket prices has exacerbated
the volatility of airline industry profits.
The third essay focuses on the insurance industry, where the delay in building pro-
ductive capacity is short. I build and analyze a parsimonious model of the property-
casualty insurance industry, and show results which suggest that delays in adjusting
the characteristics of underwritten insurance policies are responsible for the oscil-
latory behavior. Simulations where the industry increases both the target level of
capital reserves, and the attention paid to the adequacy of that level, show signifi-
cantly reduced profit variance.
Thesis Supervisor: John Sterman
Title: Jay W. Forrester Professor of Management
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Chapter 1
Earnings Mean Reversion or
Cyclicality? Competition as
Delayed Negative Feedback
1.1 Introduction
Explaining how companies become the financial statements they report is one of the
central purposes of accounting research. Yet little research in accounting is focused on
understanding what portion of the reported earnings number is caused by economic
processes that are beyond the firm's control. If earnings are, in part, caused by the
environment a firm occupies, estimates of expected earnings that do not control for
that environment will be misspecified.
By studying how competition contributes to earnings mean reversion, this chap-
ter extends our understanding of how economic forces manifest in reported earnings
numbers. Current research on mean reversion does not offer testable hypotheses for
how competition plays a role, because no theories have been put forward about the
mechanism of competition's action. I theorize that industry membership is important
for how competition affects firm earnings because each industry has a characteristic
delay before firms can respond to competitive signals. I find evidence that, on an
industry level, earnings display cyclicality over long time scales, and that the time
necessary to build productive capacity is related to the length of this cyclical mode
of industry earnings.
A recent survey of the earnings quality literature by Dechow, Ge and Schrand
(2009) concludes that, regardless of the metric used to measure earnings quality, we
currently cannot separate the economic processes causally related to the earnings of
the firm and the accounting practices that also influence reported earnings. Specifi-
cally, they conclude:
"Existing research does not clearly distinguish the effect of a firm's
fundamental earnings process on the decision usefulness ("quality") of its
earnings from the effect of the application of accounting measurement to
that process."
Even though the behavior of accounting earnings has been of interest since the work
of Ball and Brown (1968), and is still actively discussed (Dechow et al. 2008 among
others), Dechow, Ge and Schrand strikingly note that the confounding of economics
and accounting is a gap in our understanding that must be addressed. One example
of this need is their finding that many recent papers in earnings management have
conclusions that are not robust to changes in the models and metrics employed by
the researchers. This suggests that a model of expected earnings grounded in the
economic process of earnings generation, is greatly needed for future research that
uses measures of expected earnings.
Using post-1970 quarterly financial statement data from Compustat, I find that
the current consensus that earnings mean reversion only exerts pressure on a firm over
a short time horizon (Ball and Watts (1977); Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998)) is
not supported by longer term autocorrelation tests of firm earnings. Exploring this
result, I find evidence that a long-term cycle in firm earnings exists. By drawing on
conceptual insights from engineering control theory, I argue that the mechanism of
action behind competition should be expected to cause a firm that begins moving
towards the mean to continue its trajectory past the mean, rather than smoothly
adjusting towards it. This earnings inertia would cause firm earnings to display
cyclical earnings over time, since same competitive forces act on both profitable and
unprofitable firms, just as gravity acts on a pendulum regardless of which side of
equilibrium it lies on.
The delayed productivity of capacity expansion means that decisions made using
current expectations for profitability will have an influence on earnings far into the
future. This "time-to-build" can be conceptualized as the total length of time elapsed
between when a manager receives a signal that capacity should be expanded and when
the capacity becomes productive. Time-to-build is not a new concept in the literature
on earnings quality. Papadakis (2007) establishes that understanding time-to-build is
central to understanding earnings quality by showing that the long time delay before
capital investment becomes productive, compared to the short time delay inherent
in the abandonment option, influences conservatism measures; however, this research
is the first to hypothesize that the time-to-build delay modulates earnings mean
reversion.
Using data on the time-to-build in various industries, I find support for my hy-
pothesis that the length of the cycle in earnings at an industry level is related to the
time to build productive capacity in that industry. I then document how this aspect
of competition can be incorporated into earnings models by developing a regression
estimate for current-period firm earnings that incorporates past, industry-specific
competitive pressures. In tests of this model the proxy for competition I employ,
an industry-specific lag of aggregate industry capacity expansion, is found to be a
significant determinant of the variation in firm-level earnings.
These findings are important for accounting research in several ways. By ex-
panding the literature on earnings mean reversion, the results provide a theoretical
grounding for what was previously only an observed phenomenon. By identifying
one of the economic forces that affects earnings, my paper provides researchers with a
model that can better remedy the weaknesses highlighted by Dechow, Ge and Schrand
(2009).
Since my results give a new conceptual framework for thinking about what growth
means as a proxy for competition at an industry level, there is also the potential
for applications of my findings in other areas of accounting. Growth in productive
capacity is a variable that has been found to be important in a variety of research
settings, from asset valuation to anomalies. Re-examining those findings using this
new theory could potentially be insightful. Finally, by showing that the inertia behind
competition's effect on reported accounting numbers has a surprising effect on those
numbers, even over a long time horizon, this paper shows a potential new line of
inquiry into how a company's historical data can be used to provide insight into its
future prospects.
This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section two gives background on the relevant
literature. Section three discusses the generation of my hypotheses. Section four
concerns the data used in my tests, and section five describes the research design.
Section six presents the results, and section seven summarizes the conclusions.
1.2 Background and Literature Review
Beaver (1970) reports that over time earnings changes tend to revert back to the
economy-wide mean. This property of earnings has been widely used in account-
ing research. Modern valuation formulas (Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 1995)
incorporate the effect in their future abnormal earnings forecasts. While several al-
ternatives for these forecasts have been offered, the original papers and many others
employ a random walk with drift model that includes an explicit mean reversion
term. Mean reversion in earnings was cited by DeBondt and Thaler (1987) to give a
rationale for what was causing the book to market anomaly they documented. When
this anomaly was later studied by Fama and French (1996) they argued that a mis-
perception of mean reversion was why investors did not understand that firms with a
low market to book ratios were more likely to have large earnings changes. Earnings
mean reversion was also a motivation cited by Sloan (1996) in the development of
the theory behind the accrual anomaly when he proposed that even though earnings
mean revert, the higher persistence of the cash flow component of earnings, relative
to the accrual component, was misunderstood by investors. 1
The original argument for why earnings mean revert, the fact that competition
is ubiquitous in the modern economy, seems simple enough to need no further in-
vestigation. When we consider recent research findings however, several features of
competition suggest themselves as potentially important to our understanding.
Fairfield et al. (2003) find that long-term growth in net operating assets results
in diminishing marginal return on those assets instead of economies of scale. In the
11t is likely that Sloan's findings on the relative persistence of the accrual and cash flow compo-
nents of earnings were influenced by the effects of competition this paper analyzes. Since revenues
are formed by a competitive determination of prices for a firm's product competitive cycles that are
elongated by the time-to-build delay might cause the cash flow component of earnings to be more
persistent than it otherwise would be.
paper it is unclear why asset growth over a long time period should cause margins
to fall, however competition caused by industry level asset growth is a potential
explanation. Firm level asset growth is the variable used in their tests, but all firms
within an industry share common signals for profitably. This means that firms within
the industry will likely make expansion decisions that are positively correlated, and
so industry-level growth in net operating assets, my measure of competition, will be
correlated with firm-level growth in assets. The competition from capacity building
up over time would therefore act as a common force driving down margins for all firms
in the industry and could be involved in causing the negative correlation between long
term asset growth and return on assets that is documented in their research. Unless
those competitive effects are controlled for we cannot be certain that characteristics
of the marginal return are behind the result.
Another example of research that suggests the importance of competition for
modeling company earnings is Zhang (2004). Zhang extends Sloan's (1996) work on
discretionary accruals and finds that both the industry of the firm and its recent
rate of growth play a role in determining how well the accrual anomaly performs. I
conjecture that an explanation for those findings is that competition acting at the
industry level industry, represented in the growth or decline of assets, is an important
determinant of the path of profits. Therefore the accrual anomaly is, at least to
some extent, detecting the effects of competition. Investment in productive capacity
can sometimes result in accruals, and while all accruals revert to the mean, accruals
that result from capacity expansion not only revert but also signal additional, future
pressure on the cash flow component of earnings.
In order to operationalize the often-quoted assertion of Stigler (1963) that "En-
trepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable industries and enter relatively
profitable industries," we must focus on how that process occurs. A highly profitable
industry not only draws capital from outside entrepreneurs, but also signals firms in
the industry to invest in their own productive capacity. Productive capacity cannot
be created instantly, a fact that has influenced economic thought since the develop-
ment of the 'Cobweb Model' (Kaldor 1938). It takes a significant amount of time for
investors to perceive a signal of high profits, trust that the signal is not noise, design
the capacity, and build it, before the action of competition can subject high profits
to competitive pressure.
The time to build productive capacity has been suggested as an important variable
for economic analysis by many previous academics. Kydland and Prescott (1982)
show that when a macroeconomic model includes a fixed delay between the initial
desire for and final production of capital, the resulting effect provides a shock to the
production function that can help explain business cycle fluctuations. However, the
implications of this macro-economic effect for firm-level earnings was not examined
in the many papers that built on their work.
To see why this delay produces testable predictions about the behavior of account-
ing earnings, I will begin by examining how engineering control theory understands
delays. Control theory models many of its research settings as networks of feedback
loops, and has developed a rigorous understanding of the behavior of feedback sys-
tems. A feedback loop occurs when a signal from one variable is transmitted through
a system, acting on other variables until the original variable is itself affected. The ac-
tion of competition on a firm is a feedback loop. When earnings are abnormally high
(low) competitive forces work to increase (decrease) capacity in the industry, which
raises (lowers) competition and eventually lowers (raises) margins, causing earnings
to be lower (higher) than they otherwise would be.
Control theory categorizes feedback loops into two types: positive and negative.
The difference is straightforward: if the initial signal travels around the loop and
reinforces itself by causing the initial variable to move further from equilibrium, feed-
back positively reinforces the original signal. If instead the initial signal causes the
variable to move towards equilibrium, the feedback is restorative and the feedback
loop is negative. Applying this categorization to the action of competition on profits,
I suggest that the competitive feedback loop is negative, since the initially high profits
act to move future profits back towards the economy wide mean.
The most important insight from control theory is that there are a limited number
of ways that systems dominated by negative feedback will evolve through time. In
fact, when a system is driven by a single negative feedback loop, there are only two
ways that it will respond to disequilibrium (Brown 2001). If the feedback loop acts
quickly, then the system will smoothly transition back towards its equilibrium. If,
instead, the feedback loop includes a significant delay, the system will move in cycles
around the equilibrium before eventually settling. While the discussion of exactly
where the threshold between these two behaviors lies is beyond the scope of this
paper, one of the key variables that determines the threshold is how strongly the
signal is preserved in the course of its movement through the feedback loop. If the
signal's feedback has a large effect on the original variable then even very short time
delays can cause the system to overshoot its equilibrium and start oscillation, since
the feedback is so forceful that it is easy for it to move the system past where it will
eventually settle.
In the case of competition, not only is the time-to-build delay very long, but
economic agents have very strong incentives to act on the signals they receive from
the market, so the feedback effect of competition is likely to be quite forceful. If
the action of competition on firm earnings is a negative feedback process with a long
delay, and the power of this economic feedback loop is large, then engineering control
theory would indicate that firm earnings should show evidence of cyclicality instead
of gentile mean reversion.
1.3 Hypothesis Generation
Developing an intuitive argument for why the nature of competition leads to cycles
in firm earnings requires a relaxation of some of the assumptions of market efficiency.
If actors had perfect knowledge of future demand, the reaction of prices to supply,
and the investment plans of their competitors, then the amount of capacity added
during profitable periods would be the correct amount to bring industry profitability
into balance with outside opportunities. However, since these quantities are only
imperfectly known, the delay from the time to build capacity induces over-investment
by continuing to send a signal to entrepreneurs that investment will be profitable
even after so much capacity is under construction that future profitability will be
depressed. Once profitability starts to fall, many projects will be beyond the point
where abandonment is an economically viable option, and even if continuation of
the project makes no economic sense, the "sunk cost fallacy" (Kanodia et al. 1989)
might make abandonment no longer psychologically viable. Furthermore, even if all
capacity under construction was abandoned the moment that profits began to fall,
the pressure on profits from competition would already be exigent, because excess
capacity would already be causing profits to drop.2
This inertia in capacity expansion means that the competitive forces acting on a
firm's earnings will likely increase, rather than weaken, as earnings start to approach
the economy-wide mean. This pressure on earnings will not abate until there is a
period of capacity stagnation or contraction, and the only way that rational agents
will allow capacity to adjust in this manner is if the return on assets for the industry
falls far enough below the mean that no investment in the industry is warranted.
Therefore I hypothesize that:
H1 - Over a long time horizon, firm earnings show evidence of cyclicality,
displaying alternating periods of positive and negative autocorrelation.
On its own, a confirmation of this hypothesis would be an interesting extension of
the literature on the mean reversion of earnings, but essential elements of the theory
that motivates this hypothesis would still be unsupported. Centrally, evidence of
cyclicality in firm earnings does not provide any information about whether that
cycle is caused by the delay inherent in capacity building or by some other force.
There is a large body of work outside of the accounting, finance, and economics
literatures that uses models grounded in the mathematics of control theory, but set in
an economic context, to suggest that time-to-build is an important cause of earnings
cycles. Sterman (1985) develops a macroeconomic model along the lines of Kydland
and Prescott (1982), where he concludes that some very long-term macroeconomic
cycles are likely to be caused by delays in "self-ordering" by engineering and construc-
tion firms. Randers (2007) shows that ocean freight shipping companies experience
regular cycles in profitability, with cycle periods dependent on the length of the delay
between ordering a new vessel and receiving it. Leihr et al. (2001) show a similar
dynamic for the airline industry, and Sterman (2000) documents several delays caus-
ing cycles in the profitability of energy exploration and extraction. These papers all
focus their attention on the details of specific industries, yet they all come back to the
same central mechanism when explaining the pattern of industry earnings exhibited
by the data: the feedback between competition and investment, moderated by the
time to build capacity.
The findings in this research stream are highly consistent, yet there has been no
attempt by researchers in that literature to test whether time-to-build is related to
2 Since SG&A expenses are "sticky" (Anderson et al 2003), abandoned capacity expansion exerts
pressure on other components of earnings as well. Each firm faces a type of first mover dilemma,
where companies that abandon capacity expansion are "rewarded" by higher costs and larger com-
petitors.
profit cycles cross-sectionally. If profit cycles exist, and time-to-build is an important
driver of their periodicity, then estimates of the industry-specific time to build capac-
ity should be correlated with empirical estimates of the length of the cycle in each
industry's aggregate earnings.
Using the work of Kovea (2000) that documents the time-to-build across many
different industries, I test the second hypothesis of this chapter:
H2 - At an industry level, the length of time between successive peaks in the
cycle of earnings will vary with the time to build productive capacity.
If firm earnings show evidence of long-term cycles, and if there is evidence to support
the hypothesis that these cycles vary with the time to build capacity in each industry,
then we are left with the question of how to transform these insights into statistically
and economically significant adjustments to expectation models of firm earnings. The
final hypothesis in my paper proposes a regression model of the firm earnings that
controls for the action of competition I hypothesize.
The change in the current competitive environment in an industry can be rep-
resented by how much new capital becomes productive in that industry. Capacity
coming on line today was paid for in a previous quarter, but since the details of ca-
pacity construction vary between industries, each industry will be characterized by
a different lag between capital expenditure and increased competition. Therefore,
a model of expected firm earnings that controls for competitive effects should uti-
lize industry-level capacity expansion figures that are lagged by an industry specific
measure of cycle length.
One half of a cycle is how long I expect earnings to be able to persist before
capacity is constructed and competition puts pressure on them to reverse.3 If one half
of a cycle in the past industry capital expenditure was large, then new competition
will currently have a negative effect on earnings. Firms that expand capacity at the
same time as the rest of their industry will, on balance, experience a higher absolute
level of earnings because they will have more productive capacity during the period
in question; however, increases in industry capacity will be negatively associated with
firm earnings when firm capacity expansion is controlled for:
H3 - After incorporating appropriate controls, firm earnings will be nega-
tively related to half-cycle lags of past industry capacity expansion.
1.4 Research Design
1.4.1 Firm Earnings Autocorrelation Spectrum
In order to examine the autocorrelation of firm earnings over a long time horizon, I
estimate the following regression:
3The choice to use a half of the cycle time rather than the full cycle time allows me to incorporate
more data into the final regression, since any data points without lagged capacity expenditure data
will be dropped from the sample.
dEt = of + #1 -dEt-1 + c (1. 1)
Where dE_{t} is the difference between current period earnings and earnings one
year prior, for the firm in question, and dE_{t-1} is the same metric lagged one quar-
ter. In this test I follow the process for running a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression.
To start, equation one is estimated once over all the firm-level data available for the
first calendar quarter of the sample.4 Equation one is then estimated over the data
from each other calendar quarter, and I use the average of all of these estimated
slopes as the final estimate for autocorrelation at that lag. The standard error of this
average is used to estimate significance. The Fama-MacBeth regression procedure
described above addresses the potential for time dependent, cross-sectional correla-
tion in the error term that can arise in regressions using time series data. This series
of regressions is then run forty-seven more times, once for each quarterly lag of the
earnings change from two to forty-eight quarters, respectively, as shown in equations
two through four. 5
dEi = a +81 - dEt-2 + E (1.2)
dEt = a +#1 - dEt-3 + E (1.3)
dEt = a + 01 -dEt_4 + E (1.4)
1.4.2 Industry Level Autocorrelation Spectrum
Since an objective measurement of the time to build productive capacity is needed
for this test, I rely on Kovea (2000) to supply part of data I use. Kovea (2000)
is an International Monetary Fund paper that examines news reports that contain
announcements of planned capital projects, capital projects starting construction,
capital projects completing construction, and canceled capital projects. After col-
lecting data on many projects the author separates the projects in the sample into
major industry groups and estimates the time to build productive capacity in each
industry. In order to match my industries with the industry designations given in
Kovea (2000) I separate firms into industries according to their four digit SIC codes
following 1.1. 6 The first step in estimating the length of the industry-level earnings
cycle is to construct a time series of aggregate industry earnings changes versus the
previous year. For each year and quarter of the data I summed the annual earnings
41970 quarter 2, since one quarter of data is needed to estimate dEt-1. Each subsequent set of
regressions starts one quarter later in time, since longer lags require additional data.
5 The choice of 48 quarters for this test was arbitrary, no precedent exists regarding the appropriate
horizon.
6 Kovea does not provide the exact classifications used, whenever possible I included every 4 digit
sic code within an appropriate range, but some judgment was necessary in order to maintain the
face validity of the industry classifications Kovea adopts.
[Number Industry SIC Begin SIC End
1 Food Products 2000 2099
2 Textile Products 2200 2299
3 Lumber 2400 2450
4 Paper Products 2600 2710
5 Chemical Products 2800 2889
6 Petrol Products 2911 3010
7 Rubber 3011 3079
8 Leather 3100 3139
9 Glass and Stone 3220 3289
10 Primary Metals 3310 3410
11 Fabricated Metals 3411 3509
12 Industrial Equipment 3540 3569
13 Electrical Equipment 3570 3694
14 Transport Equipment 3711 3811
15 Measurement 3812 3840
16 Manufacturing, Other 3841 4010
17 Railroad Transportation 4011 4099
18 Freight Transportation 4100 4399
19 Water Transportation 4400 4511
20 Air Transportation 4512 4580
21 Communications 4812 4899
23 Nondurable Wholesale 5000 5199
. _ Other All other SIC codes
Table 1.1: Industry Definitions Following Kovea (2000), shows the simplistic industry classifi-
cations used to subdivide firm quarters along the dimensions provided by Kovea (2000). These
industries roughly follow the three digit SIC code classifications except where specific four digit
industries were clearly not part of the respective group.
change, or dE7 , for each firm over all of the firms within an industry.
I use a Fourier transform algorithm to estimate the industry earnings cycle period
from this data.8  While autocorrelation spectrums can be used to estimate cycle
lengths in time series data I used the Fourier transform because it can determine
length of a cycle with greater precision, and because autocorrelation regressions at
the required lags would exclude much more data from my analysis. In unreported
sensitivity tests, the estimates of cycle length from autocorrelation tests were found
to be highly correlated with Fourier based estimates.
A Fourier transform analyzes a time series to determine whether the data show
evidence of a cycle, and also gives a measure of how strongly the data exhibits cycles
of different lengths. The mathematical tool that allows a Forier transform to detect
cycles is its ability to represent the data as a sum of cyclical curves, each with a
different frequency.9 By taking the projection of the time series on each of these
curves the Fourier transform shows how strongly each individual curve is represented
in the data. A list of weights showing these relationships, known as the periodigram
of the data, is the output of the Fourier transform procedure. If all of the cyclical
curves listed in the periodigram were added together, then the original data would
be reconstructed.
If the periodigram is significantly different from one generated by a uniform ran-
dom variable, as determined by a test very similar to a T-test,10 I select the period
with the largest coefficient and use it as a measure of the cycle length. Using this
approach I estimate the length of the cycle in aggregate earnings for each industry. I
then regress these estimates against the time to build capacity for each industry with
the following equation:
CP = a + 1 TtB + e (1.5)
Where CP is the length of the cycle in earnings that was estimated using a Fourier
transform, and TtB is the time-to-build from Kovea (2000) converted into quarters.
1.4.3 Modeling Firm Earnings Under Competition
A model of how competition affects firm earnings that only looks at time-to-build is
overly simple. First, ignoring the fact that earnings are persistent would ignore one of
the most well documented time series properties of earnings (Kormendi and Lipe 1987
7Earnings for the given year and quarter minus earnings for the same quarter one year prior.
8Fourier transform methods have been used in many papers for the analysis of time series data in
finance. They are widely used for options valuation (Carr and Madan 1998), some characterizations
of conditional expectations (Bierens 1982), and for tests of heteroskedasticity in multiple regression
analysis (Robinson 1991).
9Cycle frequency is the mathematical inverse of cycle period. The period of a cycle is the length
of time elapsed while completing one cycle while frequency is the number of cycles completed in a
set length of time.
ioThe periodogramn from each industry's Fourier transform is compared to the periodogram of a
uniform random variable and Bartlett's test for the likelihood that the time series is white noise is
performed.
among others). Including prior year earnings in my model for firm earnings does not
detract from my assertion that the model estimates the component of firm earnings
that is a result of economic forces. The large number of firm quarters included in
the analysis ensures that the model estimates only the component of firm earnings
caused by the persistence of the earnings generating process that is common across
firms. Year-on-year lags of firm earnings are therefore used as a control variable in
the model.
Firms should also be expected to generate a certain average return on assets.
If the persistence of earnings does not completely capture changes in the normal
expectation for this return, then lagged book value will be an important economic
determinant of earnings. Over time workers become more efficient with assets they
use. Automation and other technologies have driven further gains in productivity
that will be captured with this control. Therefore, I include the one year lag of book
value in my firm earnings model and propose that it will be positively related to
current period earnings when earnings persistence is controlled for.
Fama and French (2000) document many statistical properties of earnings mean
reversion. Among these is the finding that firms with higher abnormal earnings expe-
rience faster mean reversion. In light of my theory that competition is the underlying
cause of mean reversion, their finding suggests that competition acts more strongly on
firms in more profitable industries. My model of firm earnings includes a lagged value
of industry return on assets to test whether this variable has incremental explanatory
power in the presence of my competition proxy.
For tests of hypothesis three firms are organized into industries following the
categorization first presented by Fama and French (1997). Firm-level annual earnings
changes for all firms within each Fama-French industry are summed, and a time series
for aggregate industry earnings changes is constructed. This time series undergoes a
Fourier transform analysis very similar to those in tests of H2 in order to determine
the length of the earnings cycle in each industry.1 '
The indicated cycle period is divided by two, rounded up to give a whole number
of quarters, and recorded. While using the full cycle time may make more conceptual
sense, the half cycle time allows for twice as much data to be included in my regression,
and only influences the expected sign on the effects I test, not the theoretical basis for
them. After the half-cycle periods are recorded, I estimate the following regression
across all firm quarters that have sufficient data:
Earnk = a + #1 -Compt-_c + #2 - EarnT_ 4 + (1.6)
#3 - Bookt_4 + #4 -FCapt-c + p5 -IROAt-c + e
The dependent variable Earns is the reported level of firm net income, the inde-
pendent variable Compt-c is the proxy for competition measured by the c quarter lag
of industry capital expenditure scaled by lagged total industry assets; where c is the
"The difference between the two analyses is that cycle periods longer than 48 quarters are not
considered when selecting the industry cycle period for tests of H3. These long periods are excluded
in order to increase the data available to the final regression, though only one industry's cycle period
estimate is changed.
industry specific half cycle time referenced above. Earnt_4 is the level of firm net
income lagged one year, Bookt- 4 is the book value of total assets lagged one year,
FCapt-c is the total firm capital expenditure lagged c quarters, and IROAt-c is the
industry return on assets lagged c quarters. For sensitivity analysis the regression
is estimated twice, once with Newey-West standard errors and once with a Fama-
MacBeth analysis. This approach is suggested by the findings of Peterson (2009)
that Newey-West standard errors are generally unbiased in the presence of both firm
and time effects.
1.5 Sample Selection
My sample takes quarterly data from all firms in the Compustat database with non-
missing values of earnings, total assets and capital expenditure for the period from
1970 until 2009. The sample starts in 1970 because capital expenditures are not
recorded for the majority of firms until Compustat begins including cash flow state-
ment data. The total sample consists of 906,828 firm quarters of data. For tests of
hypothesis one the number of firm quarters declines to a minimum of 205,759 for
the longest autocorrelation lag due to the declining number of firms who have the
sufficient number of consecutive firm quarters of data. For tests of hypothesis three
the number of firm quarters of data that are useable falls to 690,224, since lagged
values of variables are also required in that analysis.
Utilities are excluded from my analysis of hypothesis two because Kovea (2000)
notes that his estimate for the time-to-build in that industry was skewed by the
industry's tendency to put partially completed projects on hold without announcing
this until the project was fully completed. He finds that utilities projects are over 40%
more likely than other projects to be delayed for long periods of unknown duration,
causing this data point to be a troublesome outlier in his analysis as well as mine.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Evidence that Long Horizon Firm Earnings are Cycli-
cal
Table 1.2 presents the results of the regression tests of hypothesis one, while figure
1-1 is a graph of the estimated autocorrelations. There is considerable evidence from
the regression results that the long horizon autocorrelations of firm earnings exhibit
periods of a positive relationship followed by periods of a negative relationship. While
the positive autocorrelations are in general larger and more statistically significant,
firm earnings tend to grow, so a skew towards positive autocorrelation is expected. "
121 do not believe that the observed increase in the strength of the autocorrelations towards the
later lags indicates that the effect is somehow stronger for longer lags in earnings. Instead this
slight increase in the magnitude of autocorrelation estimates is likely caused by the survivorship
bias inherent in running a regression that requires so many consecutive quarters of firm earnings
data. Any firm that lasts for such a long time will have standardized its production, and will
Lag Mean Median 25th PctI 75th PctI Std Error t Value
1 0.39 0.32 0.13 0.58 0.04 11.12
2 0.28 0.18 0.04 0.42 0.05 6.2
3 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.29 0.03 4.98
4 -0.23 -0.26 -0.51 -0.03 0.04 -6.34
5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 0.16 0.03 -0.23
6 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 0.14 0.03 0.86
7 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 0.13 0.04 -0.28
8 -0.09 -0.06 -0.24 0.10 0.04 -2.13
9 -0.04 -0.02 -0.25 0.12 0.04 -0.99
10 -0.08 -0.01 -0.19 0.10 0.04 -1.95
11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.20 0.08 0.05 -2.1
12 -0.06 -0.02 -0.18 0.10 0.06 -1.03
13 -0.06 -0.05 -0.24 0.07 0.04 -1.35
14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.20 0.07 0.05 -1.01
15 -0.08 -0.02 -0.23 0.09 0.05 -1.64
16 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 0.11 0.06 -0.19
17 0.04 0.02 -0.12 0.19 0.05 0.72
18 0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.22 0.04 1.85
19 0.14 0.05 -0.09 0.22 0.07 2.05
20 0.17 0.06 -0.09 0.30 0.06 2.97
21 0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.28 0.05 1.96
22 0.11 0.03 -0.14 0.26 0.05 2.21
23 0.19 0.03 -0.11 0.28 0.06 3.28
24 0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.21 0.06 1.87
25 0.14 0.03 -0.12 0.43 0.06 2.47
26 0.06 0.02 -0.16 0.23 0.05 1.33
27 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.17 0.05 -0.09
28 -0.04 -0.03 -0.25 0.19 0.06 -0.73
29 -0.04 0.02 -0.20 0.21 0.06 -0.67
30 -0.05 0.01 -0.26 0.23 0.08 -0.62
31 -0.07 -0.02 -0.29 0.24 0.10 -0.66
32 -0.15 -0.02 -0.39 0.21 0.13 -1.21
33 -0.26 -0.08 -0.47 0.15 0.13 -2.02
34 -0.19 -0.07 -0.46 0.17 0.10 -1.84
35 -0.27 -0.01 -0.48 0.23 0.12 -2.13
36 -0.09 0.05 -0.29 0.24 0.15 -0.57
37 0.06 0.07 -0.21 0.37 0.10 0.58
38 0.11 0.10 -0.14 0.43 0.08 1.33
39 0.19 0.12 -0.18 0.57 0.07 2.59
40 0.25 0.15 -0.15 0.49 0.11 2.29
41 0.27 0.14 -0.10 0.52 0.09 2.98
42 0.17 0.08 -0.16 0.44 0.11 1.57
43 0.22 0.13 -0.14 0.47 0.11 1.95
44 0.35 0.10 -0.22 0.48 0.13 2.63
45 0.34 0.09 -0.19 0.55 0.14 2.4
46 0.34 0.10 -0.22 0.66 0.15 2.28
47 0.21 -0.01 -0.39 0.45 0.17 1.23
48 0.25 0.06 -0.35 0.52 0.15 1.62
Table 1.2: This table presents the results from 48 sequential Fama-MacBeth regressions, each
using a different lag length, but all measuring the autocorrelation of firm earnings changes
at that lag. Statistically significant entries are shown bold, with reported Fama-MacBeth t-
statistics in the far right column.
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Figure 1-1: This figure shows the results from the first column of table 1 presented as a time
graph. The x-axis is the autocorrelation lag length in quarters, while the y-axis is the magnitude
of the average autocorrelation estimated by Fama-MacBeth regressions on firm earnings for that
lag length.
Figure 1-1 shows the pattern I detect in firm-earnings autocorrelations. For every
case, except the four quarter lag, once the autocorrelations become negative they
tend to stay negative and once the autocorrelations become positive they tend to stay
positive. The results are so consistent in this regard that the estimates from lag seven
through lag thirty-seven consist of exactly ten negative autocorrelations, followed by
exactly ten positive autocorrelations, and a final ten negative autocorrelations. This
evidence suggests that the autocorrelation structure that originally motivated the
theory of earnings mean reversion may actually be the short-term portion of a much
longer term pattern in firm earnings.
1.6.2 Evidence that the Cycle Length Varies with Time-to-
Build
Table 1.3 reports industry-level estimates of the primary cyclical mode of aggregate
industry earnings changes, as estimated by the Fourier transform analysis, along with
the estimates of time-to-build from Kovea (2000) and results from Barlett's test for
white noise. Table 1.4 presents the results of the OLS regression for the correlation
between these two sets of estimates.
The results of Bartlett's test for the likelihood that a data set is white noise show
that for the vast majority of industries the time series of aggregate industry earnings
changes is almost certainly not noise. Only three industries: freight transportation,
fabricated metals, and nondurable metals fail to differentiate their behavior from a
uniform random variable at the 1% level, and only the time series for freight trans-
portation is more likely to be white noise than not to be.
The results of the regression testing whether the time-to-build is correlated with
the length of the cycle in aggregate industry earnings indicate a statistically signifi-
cant, positive relationship between the two variables. In unpublished tests with the
constant of the regression suppressed the slope estimate on quarters to build is almost
exactly two.13 These findings are consistent with hypothesis two, suggesting that the
time to build capacity is an important determinant of the length of the cyclical mode
of the earnings of that industry. As a sensitivity test, autocorrelation regressions were
also used to detect the length of the cycle in aggregate industry earnings. The results
generally agree with the results of the Fourier transforms (65% R^2), but do not load
significantly in the regression.
have a "proven" method for responding to competitive pressures. If competition causes long-period
earnings autocorrelation then firms that standardize their response to competition will be expected
to show a relatively stronger autocorrelation of earnings across time.
13One finding from the modeling papers discussed in section two was that the peak to peak
cycle time of each industry was usually on the order of twice the time-to-build, since profitability
can persist for one "time-to-build" after competition starts to influence profits and then it takes
approximately one more "time-to-build" for actors to perceive that profits have fallen, construction
of new capacity to be finished or canceled, and demand to rise once again. This relationship can
vary considerably however, so I do not include this as an explicit hypothesis but only use it as a
reality check for my results.
Code Industry Quarters to Build Cycle Period Estimate I White Noise P-Value
1 Food Products 8 6.666 <0.001
2 Textile Products 8 8.75 <0.001
3 Lumber 10 9.9286 0.0088
4 Paper Products 7.67 15.77 <0.001
5 Chemical Products 7.67 7.55 <0.001
6 Petrol Products 7.67 2.78 0.0011
7 Rubber 4.33 8.625 <0.001
8 Leather 7.67 27.8 <0.001
9 Glass and Stone 6 11.58 0.2801
10 Primary Metals 12.33 35 <0.001
11 Fabricated Metals 4.67 6.7619 0.5
12 Industrial Equipment 6 16 <0.001
13 Electrical Equipment 8 14.4 <0.001
14 Transport Equipment 9.33 8.6875 <0.001
15 Measure 8.33 29.2 <0.001
16 Manufacturing, Other 6 15.77 <0.001
17 Railroad Transportation 6 8.875 0.01
18 Freight Transportation 7.67 2.58 0.1935
19 Water Transportation 8.33 13.4 <0.001
20 Air Transportation 8 34.5 <0.001
21 Communications 8 13.9 <0.001
23 Nondurable Wholesale 12.33 36.25 0.0977
. other 8 31.8 <0.001
Table 1.3: This table presents the data from Kovea (2000) for the empirically estimated
number of quarters to build in each industry classification under the "Quarters to Build" column.
In the "Cycle Period Estimate" column are most likely cycle periods returned by the Fourier
transform algorithm performed on aggregate industry earnings for each of those industries. The
final column, labeled "White Noise P-value" is the estimate produced by Bartlett's test for white
noise of the percentage chance that the time series evaluated for each industry was produced
by a uniform random variable.
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-stat R^2
Constant -6.93 7.9153 -0.875 29.37%
Quarters to Build 2.83 0.9822 2.884
Table 1.4: This table documents the results of a linear regression of the time-to-build estimates
from Kovea (2000) and the industry earnings cycle lengths produced by the Fourier transform
algorithm. "Quarters to Build" is the data from Kovea and served as the independent variable.
stats Earnt I Earnt_4  Bookt_4  FCapt_ I Comptc I ROAt_
N 690224 690224 690224 690224 690224 690224
mean 21.39 21.35 3556 64.45 0.0322 0 .01175
p50 0.726 0.735 140.5 0.765 0.02195 0.00958
iqr 8.4315 7.827 872.1 9.846 0.04054 0.01161
var 100410 76848 1.08E+09 253116 0.00172 0.00933
Table 1.5: This table gives the summary statistics for all of the firm quarters used in tests of
hypothesis three. The dependent variable Earnt is the reported level of firm net income, the
variable Earnt_4 is the same metric lagged one year, Bookt_ 4 is the book value of total assets
lagged one year, FCapt-, is the total firm capital expenditure lagged c quarters; where c is
the industry specific half cycle time estimated by Fourier transform, Compt-, is the industry
capital expenditure lagged c quarters and scaled by lagged total industry assets, which is the
proxy for competition central to my analysis, and IROAt-e is the industry return on assets
lagged c quarters. N is the number of observations in the sample, mean is the arithmetic mean
of all observations, p50 is the median, iqr is the inter-quartile range, and var is the variance.
1.6.3 Evidence that Past Industry Capacity Expansion Helps
Explain Current Firm Earnings
Summary statistics for the variables included in tests of hypothesis three are presented
in table 1.5. The summary statistics are generally unremarkable. Both firm earnings
and book values show the large variances and shifted means expected from a Pareto
distribution. Average firm capital expenditure is many times larger than earnings,
though it remains a small fraction of book value. The percentage growth in industry
capacity in any quarter tends to be small and positive, though the inter-quartile range
suggests that it is quite variable.
Table 1.6 presents the results of the panel regression that tests whether my proxy
for competition is significantly related to firm earnings levels. The Newey-West stan-
dard errors are reported as well.
All estimated coefficients load significantly at the 1% level and in their predicted
directions, except for lagged industry return on assets which loads significantly at
the 1% level but in the direction opposite from the one that would be implied by my
reading of Fama-French (2000). The implication of this result is that the persistence
of an industry's level of profitability acts more strongly to sustain firm earnings than
as a signal to outside investors that drives profits towards the mean, once industry
level capacity expansion is included in the analysis.
The coefficient estimate for lagged industry capacity expenditure provides evi-
dence in support of my theory of competition, and supports hypothesis three. Care-
fully chosen lags of past industry capacity expansion are statistically significant de-
terminants of future expected firm earnings, given appropriate controls.
In order to gain some insight into the economic significance of these results, con-
sider that the regression estimates imply that the average firm in my sample earns
almost 9.6 million dollars per quarter, plus 35% of their prior year earnings. Produc-
Earnt on: Coefficient Newey-West Std. Err. t P > It|I adj R^2
constant 9.59815 0.7088889 13.54 <0.001 13.86%
Earn_4  0.3529226 0.0470316 7.5 <0.001
Bookt- 4  0.0006424 0.0002178 2.95 0.003
FCapt-, 0.0644838 0.0069436 9.29 <0.001
Compt-c -74.6179 12.35903 -6.04 <0.001
IROAt-c 19.03536 3.972201 4.79 <0.001 I
Table 1.6: This table presents regression results from tests of hypothesis three. Constant is
the constant of the regression. The dependent variable Earnt is the reported level of firm net
income, the variable Earnt-4 is the same metric lagged one year, Bookt_ 4 is the book value of
total assets lagged one year, FCapt-c is the total firm capital expenditure lagged c quarters;
where c is the industry specific half cycle time estimated by Fourier transform, Compt-, is the
industry capital expenditure lagged c quarters and scaled by lagged total industry assets, which
is the proxy for competition central to my analysis, and IROAt-c is the industry return on
assets lagged c quarters. The standard errors reported are Newey-West standard errors.
tive assets can be expected to generate a very small additional return per dollar after
they have been used to produce this level of earnings.
Investment made one half-cycle ago on productive capital offers an expected return
on assets of 6.4% on average, but industry capital expenditure of just 1% of total
industry assets at the same point in the past is expected to result in a loss of over
$740,000 to the average firm. While it is true that for every 1% of profitability enjoyed
by the firm's industry at that earlier date, the average firm can expect to generate
an additional $190,000, the summary statistics show that the magnitude of lagged
industry capacity expansion is generally much larger than the size of lagged industry
return on assets. Overall, the economic interpretation of the regression estimates
indicates that the effect of competition on firm earnings is significant and negative
further supporting hypothesis three.
As an unreported sensitivity test, I also estimate the regression using a Fama-
MacBeth procedure. Under this alternate design all variables load significantly and in
the same direction as in the panel regression, though the relative sizes of the coefficient
estimates change. Also, the economic significance of the estimates is qualitatively
similar to those reported above.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter is a first step towards specifying what portion of the reported earnings
number can be attributed to economic processes as opposed to accounting processes,
with the hope of informing the literature on accounting quality. While my findings
fall short of settling the question posed by Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2009), they
provide a solid basis for future work on the subject, and inform our understanding of
earnings mean reversion, competition, and the time-series properties of earnings.
I find that competition, represented by lagged industry capacity expansion, has a
measurable effect on reported earnings. This suggests that the competitive process
I hypothesize to be behind earnings mean reversion may induce patterns in earnings
that evolve over time horizons much longer than those considered previously.
In showing that industry-level profit cycle lengths are related to the time to build
productive capacity, I further support my argument that industry-specific details com-
petition are important for our understanding of accounting earnings. The regression
model used to test Hypothesis Three provides a method for researchers to incorporate
this aspect of the economic environment in future modeling of earnings expectations,
and documents an additional control to consider in other research settings where the
economic forces influencing firm earnings are of potential importance.
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Chapter 2
Cyclical Dynamics of Airline
Industry Profits
2.1 Introduction
Researchers in system dynamics have studied cyclicality in economic settings for
decades (Forrester 1965, Forrester et. al. 1976), and have largely concluded that
profit cycles are caused by the delay in the negative feedback loops controlling the
adjustment of capacity. Because of the very long delays often associated with capac-
ity building, the salience of productive capacity to managers, and the high fixed costs
of capacity it is not surprising that capacity adjustment is a major determinant of
profit dynamics, however these same observations often serve as an obstacle to the
implementation of system dynamics research, as managers can be reluctant to accept
that such important decisions could have been mistakes.
Profit cycle models that are sufficiently endogenous to test competing hypotheses
for the cause of the cycles, proposed by defensive managers, have been well accepted
in the past (Randers 2007). Numerous endogenous feedback loops can be difficult to
include in a model though, because data is often not publicly available for the most
important stocks. Academics who want to parametrize their models against historical
data usually must trade off between making models that are less realistic than desired
or accepting data from private sources that will not allow the model structure to be
published.
The airline industry is an excellent setting for research on long term profit cycles
because the government requires airlines to report highly detailed information about
their operations, and makes all of the data available to the public. By avoiding private
sources for data, while still being able to show how my model matches the historical
path for the industry-level stocks, I provide an "open-source" feedback-rich model
that system dynamics and airline industry professionals can use to better understand
the dynamics of earnings in the industry.
Airlines are also advantageous as a research setting because of their importance.
The airline industry provides the transportation that allows people across the nation
to increase their productivity and enjoy their leisure time. Yet despite how important
airlines are, robust strategies for creating consistent profitability within the industry
have been elusive. In fact, profitability cycles have been experienced by the industry
since deregulation, fluctuating with a distance between peaks of around ten years
(Hansman and Jiang 2000). Industry analysts and experts are not blind to this
pattern of behavior. Like their peers in other cyclical industries, they consistently
argue either that specific events were the cause of the cycle turning points or that
new strategies will dampen the cycle in the future. These arguments persist in the
face of a history of strategies, such as leasing, yield-management, and mothballing,
that have failed to stabilize aggregate profits.'
In this paper I build a model of the airline industry that addresses the question
of why airline industry profits cycle. Even though this question has been addressed
previously by the system dynamics literature, most notably by Liehr et al (2001) and
Lyneis (2000), I extend those efforts by including many endogenous feedback loops
left out of earlier models, including price setting, workforce dynamics, and aggregate
demand fluctuations. Including these feedback loops in the model allows me to more
closely match the history of reported profits, and better test policies for controlling
the cycle. The model also includes structures that approximate the effects of yield
management, mothballing, and ancillary fees in an effort to address the effect of
existing strategic decisions on profit cycles.
The results of the model suggest that even though capacity adjustment can cause
profit instability, compensating feedback loops from capacity to demand, costs, and
price work to perpetuate a cycle even if capacity is non-cyclical. In particular I find
evidence to suggest that the historically fierce competition over price may be primarily
to blame for the severity of airline industry profit cycles, as policy levers controlling
the strength of the feedback loops involving price are effective for eliminating profit
variance. Specifically, yield management, or a strong feedback from load factor to
ticket price, is found to increase the average level of profits but also their variance.
Model runs that de-emphasize yield management in favor of feedback loops from
profit onto price show lower average profit but also much lower variance, and do not
alter the path of ticket prices significantly.
Additionally, the model offers an extension of the standard capacity control for-
mulation that ensures no steady state error under a constant growth path, and a
non-conserved co-flow formulation of average worker tenure with simple layoff and
hiring. is my documentation of a macro-enabled model structure for simulating the
data reporting process that can be used in any setting where a model is fit to histor-
ical data points. This structure can be adjusted to arbitrary data reporting lengths,
and avoids matching approximately continuous simulation outputs with more discrete
historical data.2
I proceed from the introduction in ten sections beginning with section 2, which
introduces the data used in the model. Section 3 reviews the core dynamic hypoth-
1Yield, the industry term for dollars per revenue passenger mile, and price, a more general term
for the concept, are used interchangeably in this paper.2Reporting periods that are not divisible by the time step will cause the structure to believe that
data reporting never occurs, however good modeling practice ensures that this will not happen in
practice.
esis for the industry. Section 4 discusses my decisions on where to place the model
boundary. Section 5 gives details on the model structure. Section 6 concerns various
methods of model validation, including partial model tests to help show the ratio-
nality of the decision makers modeled. Section 7 discusses the parameter estimation
process. Section 8 shows the final model fit to historical data. Section 9 evaluates
policy recommendations, and section 10 concludes.
2.2 Airline Industry Data
Data is publicly available for the airline industry over a long time horizon, making
it an ideal industry in which to construct a system dynamics model. The data I use
comes primarily from the Air Transport Association (ATA), the nation's oldest and
largest airline trade association. They gather and store historical records of data from
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) and perform several transformations
on it that lend themselves well to system dynamics modeling. They publish airline
ticket prices as an industry wide average in dollars per seat mile rather than the
index that is published by the BTS, and calculate the average wage of a worker in
the industry from the filings of each individual carrier. Some data is also collected
from MIT's Airline Data Project (ADP) though the ATA is the primary source.3
The model uses time series data on airline available seat miles (capacity), revenue
passenger miles (demand), average ticket price per revenue passenger mile (price),
average wage per worker (salary) and aggregate operating profit (profit) from 1977
until 2010.4 While operating costs are available as a separate data item, the data
for operating profit does not equal the data for operating revenue minus the data for
operating costs. Because of this I make the simplifying assumption that "historical"
operating costs equal that they would have had to have been in order to produce the
historical profit and revenue. When I match my simulated costs to the data, I match
to this time series rather than the time series of operating costs available publicly.5
2.2.1 Exogenous Inputs
There are many exogenous inputs to the model: population, domestic GDP, world
GDP, the consumer price index, the producer price index excluding food and energy,
jet fuel prices, the national average wage, fractional unemployment, airline industry
employee productivity, the fuel efficiency of the airlines, and total ancillary fees col-
lected by airlines. Population comes from the Census Bureau, while yearly GDP data
for both the U.S. and the world is taken from World Bank website and measured in
real, year 2000 dollars per capita.6 The CPI, the PPI, the national average wage and
3ATA - (www.airlines.org); ADP - (http://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/default.html)
4 Average wage includes all salary, benefits and other compensation.
5
"Operating" expenses as reported to the SEC include items such as depreciation, marketing,
merger costs, code sharing expenses, and other costs. For the most part these details were excluded
from the model, or modeled as a part of general variable costs.
6GDP per capita should be expressed in "real" dollars, rather than the nominal dollars used
in the rest of the model because using real GDP better captures the effect of economic expansion
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Figure 2-1: Historical Aggregate Airline Operating Profit
the unemployment time series come from the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Jet fuel prices per gallon, employee productivity, and fuel efficiency
are obtained from the ATA. Ancillary fees come from the ADP.
2.3 Causal Structure
The reference mode for industry profit exhibited in the data is that even though
demand for airline seat miles grows exponentially, profits follow an oscillatory path.
Because profit cycles in many settings are caused by a misperception of the delayed
negative feedback controlling the capacity acquisition decisions of the industry (Mead-
ows 1970) this feedback will lie at the heart of my model. There are several other
balancing feedback loops that complicate this dynamic in the airline industry however,
and these loops will be included as well.
My dynamic hypothesis for the evolution of the profit cycle in the airline in-
dustry can be explained through the interaction of these feedback loops. Suppose
that demand was initially high relative to available capacity, and the industry was
experiencing high load factors as well as high profitability. The industry would col-
lectively add capacity in this situation so as to maximize profit, but all actors in the
on demand. Inflationary effects should have little bearing on airline demand independent of ticket
price, and demand is the only variable affected by GDP.
Ticket Price
Capacity
Control
GDP
Route
Networks +
Forecasted
Demand
Desired +
Capacity
Figure 2-2: Simplified Causal Loop Diagram for the Airline Industry
industry face an average delay of two years before their new aircraft orders become
actual planes. The high load factors continue to drive prices and profits up, making
orders for new planes rise further. In the interim, since capacity is insufficient, air-
line passengers experience congestion and overbooking causing them to perceive air
transportation as less attractive than other alternatives.
Once the new planes that were ordered during this period of high profits arrive
they immediately add to both the revenue and the costs of the industry. Ordering
that occurred during the highly profitable period of the cycle cannot be canceled
even though load factors begin to fall, and as more planes are added to capacity
load factors fall further. Low load factors cause some of these planes to not produce
sufficient revenue to make operating them profitable, and previously high congestion
has caused some consumers to avoid air travel. As these dynamics play out airlines
will compete on price. As capacity grows and prices fall airlines experience a period
of high costs and low revenue that causes profits to suffer. Over time demand will
grow and this capacity will be utilized, but if similar actions are taken during the
next boom the structure of the system will perpetuate the cycle.
Load
2.4 Model Boundary
The model boundary is intentionally broad, though exogenous effects are important
in many of its sectors. Demand is partially exogenous, with the growth path be-
ing driven by population and a combination of both U.S. and world gross domestic
product. I chose to exclude the feedback from air transportation to the growth of
GDP because it is complex, small, and poorly understood. Wages are also influenced
exogenously by the national average wage, the unemployment rate and the Consumer
Price Index. The effect of airline employment dynamics on national unemployment
and the national average wage is likely relatively small, and developing a macroe-
conomic model of employment and wages would be prohibitively complex given my
model's purpose.
I drive the cost sector of the model with several exogenous inputs, including
the producer price index, jet fuel efficiency, and the cost of jet fuel. Of all of the
simplifying assumptions I make, the choice to exclude the feedback between airline
capacity and jet fuel prices is potentially the most likely to raise questions about
validity. While it may seem important to include airline industry jet fuel consumption
in the determination of jet fuel prices, the supply of jet fuel is actually relatively price
inelastic (Kendix & Walls 2010). When crude oil is refined into usable products each
barrel is cracked into a fixed fraction of different grades of petrochemical materials.
Jet fuel is made from a very small part of this material, and so any fluctuations in
refining activity due to changes in the price of crude oil will be the largest influence
on the price of jet fuel (Dahl 1994). Demand for jet fuel is more price elastic, but
demand fluctuations will not feed-back onto the price of fuel substantially.
2.5 Model Structure
In order to compute the profit of the industry my model is organized into four broad
sectors: Capacity, Demand, Prices and Costs. Since demand is measured in revenue
passenger miles per year, and revenue passenger miles multiplied by the price in
dollars per mile gives the revenue for the industry revenue minus costs then computes
profit.
Capacity is set using a stock control formulation that is adapted from the standard
one in the system dynamics literature (Sterman 2000). The stock of airline industry
capacity is compared to the desired capacity of the industry and this indicated change
is adjusted for the supply line of capacity and the forecasted growth of the industry.
The forecasted growth rate is determined using a standard third-order forecasting
structure (Sterman 2000). The stock and flow chain of productive capacity and
capacity being constructed use third order material delays with total delay times of
two years for the construction of planes and thirty years for the average service life of
planes. I include both mothballing of capacity and cancellation of orders for planes
as endogenous variables in the model, and orders for planes are adjusted for planes
returning from storage. I assume that each plane flies a constant number of seat-miles
per year in order to arrive at the total available seat miles of the industry.
Demand per person is a linear function of both domestic and international Gross
Domestic Product, with separate slopes7 . The level of per capita demand indicated
is then multiplicatively influenced by several pressures: prices normalized by the
initial ticket price adjusted by inflation8 , the recent change in airline capacity9 , and
congestion as perceived by the public. Congestion is measured as the ratio of the
current load factor to the "normal" industry load factor. Since deregulation the
load factor where consumers perceive air travel to be congested has increased due to
technological advances. Since I have no basis on which model these effects I model
"normal" load factor as the line that best fits historical load factor." Demand per
person is then multiplied by the population of the United States in order to determine
the total demand for the domestic airline industry.
Prices are modeled with a hill-climbing formulation that is common in system
dynamics modeling (Sterman 2000). Current ticket prices adjust with a delay to the
indicated ticket price, which is a function of the margin, costs and the load factor of
the industry. Margin pressure is formed from current operating margin normalized
by an empirically estimated "target margin." 1' Cost pressures are calculated as the
ratio of the current price per seat mile to the current cost per seat mile adjusted
upward by a constant "target percentage above costs."" Ancillary fees have become
a much larger share of airline revenues (and costs) in the past decade, and so the cost
per seat mile is adjusted downward by the historical ancillary fees per available seat
mile, these fees are already included in the data for total costs, and so the net effect
on ticket prices from this adjustment is zero.13
Similar to the congestion calculation, load factor pressure is the current load factor
normalized by the best fit line for the load factor historically experienced by the
industry. When yield management technology was introduced to the airline industry
in 1985 ticket prices became much more responsive to load factors compared with the
period prior. In order to reflect this, the sensitivity of prices to the demand-supply
balance is increased after 1985 by a step function with an empirically estimated height.
These effects combine multiplicatively to indicate a percentage adjustment to
ticket prices. Their relative strengths are determined by power functions with sepa-
rate, calibrated exponents.
Costs arise from several sources. Fuel prices are exogenous, as is the time series for
the average fuel efficiency of planes. Other variable costs are modeled as a constant
dollar amount per seat mile that grows at the rate indicated by the Producer Price
7Etimated by the model parametrization process.
8Prices are normalized by the initial ticket price scaled by the CPI, to reflect the increasing
affordability of air travel to the general public relative to other goods.
9The effect of capacity changes on demand represents the fact that new routes and more accom-
modating schedules will tend to create their own demand.
'
0 The linear approximation fits well over the period from 1970 to 2010, with an R2 of 87%. The
estimate is highly statistically significant at the < 1% level.
"Pressure from Margin = (1+Target Margin)/(1 + Current Margin)
'
2Pressure from Cost = Cost*(1+Target Markup)/Price
'
3The net effect on the model is not zero however, since the "historical" costs time series is
increased by the indicated fees. (Passenger Revenue + Ancillary Fees - Profit = Total Costs)
Index.14 These normal variable costs are then adjusted by the effect of congestion,
since large load factors add costs from increased services, cancellations, and many
other sources.
The final component of costs in the model comes from wages, which are endoge-
nously set based on several pressures. I employ a formulation similar to the one used
for price, but with five effects determining the indicated wage: inflation, industry
margin, national unemployment, average worker tenure and outside opportunities
proxied for by the national average wage. The formulation is set so that if there were
no net effect from these pressures the average wage for the industry would increase
by the percentage change in the CPI each year.
Industry profitability is perceived with a delay by the unions that influence wage
negotiations. Profit pushes wages up when airlines are profitable and down when they
are not. Economy wide unemployment is normalized by the "normal unemployment
rate" set equal to 5%. The outside opportunities of industry workers are represented
as the average industry wage normalized by the national average wage. Since there is
a skill premium offered for jobs in this industry, average airline wages will be higher
than the national mean. The model adjusts the national average wage up by an
empirically estimated percentage in order to represent this premium.
The effect of worker tenure on wages comes from the fact that, on balance, rookies
will be cheaper to employ than workers with experience. I use exogenous data on
average worker productivity to calculate the number of employees in the industry,
and use an aging chain with a non-conserved co-flow of worker tenure that accounts in
order to arrive at a rough estimate for the average industry experience of an employee
over time.1 5 This variable then influences the average wage by putting pressure on
wages when the average tenure differs from a normalizing constant. The aging chain
and co-flow are shown in the figure 2-3.
In order to interpret the fit of the model to historical data the model includes
the summary statistics created by Sterman (1984) with a few minor modifications.
The mean square error is decomposed into its three Theil statistics, and the square
of the error between the simulated and historical data is normalized by the mean
of the historical data in order to fit the model along multiple dimensions without
over-weighting errors in variables with higher means.
2.5.1 September 11th Effect
The historical path for airline demand shows a sudden drop from 2001 to 2002, and
so the model includes an exogenous shock to demand at the end of 2001. This shock
takes the form of a multiplier to the demand for seat miles per capita that increases
over a period of time and then decays as the public becomes less influenced by the
memory of this tragic event. The two time delays as well as the size of the shock are
empirically estimated.
"The PPI excluding food and energy is used to avoid double-counting of jet fuel in the calculations
151 model very simple layoffs that remove employees at an equal rate from each stock in the aging
chain.
<Indicated <Indicated
Layoffs> Layoffs>
Time to Execute
Layoffs>
0
0
Indicated
Hiring
Indicated
Layoffs
Laya
<Rookie
Layoff r>
2.5.2 Data Reporting Macro
One of the challenges when fitting models to reported data is that reported data is
coarse and discrete, while good system dynamics models output discrete time series
with much smaller time steps in order to avoid integration error. Directly comparing
reported data with the model's computed values can therefore be difficult because
the instantaneous value simulated at any particular time step cannot be viewed as
conceptually the same as the value of the reported variable. As an extreme example
imagine a model that reported demand for widgets as exactly equal to the historical
data on whole numbered years, but zero at all other times. Such a model would fit
the data very well, but would not accurately represent the system.
In this essay I document a Vensim macro that efficiently replicates the data report-
ing process for an arbitrary data reporting period. Using this structure transforms the
variables simulated by the model so that variables that are conceptually equivalent to
the reported data are available for calibration. This structure and the motivation for
using it are not novel in the literature, however no published work to date includes a
portable structure that easily adjusts to reporting periods of different lengths. Figure
2-4 shows this structure.
The reporting process records the variable of interest continuously, filling a stock
that is waiting to be reported. The stock measures what the reported variable would
be if it were to be published during that time step. Once the reporting period has
passed the stock is drained at a rate that will empty it in one time step. The reported
variable is this rate adjusted for the size of the time step. Since most reported variables
are annualized, the reporting structure annualizes the reported variable by dividing
by the length of the actual reporting period. Equations for this structure can be
found in appendix A.16
2.6 Model Validation
2.6.1 Tests of Fit when Driven by Historical Variables
When the feedback loops between major sectors of the model are cut and each por-
tion is driven by the historical data all of the variables except price closely mimic
their behavior in the fully endogenous model calibration. Historically, the yield per
revenue seat mile has remained remarkably low during this decade, and while I have
incorporated the historical effect of transportation related revenue and ancillary fees,
cutting the feedback loops between price and the model makes it impossible to find a
combination of parameters that can reproduce both the pattern of prices from 1977
until 2001 and the pattern afterward. In the fully endogenous model price has an
important effect on many of the other sectors, and so small deviations from it histor-
ical path quickly initiate compensating feedback loops that bring price back to the
path observed. When those feedback loops no longer work, pressure on price from the
16Please contact the authors for a copy of the model, or a copy of the macro that can be easily
implemented in other models
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Figure 2-4: Data Reporting Structure
rising costs and load factors this decade cannot be accomodated without sacrificing a
good fit for the path of prices before the year 2000. This is a potential area for model
improvement, though the payoff for a reformulation of the pricing sector in my model
is small, because it behaves well when all feedback loops are enabled, and the more
standard formulation I use has ancillary, face-validity benefits.
2.6.2 Growth Adjusted Capacity Control
The structure used to represent the capital stock of the airline industry is based on
the standard stock management structure, but has been modified in several ways.
The most significant of these modifications is an adjustment for growth that insures
that capacity acquisition decisions do not exhibit steady state error under a constant
growth path. Having no steady state error is defined as having a level that will be
equal to the desired level when given a consistently patterned goal over a long time
horizon. Zero steady state error during growth is important when modeling decisions
in an economic context. Even though decision makers have bounded rationality, a
constant growth path will not be underestimated over the long run by an actor with
an incentive to estimate it well. In this subsection I provide a mathematically rigorous
argument for the behavior of my modified structure under a growth path. I assume
that the material delays in the stocks are first order as a simplification.
The stock of capacity will equal the desired capacity in the steady state if the
inflow of airplane completion equals the retirement of capacity plus the increase in
capacity needed to accommodate growth. In the steady state the desired growth rate
of the industry is equal to the actual growth rate. Since zero steady state error means
that capacity will be equal to desired capacity, the adjustment for capacity will equal
zero in equilibrium. This makes the desired capacity acquisition rate equal to:
R+C -g (2.1)
Where R is the level of replacement orders that compensate for capacity retire-
ments, C is the level of current capacity and g is the growth rate of demand. By
a similar argument, the adjustment for the supply line will equal zero in the steady
state and orders for capacity will be:
R +C -g + SL -g (2.2)
Where SL is the current level of the supply line of capacity. The model therefore
includes terms that adjust orders in the way indicated by equation 2.2. To see why
this adjustment ensures that steady state error under a constant growth path will be
zero we start by noting that zero steady state error under growth implies that:
lim C(t) = Coe9' (2.3)
Where C, is the initial capacity and t is time. Since a good approximation of C(t)
for small time steps is capacity completion minus capacity retirements plus previous
capacity, C(t - 1), it follows that:
C (t) - C (t - 1) = COe** - Coeg(*-1 = Coe** - (1 - e-9) (2.4)
Assuming that g is small and applying the first term of the Taylor series expansion
to replace e-9 with (1 - g) equation 2.4 becomes:
Coe. -(1 -1+g) =g-C(t) (2.5)
Therefore by the equation for the stock of capacity and by the fact that modeled
retirements are equal to capacity divided by the average life of capacity when the
material delays are first order:
C (t) 1 _1Comp(t)=g-C(t)+ =C(t) g+ = (t) (2.6)
TL TL TM
Where Comp (t) is the capacity completion flow, TL is the average life of capital,
TM is the delay in manufacturing capacity and S(t) is the level of the supply line of
capacity. By rearranging the final two expressions in equation 2.6 we can rewrite the
level of the supply line of capacity as:
S(t) =C(t)-7M g+--) (2.7)( TL
Again assuming a small time step and approximating S(t) as orders for capacity
minus capacity completion plus S(t -1), we can incorporate the equivalent expression
for Comp (t) from equation 2.6 to yield:
Order (t) = C (t)- TM g +-) +C(t). g+ - ) -S(t-1) (2.8)
71L TL
= C (t)- g + (TM +1)-S (t -1) (2.9)
TL
=g-C(t)+ -. C(t)+C(t).TM g+ -S(t-1) (2.10)
TL TL
Combining the results of equations 2.8-2.10 with equation 2.7, equation 2.5 and
the definition of a first order material delay gives:
Order (t) = g -C (t) + g -S (t) + R (t) (2.11)
Where R(t) is the current rate of capacity retirement, and is equivalent to R in
equation 2.2. Equation 2.11 shows that if the stock of capacity and the capacity
supply line are each first order material delays, then their controlling feedback loops
will avoid steady state error under growth if the normal order rate for new capacity is
added with the growth rate times the sum of both capacity and capacity on order.1 7
2.7 Parameter Estimation
2.7.1 Approach to Fitting
The parameter space for a large scale model being fit over multiple dimensions is
so large that modern desktop computers and automated model fitting algorithms
can have difficulty finding global optimums. In order to simplify the task of fitting
the entire model to the data I proceeded sequentially, isolating each portion of the
model and finding the best parameter set when that portion was driven exogenously
by the historical data. I then added the model sections together sequentially, using
the first set of parameters as an anchor for each subsequent parameter search. By
identifying which sections of the model were highly interrelated and grouping them
together during this procedure I was able to do a much more extensive search through
the parameter space than I would have been able to accomplish by only performing
one calibration with the fully endogenous model. The final parameters estimated
are reported in the table 2.1. The 95% confidence intervals reported in the table
were evaluated using the non-parametric bootstrapping procedure outlined by Dogan
(2007), with a total sample size of 1000 observations.
2.7.2 Numerical Issues and Fixes
I estimate the model parameters by seeking to minimize the sum of the square error
between the historical data and the model's simulated output. When more than one
historical variable is being used to evaluate fit, the error is scaled by the variance
17R(t), or retirements of capacity are a component of the order rate in the standard stock man-
agement structure.
Parameter Name Lower Bound Estimated Value Upper Bound
View: Denand
Miles per Person per Dollar of GDP (aae".)/e.s) 0.082 0.093 0.101
World Miles per Person per Dollar of GDP ("mes)/r-) 0.047 0.05 0.059
Sensitivity of Demand to Congestion (dmni) -0.94 -0.726 -0.53
Congestion Perception Time (Years) 0.43 0.75 1.12
Strength of New Capacity Effect on Demand (dmni) 0 0.25 0.69
Strength of Affordability Effect on Demand (dmrd) 0 0.106 0.257
Constant Demand Adjustment ( -1152 -1087.7 -940
Length of 9/11 Effect (Years) 0.479 0.5 0.969
Size of 9/11 Effect (dmni) 0.113 0.185 0.32
Public Perception of Terrorism Decay Time (Years) 2.38 4.25 7.13
View: Capacity
Time to Adjust Capacity (Years) 0.226 0.594 0.75
Supply Line Adjustment Time (Years) 0.05 0.1 0.62
Time to Perceive Changes in Demand (Years) 0.05 0.125 0.381
Time to Perceive Trend in Demand (Years) 0.2 0.3 0.5
Wages
Time to Change Worker Compensation (Years) 0.43 1 1.53
Strength of Margin on Worker Compensation (dmnd) 0.25 0.425 0.71
Normal Margin (dmrd) 0.039 0.068 0.09
Margin Perception Delay (Years) 0.5 1 1.8
Normal Unemployment (dmnl) 0.02 0.048 0.06
Normal Worker Tenure (Years) 11.79 14 14.69
Strength of Outside Opportunities on Compensation (dmvd) 0.65 0.75 0.9
Strength of Tenure Effect on Wages (dmrn) 0.3 0.425 0.6
Strength of Unemployment Effect on Wages (dmnt) 8.1 10 22.3
Wage Premium for Skill (dmni) 1.172 1.2 1.56
Price
Original Sensitivity of Price to Demand Supply Balance (dmni) 0 0.25 0.92
Effect of Yield Management on Sensitivity (danl) 1.75 2.25 2.89
Sensitivity of Price to Costs (dinn) 0.1 0.3 0.438
Sensitivity of Price to Margin (dinan) 0.139 0.4 0.82
Thrget Margin (dmal) 0.042 0.05 0.1
Trget Percentage Above Cost (dmna) 0.54 0.54 0.586
Time to Adjust Ticket Prices (Years) 0.04 0.05 0.26
View: Costs
1977 Other Variable Costs~dclat)/(sawen..m)) 0.02449 0.0245 0.02495
Table 2.1: A list of the constants estimated by the model fitting procedure is shown in this
table, with units indicated in parentheses to the right of the variable names and bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals recorded as lower and upper bounds. DmnI stands for dimensionless,
and includes fractions, ratios and percentages along with constants used as the exponents of
power functions. The nonparametric bootstrap with the percentile method put forward by
Dogan (2007) was used for the calculation with a total sample size of 1000 observations.
of each historical variable. This structure closely matches the methodology of least
squares estimation while avoiding one potential pitfall. By scaling with a constant
that is likely to be proportional to the variance of the estimation error, I avoid over-
weighting errors in variables with higher means when optimizing over more than one
dimension.
If the error were measured at each time step, the estimation procedure would be
weakened because only a small percentage of the time steps simulated correspond
to actual data points in the historical series. Therefore, the "pick" function in the
summary statistics module is utilized to ensure that the error is measured only when
appropriate. 18
The well-known "endpoint" problem in model calibration arises when reported
data for a particular year does not match correctly with the time step it is compared
against. For instance, reported airline demand for 1977 is the sum of the demand
each day during 1977 and is not reported until 1978. Since the model simulates
this summation process and also outputs the result at the beginning of 1978 I have
modified each of the table functions representing the historical time series so that
their data for a given year will be displayed during first time step of the following
year. Specifically, when the model computes variables such as the average ticket price
over the year 1995 and reports that value at the beginning of 1996, 1 match this to
the historical 1995 average ticket price by calling a table function that contains the
historical data with the input (Time - 1) rather than simply (Time).19
2.8 Evaluation of Fit
2.8.1 Summary Table
The overall fit of the model has relatively high R^2, low error as a percentage of
the mean, and Theil U statistics that indicate that the error tends not to come from
differences in the means of the variables. For all of the variables other than cost the
Theil statistics also indicate that the error is due mostly to random variations in the
historical time series. The formulation for cost in the model is very simplistic, with
jet fuel costs and wage costs being driven entirely by other sectors in the model. The
only other variable controlling the fit of costs is modeled as a constant multiplier of
the producer price index. When this is considered alongside the relatively small size
of the total error for costs this limitation of my model fit should not detract markably
from the overall results.
In the following subsections I discuss the goodness of fit of each of the model's
variables, grouping them into pairs that are closely interrelated. While the summary
table in the above figure is meant to be a quantitative treatment of the fit of the
model I intend the rest of this discussion to be more qualitative, discussing fit within
the context of the history of the industry and the reasonableness of the estimated
18terman 2000, Business Dynamics, contains the summary statistics module I mention in its
electronic supplement.
"Use Table(time - 0.25) for quarterly reporting.
Variable R2 MAE RMSE Um Us Uc
Capacity 97.88% 3.79% 4.48% 0.90% 2.25% 96.84%
Demand 99.52% 2.16% 2.77% 3.60% 12.36% 84.04%
Wages 40.05% 3.88% 5.00% 2.46% 11.07% 86.46%
Cost 99.57% 3.26% 4.18% 3.18% 45.42% 51.40%
Prices 79.47% 4.82% 6.09% 2.46% 9.84% 83.33%
Profit 57.71% 170.7% 240.3% 7.66% 12.37% 79.97%
Table 2.2: The statistics in this table show the goodness of fit of the simulation to the historical
data during the period from 1977 through 2010. R2 is the coefficient of determination, defined
as one minus the ratio of the sum of the squared error to the total sum of the squares. R2 is
not a good indicator of fit for growing data series. MAE is the mean absolute error divided
by the mean of the data. RMSE is the root mean square error divided by the mean of the
data. These statistics are a better measure of fit for growing data series. Um, Us, and Uc
are the Theil statistics, and correspond to an estimate of the portion of the estimation error
that comes from a difference in means, a difference in variance and a difference in covariance
(random fluctuations), respectively.
parameters.
2.8.2 Demand and Capacity
There are feedbacks to demand from both capacity and prices, and so I've chosen
to discuss capacity and demand together, leaving prices for treatment later because
price is the most centralized variable in the model. Overall the parameters estimated
for demand and capacity are reasonable. The fact that the supply line adjustment
time is smaller than the capacity adjustment time conforms with the finding from
Forrester and Senge (1980) that supply line adjustment tends to be more reactive
than stock adjustment.
The parameters surrounding the forecast of demand are all within the ranges that
would be expected. The parameters estimated for demand also have high face-validity.
The number of miles per capita demanded for each dollar of world GDP is lower than
the miles demanded per dollar of domestic GDP, because even though international
flights are physically longer many fewer flights are demanded per-capita. New capacity
increases demand by a small amount, and demand is sensitive to congestion when
congestion is persistent.
The model structure that was added to represent the exogenous effect of the
September 11*^ attacks on airline demand generated parameters during model cali-
bration, that are similar to those estimated in the economic literature surrounding
the effect those attacks had on the demand for air travel. For instance, Ito and Lee
(2005) estimate that the attacks resulted in a drop in air traffic demand of as much as
30% at their peak, and that the majority of the reduction had not dissipated by the
end of 2003. While my structure does not hit those estimates exactly it does conform
with the qualitative nature of their results, as I find a 20% instantaneous reduction
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Figure 2-5: Historical and Simulated Demand
that dissipated over many yearsO.
The overall fit of capacity shows a similar pattern to that of demand, with a
significant divergence from the historical path in 1983, and another after the 1992
gulf war. This should be expected given the model structure, because the largest
determinant of the industry's capacity is the level of demand forecasted. After 9/11
however the model does not anticipate the degree to which the industry is reluctant
to increase capacity in the face of growing costs. This may be because the model
structure does not incorporate some new dynamic emerging in the industry, suggesting
the potential for improvement of the causal structure of the model by future model
consumers. Another explanation for this mismatch may lie in the linear relationship
between GDP and indicated demand modeled, since over time the portion of the
gross domestic product that generates demand for air travel has changed with the
advent of high speed communications. Extensions of my work should look to improve
on our understanding of demand and capacity in the airline industry, potentially by
specifying the dependence of airline demand on each component of GDP rather than
using the simple structure I employ.
2There are many reasons for why my model estimates the shock differently. For instance, the
endogenous feedback between capacity and demand is excluded from econometric models of airline
demand. Since airline capacity was cut after September 11 some of the reduction in demand in my
model is causally related to that change, and so my estimate of the 9/11 demand shock is smaler.
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Figure 2-6: Historical and Simulated Capacity
2.8.3 Wages and Costs
While airline capacity is an important determinant of overall costs in the industry, the
variability in that relationship is largely controlled by the effect of jet fuel prices and
the endogenous wage setting structure. The fit for simulated wages, shown in figure
nine as CPI deflated real wages, is very close to the historical average real wage in the
industry, although the model again has difficulty fitting the most recent data. The
low inflation during this period may have stressed the model's assumption that wages
in the industry will increase at the rate of inflation in equilibrium, causing the fitting
algorithm to compensate by overestimating the upward pressure on wages from other
sources. Overall however the 40% R2 for the fit on real wages, when considering the
fact that the model uses the nominal value of wages in its calculations, stands.
The parameters estimated indicate that margin is a surprisingly small determi-
nant of airline industry wages. Unemployment in the overall economy and outside
opportunities have a much larger effect on average wages in the simulated industry.
While the size of the parameter for controlling the strength of the tenure effect on
wages is small, the fact that the average worker tenure has the largest range of any
of the time series that influencing average wages means that the effect of a workforce
tenure is still very important.
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2.8.4 Prices and Profit
Price is by far the most. centrally connected of the stocks I model. It has a direct
effect on demand, it affects each of the other sectors through its effect on profit, and
many of the other sectors of the model feed-back to directly affect it. This observation
informs the results of the model for fitting ticket price because the structure of the
model forces price to fit well in order for the other sectors of the model to fit well. The
model parameters lend anecdotal support to this formulation because they indicate
that after the introduction of yield management, load factors were the single most
important. determination of ticket price. This corresponds well with intuiton obtained
from talking with sources in the industry.
The fit of the model to historical operating profit is, perhaps, the most critical of
the model's results. Even though the determinants of revenue and costs had some
systematic errors in their fit to the data, the difference of these two large numbers
produced a simulated path for profits that exhibits the majority of its error from
random covatiarion between the historical data and my simulation.
2.9 Policy Recommendations
2.9.1 Description of the Cycle in Profits for Airlines
Most system dynamics models of business cycles suggest policies that control capacity,
since this balancing loop is the underlying cause of the cycle. One of the advantages
of this model's broad boundary however, is its ability to test policies unrelated to
capacity control. One insight that arose from my parametrization of the model was
the centrality of ticket price within the overall model. An examination of the time
path of the pressures on profits reveals an interesting pattern of covariance between
the three sources of pressure on ticket prices.
Figure 2-11 plots the pressure on price from costs, the pressure on price from
margin, and the pressure on price from the demand supply balance before any of
those pressures are adjusted by their respective sensitivities. It is clear from inspection
that the pressure on prices from costs and margins have a high correlation, while the
pressure on price from load factors varies inversely with the other two. An operational
description of this phenomenon follows directly from the mechanics of the airline profit
cycle. When profits are low airlines are experiencing insufficient load factors that put
downward pressure on prices in order to increase demand, however low profits and
high costs send a signal to raise prices. Yield management means that the signal from
load factors will feature heavily in pricing decisions, exacerbating the downturn.
That description is not novel, but the interpretation of the dynamic within my
model leads to one observation that is interesting: from an industry standpoint de-
mand is fairly price inelastic, and so the decision to compete heavily on price during
downturns leads to lower profits for everyone. Essentially, the pressure on prices from
load factors is pro-cyclical, while the pressure on prices from costs and margins is
counter-cyclical. If yield management is removed from the simulated industry by set-
ting the sensitivity of price to the demand supply balance to zero the cycle in profits
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Figure 2-11: Size of Unadjusted Pressures on Ticket Prices
still exists, but its amplitude is smaller and its average value is both much higher and
mostly positive.
2.9.2 Pricing Rules Absent Yield-Management
In order to simplify the interpretation of how the pressures on price combine to
exacerbate the airline profit cycle I first test the implications of varying the sensitivity
of price to costs and the sensitivity of price to margin while the sensitivity of price
to the demand supply balance is set to zero.
Figure 2-13 shows the average profit over the model run from 1977 to 2010 plotted
over the parameter space defined by the price sensitivity to costs and the price sensi-
tivity to margins each varied between zero and two. The results, unsurprisingly, show
that pricing to maintain high margins will result in high margins. It is interesting to
note however that considering costs along with margins during price setting is gen-
erally detrimental to overall profits, but the effects do not become pronounced until
the sensitivity of price to costs is roughly twice the sensitivity of price to margin.
Figure 2-14 shows the same parameter space, rotated slightly to better show the
surface graphed, with the variance of profits is plotted in the place of the average of
profits. This analysis shows the effect on the volatility of profits of pricing decision
rules. The sensitivity of price to cost is strongly positively related to the variance of
profits, suggesting that pricing rules that emphasize reactions to profit rather than
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Figure 2-14: Variance of Profit Under Changes to Pricing Rules with no Yield Management
markups reduce the severity of the cycle in profit.2' Because the global minimum for
variance in profit occurs at the same location as the global maximum for the average
profit, the corner where margin sensitivity is at its maximum and cost sensitivity is
zero, these two tests make a strong, preliminary case for a pricing rule that focuses
heavily on maintaining profit over other considerations.
2.9.3 Pricing Rules Under the Presence of Yield Manage-
ment
When the same parameter space of pricing rules is evaluated when including yield
management by setting the sensitivity of price to the demand supply balance to 1.
The results for the average value of profit at the end of the model run in figure 2-15
show an important result for our understanding of the genesis of, and adherence to
yield management in the airline industry.
In figure 2-15, the large spike in average profits occurs at the point where both
the sensitivity of price to margin and the sensitivity of price to costs are at their
minimum. If the average level of profit is the only metric of interest, then decision
makers in the airline industry are well advised to focus singularly on maximizing the
load factors their companies experience.
21In fact, if this data were analyzed as a vector field the divergence of the variance with respect
to the sensitivity of price to costs would be positive at every point except the point where both
sensitivities are zero.
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Figure 2-17: Variance Scaled Profit Under Changes to Pricing Rules
When we consider the variance of profits as well as their average level however,
the picture becomes less clearly positive. Figure 2-16 shows that while the pricing
strategy of maximizing profits through high capacity utilization does produce very
high profits, it also greatly exacerbates the volatility of those profits. While none
of the parameter combinations tested here completely eliminate the cycle in airline
industry profits, the set of parameters identified by my model parametrization as the
most likely standard in the airline industry, a high sensitivity to load factors and a
low sensitivity to other pressures, is also the set of parameters that will maximize the
variance of profits.
Of course, data with a higher mean will naturally have a higher variance. In order
to test whether the high variability of the simulated profits are simply related to the
high mean of those profits or whether pricing policies are increasing the amplitude
of the cycle more than would be expected by the increase in its average, figure 2-17
plots the ratio of the average profits at the end of the model run to the standard
deviation of those profits. The results are striking on two levels. First, the policy
suggested by the analysis with yield management turned off reasserts itself as the
best trade-off between the size of profits and the amplitude of the cycle. Second,
the current, suboptimal decision rule of maximizing average profits by focusing on
maintaining load factors is revealed to be a local maximum of the trade-off between
profit and variance in figure 2-18.
The first result lends support to a policy not previously proposed by the system
dynamics literature: regardless of the industry's approach to capacity adjustment, a
4-0
0-
0
CC
0.5
Figure 2-18: Detail of the Current Local Maximum
pricing policy that accepts some slack capacity, competes very little on markup, and
focuses heavily on using ticket prices to ensure that margins are kept at reasonable
levels can produce a much smoother path for profits than currently is experienced.
The second result is interesting from a different perspective. The fact that adjust-
ing price primarily through load factor is a locally optimal solution to the problems
presented by the airline profit cycle suggests that, at least in the airline industry, de-
cision makers who focused on load factors were boundedly rational in improving the
financial performance of their industry. Yet the model suggests, and professionals in
the industry might agree, that a myopic focus on momentarily high profit is damaging
the industry's ability to stay solvent in the long run, because the policies adopted as
the best practices of the industry are unsustainable if they cause profitability crashes.
Within the context of the broader system dynamics literature this result tells a
compelling, behavioral story about the evolution of policy resistance and better be-
fore worse archetypes from the perspective of an industry focused on profitability. If
financial markets are focused on the level of profits with very little attention paid to
second order effects then managers in the airline industry are acting rationally. If, on
the other hand, publicly traded firms believe that the market values smooth earnings,
as suggested by many academics (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), then air transporta-
tion companies may need a deep understanding of their industry dynamics in order
to maximize equity valuations. De-emphasizing yield management will greatly reduce
the level of profits in the short term, but will have many benefits for the industry in
the long run.
2.10 Conclusion
While my model supports the well accepted view that a misperception of the delay in
adjusting capacity is central to the genesis of profit cycles exhibited by the airline in-
dustry, it also presents a case for how feedback rich models enhance our understanding
of systems by testing a policy for price setting that greatly reduces the variance of the
cycle. The simulations show that pricing policies that focus primarily on achieving
high load factors increase profit levels at the expense of profit stability. Simulation
tests also provide evidence that yield management is a locally optimal solution to the
trade off between profit levels and volatility, even if it is far from the global optimum,
and therefore may be difficult to transition away from unless industry professionals
can adapt their mental models.
Without the plethora of publicly available data on the airline industry the model
documented here would likely not be available for scrutiny and enhancement, which
highlights the importance for system dynamics academics of finding settings where
similar amounts of data can be obtained. This data also enable the model to have
greater face validity with professionals by including many endogenous feedbacks; po-
tentially enabling future work on novel strategies for lessening the severity of profit
cycles from inside the industry.
By documenting a model for the airline industry that matches the simulated data
with the what has been observed historically this work offers a small step towards a
collabrative understanding of the industry, and highlights important aspects of the
process of model calibration. The capacity adjustment for growth formulation, shown
to eliminate steady state error under growth paths, has potential applicabilty to many
modeling settings. This modification provides additional realism to the standard
capacity adjustment structure by ensuring that the simulated decision makers act
reasonably when faced with persistent growth.
Looking to the future, the commodity nature of air travel and the rising costs of
jet fuel mean that air transportation companies will face pressure from sources other
than just the cyclical forcing of aggregate profits. This inquiry into why airline profits
cycle is offered in the hope that its insights will be useful as we attempt to stabilize
airline industry profits so that airlines can continue providing a vital service to the
global economy.
Chapter 3
Cycles in Casualty: An
Examination of Profit Cycles in
the Insurance Industry
3.1 Introduction
The property-casualty insurance industry has exhibited cycles in profitability for
decades, as shown in figure 3-1. During the 1980's when a cyclical dip in the prof-
itability of insurers threatened their long-term viability, the causes of the insurance
cycle were hotly debated among academics and industry professionals. Commonly
accepted wisdom within the industry holds that the drops in profitability are caused
by unforeseeable major disasters or other exogenous shocks. According to view the-
ory profitability slowly improves after these events pass, because insurers gradually
rebuild capital stocks and readjust to the new risk landscape over time.
Academics also have a host of competing theories on the origin of cycles. Regres-
sion analysis by Doherty and Kang (1988) has shown significant correlation between
macroeconomic variables and insurer profitability, while in contrast numerous econo-
metric models of the price setting and revenue generating process in the industry
have suggested that autocorrelation in profits might arise endogenously, as shown by
Venezian (1985). Nevertheless, the origin of the cycle, and the extent to which it is
endogenous to the industry's structure and decision practices, remains unclear.
In this chapter I build a medium-scale, feedback-rich model of the property casu-
alty insurance industry to explore the relative contribution of macroeconomic vari-
ables, exogenous disasters and endogenous feedback to profit cycles. The model
incorporates decision making processes for premium setting, loss expectation forma-
tion and risk standard setting that are approximate to those used in the industry.
When these processes are combined to create a simplified but realistic picture of how
the industry operates, the results suggest that profit cycles in the insurance industry
can be explained endogenously. The macro-economy and the incidence of accidents,
while important for determining profitability, are likely not primary causes of the
cycle. In tests where the model is shocked out of dynamic equilibrium the fact that
these exogenous influences are held constant does not eliminate the cycle.
This modeling work offers a novel dynamic hypothesis within the system dynamics
literature on cyclicality. Currently the literature points to negative feedback loops
around capacity adjustment as the primary cause of profit cycles. In my model I
assume that the insurance industry can adjust its productive capacity instantaneously
and at no cost. 1 While this structure makes the model less realistic, cutting this
feedback loop allows my model analysis to focus on the central hypothesis, that
cycles in profitability for the insurance industry are caused by the delay in adjusting
the riskiness of and revenue from the book of underwriting business.
Many of the decisions made in an insurance company can be modeled as negative
feedback processes that use profitability or capital adequacy as signals to adjust pol-
icy levers. Because the effects of these decisions accumulate in a stock of currently
underwritten policies, the levers managers are able to use to control profit act only
with a delay. My conclusion that profit cycles in the insurance industry arise regard-
less of the capacity adjustment process is therefore similar to existing work; but, by
laying out a new mechanism for profit cycle causation this research suggests a host of
applications for similar cyclical models in industries where system dynamics modeling
has not previously been applied because capacity adjustment was not likely to be a
factor in the cyclical forcing of profits.
For parametrization I collate an aggregate data set of financial variables for the
property-casualty insurance industry from Compustat, and use it to calibrate the
model to the observed historical behavior.2 The behavior of the model is also analyzed
under the effect of separately calibrated, stochastic patterns for the exogenous inputs.
Using these inputs I analyze the correlation between the model variables and a broader
range of historical variables available for the entire insurance industry. This process
is augmented by an implementation of an ARIMA model driven by a simple Markov
process for the standard pink-noise generator.3
Finally, my analysis suggests an interesting strategy for mitigating the severity of
the profit cycle in the insurance industry. In simulation tests the stock of investment
capital for the industry is shown to do remarkably little to limit the severity of the
cycle when only the target for its level is changed. Actions that ensure high adequacy
of capital are only effective when capital is used as the most salient input to decisions
effecting the scope of the insurance industry. This result suggests that regulation to
ensure higher capital adequacy will only be effective at ensuring high profits in the
insurance industry if industry actors are fully committed to using the capital as the
most important determinant of their financial health, rather than focusing on recent
net income.
'In fact, the productive capacity of the industry is excluded from the model structure as costs
from these sources are treated as a constant function of the amount of work that needs to be done.
2Specifically, this means premiums collected, claims incurred and operating profit, as these vari-
ables are both salient and available in the Compustat data for the segment of the industry I am
interested in.
3I use normal probability plot analysis of the historical data for investment returns to calibrate
the structure, following Webster et al. (2007) in their analysis of refinery emissions in Houston. The
pink noise formulation is covered by Sterman (2000).
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Figure 3-1: Historical Aggregate Net Income of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry.
3.2 Literature Review
Researchers examined the nature and causes of the insurance cycle extensively during
the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's. By the end of that period a substantial
body of literature had separated into three groups (Gron 1994).
The first body of research hypothesized that the cycle was caused by interest rate
fluctuations and exogenous shocks (Doherty and Kang 1988). Later research within
this school of thought added additional macroeconomic variables to the regressions
for estimating insurer profitability (Grace and Hotchkiss 1995). Even though these
tests improved in explanatory power as they developed, they still could not explain
the majority of the variation in combined ratios or operating profit, and did not
hypothesize causal directions for the statistical relationships they documented.
A second stream of research focused on excessive regulation as the most likely
cause of insurance profit cycles. These capacity-constrained models held that ra-
tional expectations and competitive markets would overcome the cycle if regulators
would stop limiting the supply of insurance by mandating the level of reserves (Win-
ter 1991). These models tended to be very simple in structure, and were criticized for
neglecting two important interactions. The first critique was that insurer bankruptcy
is also a large supply shock, and deregulation would likely increase the risk of insol-
vency. The second was that the limited supply of insurance available was not the only
problem during the 1980's liability insurance crisis, and the increasing rate of claims
by policyholders was not well explained by variation in the regulatory environment.
The final body of research on the insurance cycle supported a hypothesis that
a lagged negative feedback loop within the insurance industry was the cause of the
cycle. Since past information must be used for determining present prices, and since
these prices are only revealed to be profitable or unprofitable once losses are realized,
a simple discrete time model of the premimn-setting process in the insurance indus-
try will produce a cyclical output (Venezian 1985). Later work made the connection
between this price-setting process and the total surplus capital of the insurance com-
pany (Berger 1988). When this link is included in a model, it completes an additional
negative feedback loop, since profits increase the capital surplus, which increases com-
petition in the industry, driving prices down and eventually lowering profits.
While this research approach was promising, it suffered from several limitations
that kept it from dominating the debate on the causes of the insurance profit cycle
(Doherty and Garven 1995). The first limitation was that all of the models published
were made analytically tractable by grouping the negative feedback processes they
modeled into a very small number of effects. This meant that researchers could not
differentiate between the various hypotheses for the cause of cycles in the insurance
industry, because each model had to largely exclude the insights from the others. The
second limitation was that, because these models excluded the effects of exogenous
variables on the profitability of insurers, they could not respond to the research that
suggested that cyclical profits were the result of fluctuations in interest rates or other
exogenous variables.
From the standpoint of these research efforts this essay lies within, and extends,
the third body of work by seeking to explain the insurance cycle through the modeling
of endogenous feedback processes. My approach addresses the limitations mentioned
above by numerically simulating, rather than analytically solving, the differential
equations within the model. This approach allows me to build a model with a richer
structure and appropriate exogenous forcing. Competing hypotheses about which
macroeconomic fluctuations or specific feedback loops are the most important for
causing the profit cycle in the insurance industry can therefore be evaluated here.
Research on the insurance industry has also been a feature of the system dynam-
ics literature, but these papers have largely dealt with managing the quality of the
claim adjustment process. Starting with the learning laboratory built for Hanover
Insurance,4 researchers noticed that the low salience of soft variables associated with
insurance claim adjusting made the quality of settlements less important to managers
than the total productivity of their workforce. This incentivized managers to increase
the workload on adjusters, which led to an erosion of the quality of settlements, 5 and
raised the total costs of insurance companies (Morecroft 1988; Senge and Sterman
1992). Later studies have taken this theory of service delivery dynamics and applied
it to many different settings, including health care (Homer and Hirsch 2006), Toyota's
Total Quality Management (Repenning and Sterman 2001) and the service industry in
general (Oliva and Sterman 2001). The implementation of system dynamics to solve
"See Stermian and Moissis (1989)
5Quality here is taken to be a measure of the size of the payment relative to some unknown
payment size that the customer would accept at minimum, higher quality means lower cash outlays
for claims.
the problems at Hanover Insurance was an early instance that showed the power of
the technique and was cited as a good example of how system dynamics can be used
to change the mental models and behavior of managers (Cavaleri and Sterman 1997).
The dynamics of service quality erosion have been applied in many different con-
texts within the insurance industry (Doman et al. 1995). But surprisingly, the system
dynamics literature has not expanded its focus on insurance to explore the question
of how the profit cycle in the insurance industry arises. This essay is not without
precedent, since the topic of profit cycles has been extant in system dynamics research
for decades.
Cyclical profit dynamics in the commodity markets (Meadows 1970), paper makers
(Berends and Romme 2001), airlines (Liehr et al. 2001), and the economy as a whole
(Forrester 1991; Sterman 1986) have all been addressed with dynamic modeling, but
the vast majority of earlier attempts focused on industries with long lags in capacity
adjustment. Because capacity decisions are made using current profit signals, and
the appropriateness of their decisions will not be known until capacity is built, the
capacity adjustment delay has been widely cited as a cause of profit cycles. While
delays still play a role in the insurance profit cycle, the capacity adjustment delay
does not, and so the setting of this essay places it apart from existing research.
3.3 Data Sources
I compile aggregate financial statement data for all firms in the Compustat Fun-
damental Annual Data Files that have SIC code 6331.6 Many of these firms are
diversified into businesses unrelated to property casualty insurance, and so I only
use data classified as "non-life" when calibrating the model. For instance, instead of
calibrating the model using total premiums collected by all firms in the industry, I
use the separate data item for total non-life premiums collected. Because this more
disaggregated data is only available after 1982 only the data from 1982 through 2009
is used during model calibration. Investment results, total capital and several other
variables are not recorded in this way, and so I use them only when appropriate for
estimation of model parameters and tests of the correlation of the model over a long
time horizon. Specifics on the time series I use can be seen in table 3.1. Two other
data series that I use are quarterly nominal GDP for the United States, and average
Baa-rated bond yields. These series come from the United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
3.4 Causal Structure
Figure 3-2 shows two important balancing feedback loops in my model of the insurance
industry. When the stock of capital on hand is large relative to some target, insurers
will seek to expand the scope of their offerings by branching out into types of policies
6 Standard Industry Classification 6331. Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurance.
Data Description Usage Notes
Operating Income "Non-life" Income All Insurance companies report
investment income as "operating"
Premiums Collected "Non-life" Total Premiums All
Claims Incurred "Non-life" Claims All
Nominal GDP FRom the BEA All All financial data used is nominal.
Claims Expense "Non-life" Claims Expense Corr See section 3.5.4 for the relationship
between claims incurred and claim expense.
Dividends All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Assets -Total All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Invested Capital All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Investment Income All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Total Expenses All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Total Liabilities All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Shareholder's Equity All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Commissions All firms in SIC 6331 Corr Only reported at a firm level.
Table 3.1: This table is a short description of the data used during model formulation, cali-
bration and testing. Premiums, claims and income were available at the level of the "non-life"
insurance industry, while most of the data were only available for the aggregate four-digit SIC
code. Because of this, most of the data was used only for testing of correlations as shown
in table 3.6 and section 3.8. For all of these tests I am assuming that the property-casualty
industry represents a constant fraction of the total insurance industry. This is obviously not
the case, and to the extent this assumption is incorrect the correlations reported will be biased
towards zero.
that they are less familiar with. A study by Ericson and Doyle (2004) describes this
effect well, and from many angles. For instance, they write:
"One option for insurers faced with uncertainty is to simply refuse to
participate in underwriting a particular risk.... Refusal to participate in
particular risks also occurs in the process of excluding certain popula-
tions from a given insurance pool because they threaten the integrity and
profitability of that pool. (2004:17)"
During lean times insurers will look to scale back the types of policies they write by
focusing only on the populations where they feel that they have sufficient data to
price the risk correctly 7. In aggregate, this causes the overall value of the property
insured to fall. When insurers are well capitalized the opposite happens, as each
individual company puts some of its money to use writing policies for clients that it
would otherwise avoid because of the high uncertainty of the underlying risk8 . This
adjustment of insurance scope results in an increase in the total underwriting of the
industry as well as an increase in the riskiness of the policies written9 , forming the
two closely related "Size" and "Risk" balancing loops, respectively.
Both of the loops in figure 3-2 can also be thought of as arising in part from changes
in the price of insurance not captured by total premiums. Smith (1981) and many
other scholars in this area discuss the problem that arises out of using premiums
7 One of the features of the 1980's insurance crisis was the inability of consumers to find insurance.
See Cagle and Harrington (1995) for a capacity-constrained model of that dynamic, Cummins and
Lewis (2003) for a discussion of the effect in the case of terrorism insurance, and Winter (1991) for
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Figure 3-2: A causal loop diagram of two delayed balancing loops that describe how increases
in the adequacy of capital for the insurance industry lead to expansions in the size of the
industry as well as the level of risk taken. These two feedback loops result in capital being less
adequate than it otherwise would have been.
as a measure of price, given that the industry employs numerous other incentives
when marketing policies. For instance, if deductible increases are implemented as a
response to rising cost expectations, the net effect will be a reduction of both the
size of claims incurred and the total underwriting exposure compared to what they
would be otherwise. Claims will be reduced on new policies because a larger fraction
of the loss is covered by the deductible, while exposure will be reduced because the
marginal customer will be less likely to insure their assets.
Figure 3-3 shows another set of balancing loops that result from the expansion
of the scope of the industry in my model. Each of these loops is caused by the
increase in various components of cost 0 . As costs increase, operating profits fall;
ceteris paribus, total capital therefore decreases, and capital adequacy becomes lower
than it otherwise would have been". This acts to balance the initial expansion of the
industry through the balancing "Costs" feedback loop.
Figure 3-4 brings premiums into the causal structure and completes several new
feedback loops. First, excess capital can cause insurers to compete for market share
in areas where they already have a presence.12 This competition reduces premium
income, which acts through operating income to make the stock of capital lower than
it otherwise would have been, and thus balances the initial increase in capital through
the "Price War" balancing feedback loop.
The increases in cost from the scope of the industry also influence premiums.
Insurers update information about their claims and expenses, forecast them, and use
that information to ensure that they are pricing policies correctly to guarantee future
profitability.13 This "Profit" reinforcing loop acts through the same causal path as the
"Price War" loop but in the opposite direction, and reinforces the signal to expand
the scope of the industry by keeping prices high enough to justify the added risks.
The "Price war" and "Profit" loops are difficult to see clearly in figure 3-4, and so
are shown separately in a simplified causal loop diagram in figure 3-5.
Figure 3-6 completes the causal loop diagram of my model by incorporating a
set of financial feedback loops stemming from net income and dividends. Income
increases total capital," and with a short delay capital is invested and contributes to
net income through investment, completing the "Interest" reinforcing loop. The effect
of the "Return on Shares" balancing loop created by dividend payments is mitigated
somewhat by a counteracting "Return on Equity" reinforcing loop that captures the
opportunity cost to shareholders of dividend disbursements. If the income of the
an overview of the experience during the 1980's.
8See Myers and Read (2001) as well as section 3.5.4.
9 Discussions with industry professionals also indicate that scope changes have an effect on the
measurement uncertainty of the underlying risk. When scope expands, insurers have less data, on
balance, about the policies they are writing. For a description of the expansion of scope in my model
and a justification of this causal link, see section 3.5.6.
10A discussion of how I model the components of cost can be found in section 3.5.5.
"These are all mechanical results of the definition of profit, and the stock of total capital.
1 2Pauly (1974) is a frequently cited early example of price competition in the insurance industry.
13Oockley et al. (2001) or any practitioner-oriented book on the insurance industry will provide
numerous examples of the process of forecasting insurance underwriting costs.
14This occurs mechanically, through its definition and the definition of the stock of total capital.
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Figure 3-3: When costs are added to the causal map the effects of increasing scope become
more important for the model's behavior. Costs complete another set of strong negative feedback
loops with significant delays caused by inertia in the the book of underwriting.
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is partly to help sustain the expansion of scope and costs caused by capital adequacy. This
intended rationality is counterbalanced by an additional balancing loop that describes how
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Figure 3-5: This figure shows a subsection of figure 3-4. In this simplified diagram the
reinforcing action of profit to justify changes in insurance scope is shown in the "Profit" loop.
The compensating action of price competition is shown in the "Price War" loop.
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Figure 3-6: The final causal loop diagram for the insurance industry model, which includes
loops around dividends and investment.
insurance industry is high, dividends will be limited so that capital can be reinvested
in the business.' 5
3.5 Model Formulations
The model for the insurance industry starts with a parsimonious formulation for profit
shown in equation 3.1:
Nt = Rt - Ct - Ot (3.1)
Where Nt is current net income R is total revenue Ct is claims expense and Ot is
other operating costs. The formulation for each of these components will be explained
in detail in the following sub-sections.
3.5.1 Premiums
Millions of dollars are spent every year by insurance companies to ensure that the
premiums they charge are adequate to cover the costs they will incur from claims, their
15See Bringham and Gordon (1968), or section 3.5.8.
operating costs, and a reasonable profit margin. Understandably, the exact heuristics
behind the pricing of insurance are a closely guarded secret and involve volumes
of data on hazard rates that are not available to academics. Many practitioner-
oriented texts do exist, and the basic process of rate making described by them is
not significantly different from the process of price setting in other industries. For
example, Cockley et al. (2001:83) supply an equation to determine the rate per unit
exposure on page 83 of their book:
Pr= Pp+F (3.2)
1-V-Q
Where Pr is the premium rate charged per dollar of underwriting, P, is the pure
premium, 16 V is an adjustment for variable costs, and Q is a factor that builds
in a profit margin. My model incorporates the concept behind this description of
the price-setting process, but translates some of the influences on premiums into
functional forms more familiar in the system dynamics literature.
The average premium-per-dollar of underwriting exposure charged by the insur-
ance industry is influenced by the costs they expect to bear in servicing the policy. 17
Many texts on the rate-making process in the insurance industry advocate for in-
surance adjusters to project this cost forward to account for changes in the value of
future expenses. Therefore my model takes the costs calculated by the structures
described in sections 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 and projects their perceived value forward using
the standard third-order forecasting structure to arrive at the expected cost-per-unit
underwriting18 . This variable is then used as part of a multiplicative hill-climbing
heuristic (Sterman 2000) in the following way.
First, an indicated premium is calculated as shown in equation 3.3:
TPrt = (Prt) - EfNI - EfcaP -Efcost (3.3)
Where TPrtis the indicated premium, Prt is the current premium per unit ex-
posure, EfNI is the effect of profit on premiums, EfCaP is the effect of capital on
premiums and EfcOst is the effect of cost on premiums. Conceptually, Efcost can be
thought of as the change in the premium indicated by the forecasted costs discussed
above. It is calculated as the ratio of forecasted costs to current perceived costs.19
Consequently if costs were expected to rise by some percentage, then the indicated
premium would be higher than the current premium by exactly the change in cost
expected during the policy lifetime.
EfNI and EfcaP are both formulated as power functions that take as their input
the current state of the variable in question compared to a "target" state. Efcap is
calculated according to equation 3.4:
16 Pure premium is the term used in the insurance industry to represent the expected claim expense
plus the expected costs of claims adjustment. In my model these concepts are kept separate to
increase transparency for academics unfamiliar with insurance industry terminology.
17See Cockley et al. (2001), or look up the term "trended projected ultimate losses".
18This projected value represents the influences from P, F, and V in equation 3.2.
19More precisely I use the "expected" current costs as the basis for the forecast, since decision
makers do not have access to the current "true" value of costs-per-unit exposure.
EfCaP = (CapA)SPr2c (
Where CapA is the adequacy of capital described in equation 3.10 and SPr 2CGpis the constant sensitivity of premiums to capital. Given this formulation SPr2cap
should be negative, because more capital adequacy will result in downward pressure
on premiums.
The effect of profit on premiums is calculated according to equation 3.5:
EfNI - (JnAde)SPr2 NI (3.5)
Where IndA is the adequacy of income and SPr2NI is a constant sensitivity of
premiums to net income. Similar to the effect of capital on premiums, the causal
theory behind my model necessitates that SPr2NI be negative in order for higher
income to translate into lower premiums. In,4e is:
S(1+ ROA)
(1+TROA)
Where ROA is the current level of industry return on assets and TROA is the
target return on assets, a constant determined during model parametrization. ROA
and TROA are fractions, and since it is possible that the model could calculate an
ROA that is less than negative one, In'44 could be less than zero, and the formulation
in equation 3.6 would return a floating point error. In order to prevent this from
occurring, I employ a sharp maximum so that the lowest possible level of the income
adequacy in the model is zero. Given this formulation, if the modeled industry were
to lose more money in a single year than it had in total assets, the model would still
empty the stock of assets and bankrupt the industry, but the floating point error in
calculating income adequacy would be eliminated.
I accomplish the adjustment of premiums towards the indicated level with equation
3.7:
Prt = (TPt- Prt)] dt + Pro (3.7)
TP
Where Prt is the current premium per unit exposure charged on average, rp is the
delay time associated with changing premiums, Pro is the initial premium per unit
exposure and TPrt is the premium indicated from equation 3.3. The instantaneous
premium Prt is then recorded in a co-flow to the aging chain of total underwriting
exposure, and the total premium income of the industry is calculated as:
PrInc = PrAvg. Ut (3.8)
Where PrInc is the flow of premium income, Prvg is the average premium per
unit exposure calculated by the co-flow, and Ut is the total underwriting exposure of
the industry, discussed in section 3.5.6.
(3.4)
3.5.2 Capital Adequacy
One of the liquidity ratios used by analysts and regulators covering the insurance
industry is the "claims solvency ratio" or:
CSR = Oh (3.9)PrInc
Where CSR is the claims solvency ratio, and CI is the flow of claims incidence
for the industry. I do not directly compute the claims solvency ratio for determining
capital adequacy; rather, adequacy of capital in the model is calculated following
equation 3.10:
CapA = ZIDZ( Cap (3.10)
DCap
Where CapA is the adequacy of capital, ZIDZ is the "zero if division by zero"
operation, Cap is the current total capital of the industry and DCap is the current
desired capital, calculated as shown in equation 3.11:
DCap = DCSR -CI (3.11)
Where DCSR is the desired claims solvency ratio, which is a constant estimated
during model calibration.
3.5.3 Investments and Capital
I model the stock of investment capital as shown in equation 3.12:
Capt = J(OCF + Inv - Div)dt + Capo (3.12)
Where Capt is the current total capital, OCF is the operating cash flow', Inv is
the flow of investment income, Div is the flow of dividends being paid to shareholders,
and Capo is the initial capital stock of the industry. The flow of investment income
is calculated as shown in equation 3.13:
Inv = Capt - R% (3.13)
Where R% is the percentage return on investment gained by the insurance in
industry each year. The formulation for the percentage return on investments is
exogenous, and a detailed description of how it is modeled is included in the section
3.6.2. For the process of fitting the model to historical data, the percentage return
20Because I exclude depreciation, taxes and physical capacity from the model, there are no flows
from these sources, making operating cash flows an appropriate name for the flow recorded here.
The financial data for the insurance industry includes investment income in operating income, and
so throughout this chapter I use net income and operating income interchangeably to refer to that
concept. In the model, operating cash flow is separate from net income in order to make my
formulations general enough for future modelers to extend.
on invested assets was set to be the historical investment return. Rt from equation
3.1 is then:
R* Ut + Cape (3.14)
3.5.4 Claims Costs
The total dollar value of claims incurred by the insurance industry is shown in equa-
tion 3.15:
CI = Ut -LF (1 + e) (3.15)
Where CIt is the flow of claims incurred by the industry, Ut is the total under-
writing exposure of the industry, LF,, is the average fraction of dollars underwritten
that result in a claim each year and e is an exogenous noise term that is only used in
the long-horizon statistical tests of the model, explained in section 3.8. The determi-
nation of the total underwriting exposure is described in subsection 3.5.6.
The percentage of underwriting that generates a claim is not constant in the
model. As discussed in section 3.5.6 and 3.4, insurers seek out more business when
they are more financially healthy, and in the process insure risks that have both a
higher absolute level of exposure2 1 and a higher exposure measurement uncertainty.
The specific functional form for the riskiness of new policies in the model is a
constant normal level of loss, multiplied by an adjustment factor that varies as a
power function of the normalized scope of the industry. This relationship is shown in
equation 3.16.
LF =NLF- ( Sci )SC2 sc (3.16)NSc
Where NLF is the normal underwriting loss fraction, and is estimated during
model calibration, Sct is the current scope of the industry, NSc is the normal scope,
and ScRasc is the sensitivity of the casualty rate to insurance scope. This loss frac-
tion is applied only to newly underwritten policies, and is recorded in the co-flow
structure for the riskiness of current underwriting. The average loss fraction for the
entire book of underwriting business is calculated using a co-flow of the total dollars
underwritten" to arrive at LFv.
Claims incurred then flow into a stock of pending claims, as shown in equation
3.17:
CPt = J(CIt -Ce -CDt)dt +CP (3.17)
Where CP is the stock of claims pending adjustment, Ct is the claims expense,
CDt is the flow of claims that are denied and CP is the initial level of pending
21Level of exposure here means the fraction of dollars underwritten that will result in a claim
every year. I use this term interchangeably with "casualty rate."
"See Sterman (2000).
claims. Claims expense and claims denied sum together to the outflow from a first-
order material delay of CP such that:
cA= C +CD = FCP - pt+ (1 - FP)C (3-18)
TC TC
Where TC is the average delay in adjusting claims and Fcp is the fraction of claims
that are paid. I estimated the fraction of claims paid with a regression of non-life
insurance claims incurred on total non-life claims expense. The result, that 84.7% of
claims are paid on average, was highly statistically significant, with a standard error
of 0.02 on an estimate of 0.847 and an R2 of 95%.
3.5.5 Other Operating Costs
In formulating "other operating costs" I assume that costs primarily arise from claims-
handling costs and commissions. Claims-handling costs represent all of the adminis-
trative costs arising from claims, and are modeled as a constant fraction of the flow
of adjusted claims, as shown in equation 3.19:
COstCH =Ct - FCHC (3-19)
Where CostcH is the costs arising from handling claims and FCHC is the fractional
cost of handling one dollar of claims. The justification for this formulation comes from
the Hanover Insurance "Claims Game" documented by Sterman and Moissis (1989)",
where the authors make the simplifying assumption that the administrative costs from
claims adjustment varies linearly with the number of cases. Since my model is less
concerned with the details of how costs from claims vary in time, the same assumption
here should have little effect on the model's fit.
Commissions are a common practice in the insurance industry, and are paid to
independent insurance agents after they persuade a customer to buy a policy". Most
commissions are paid in the first year that the policy is active, and are built into
the premium paid by the customer; however, some commission payments continue for
multi-year policies and renewals. With this in mind, I model commissions as a mate-
rial delay of deferred commission payments, proportional to the inflow of premiums
written. The flow of commission expenses use an empirically estimated delay time,
as shown in equations 3.20 and 3.21 :
ComP = J(PrNew - Fpcc - Costcm)dt + Como (3.20)
Costorn = ComP (3.21)
Trom
2aSee page 68, table 6
24See Regan and Tennyson (1996) for a description of the commission system in property-casualty
insurance.
Where Comp is the deferred liability of commission costs pending, PrNew is the
flow of new premiums written2, Fpcc is the fractional cost of commissions per dollar
of new premiums written, Costcom is the flow of actual commissions costs being paid,
Cono is the initial level of pending commissions costs26 , and Tcom is the average delay
for commissions payments.
3.5.6 Demand for Underwriting
Conceptually, the demand for insurance should be proportional to the stock of assets
in the economy. Unfortunately the stock of assets in the economy is not a variable
that is easily measurable, and so reliable data on its level are not available. For this
reason, many academics researching insurance assume that the demand for insurance
is proportional to the flow of investment, which is some unknown fraction of the gross
domestic product27. Therefore my model uses the nominal gross domestic product as
the basis for the demand for underwriting. Some fraction of that flow is considered to
represent investment in insurable assets, creating a stock that proxies for the assets
in the economy, as shown in equations 3.22 and 3.23:
A = (GDPt - )dt (3.22)J TA
Assets = FGDP2Un ' At (3.23)
Where Assets is the proxy my model uses for the level of assets in the economy,
FGDP2Un is the fraction of the annual GDP that represents those assets, TA is the
average life of capital2, At is an intermediate stock that accumulates the flow of
GDP and the flow of assets being removed from the pool of insurable capital and
GDP is the flow of exogenous, nominal gross domestic product. This level of assets
desiring insurance does not directly represent the demand for dollars of underwriting
however, as other important effects must be taken into account.
DesInsc,. = Assets - EfPE (3.24)
Equation 3.24 shows the effect of premiums on the proportion of the assets from
equation 3.22 that are insured. EfPE represents the effect of the price elasticity of
demand for insurance, and its inclusion should be justified briefly. Many previous
studies on the insurance industry have assumed that demand for liability insurance
is price inelastic, and that assertion has been supported by empirical studies29 as
25This flow is collected in a co-flow of written premiums that follows a standard formulation for
a co-flow with aging chain. More information on these formulations is available in the appendix.
26Set in dynamic equilibrium to be -rcom -PrNew * fpcc, by Little's Law
27See Smith (1981) among others.
28There is no reason to assume that the average life of capital in my model is identical with the
actual physical life of capital in the economy or with the life of capital assumed for depreciation. Here
the concept is the "insurable" life of capital, i.e. the length of time on average capital investments
will be considered as worthy of insurance by their owners.
29See for example: Cagleand Harrington (1995), Strain (1966) and Weiss and Chung (2004)
well. Automobile insurance, homeowners insurance, and marine insurance are often
mandatory, and so changes in the cost of insurance will shift the distribution of
customers between companies in the industry but will have a relatively small effect
on the overall demand for insurance until price changes become so extreme that they
influence demand for the underlying goods being insured 0 . Rather than assume that
the price elasticity is zero however, it is better practice to include the elasticity of
demand to price and let model calibration determine the value of the parameter. The
exact formulation for the effect of price on demand that I use in the model is shown
in equation 3.25:
Ef PE = Prt )'P (3.25)
Prrni
Where Prt is the current premium per dollar of exposure, Prai is the normalizing
initial premium charged per dollar of exposure and i9p is the price elasticity of demand.
The demand for insurance is also affected by the income elasticity of demand.
Consumer income in the model is proxied for by the exogenous GDP, and normalized
by GDP's initial level, as shown in equation 3.16:
Ef" =( GDP )1  (3.26)
Where GDPt is the current nominal GDP, GDPin; is the normalizing initial GDP
and 7,r is the income elasticity of demand, which is positive. This effect combines with
the price elasticity of demand to arrive at the adjusted desired level of insurance as
shown in equation :
DesIns =DesInsco.,,, - Ef1 c (3.27)
Two important concepts for the determination of the demand for insurance have
now been calculated by the model. The first is the level of insurance a priori, and
the second is the level of demand for insurance that can actually be served by the
industry after considering price and income effects. Once the model has calculated
this desired level of insurance, the calculation of the inflow to the aging chain for total
underwriting exposure is accomplished by way of the standard stock management
structure, as shown in equation 3.28:
Uin = Max( Desins - U + Uo , 0) (3.28)
TU
Where Ui, is the inflow of underwriting to the industryMax denotes the maximum
function, Ut is the current level of total underwriting exposure3 ', TU is the delay in
adjusting underwriting to its desired level and Uowe is the outflow of underwriting,
analogous with replacement purchases in the stock management formulation.
3Feldblum (1999) describes the price elasticity of demand for property liability insurance in detail.
31Underwriting is tracked by a third order aging chain in the model, for more information on this
formulation please see the appendix.
3.5.7 Scope
The "scope" of the industry is an important feature of my model and has already been
discussed conceptually in section 3.4. The mathematical formulation for this effect is
the smooth adjustment of scope towards an indicated scope that is multiplicatively
influenced by two effects:
Efcap2sc =(CapA)Scap2sc (3.29)
Efrasc =(In 44d) S "c2 Sc (3.30)
Where Efcap2sc is the effect of capital on scope, CapA is the capital adequacy of the
industry discussed in equation 3.10, Scap2sc is a constant denoting the strength of
the relationship between capital and scope, Efrac2sc is the effect of income on scope,
InA4 is the adequacy of income measured according to equation 3.6, and Srne2sc is
the strength of the relationship between income and scope. The indicated scope is an
adjustment around a constant normal level using the structure shown in equations
3.31 and 3.32:
Scrna =ScNO,n -Efcap2sc - EfrncQsc (3.31)
Sct =J(ScIs- Sc)dt + Scaf (3.32)
TSC
3.5.8 Dividends
The model's formulation of dividend policy is extremely parsimonious. Dividends in
the model are simply a constant fraction of net income, constrained to always be a
positive number, as shown in equation 3.33:
Div =Max(N -Divnapi,, 0) (3.33)
Where Divnati, is the constant dividend payout ratio, Max denotes the sharp
maximum function, Ntis the flow of net income from equation 3.1 and Div is the
dividend payment flow. Because dividends only affect net income indirectly through
their effect on the stock of invested assets a more complex formulation was prohibitive
given my model's focus. Initially the insurance industry model had a formulation for
dividends based off of Sterman (1981), however extensive testing revealed that the
net effect of the formulation was to hold dividends at a roughly constant fraction of
net income.
3.5.9 Exclusion of Reserves for Claims
Reserves are an important concept for insurance executives. Regulators require insur-
ance companies to estimate reserves against foreseeable losses in many areas, and the
companies are required to account for these reserves as liabilities on their financial
statements. I choose to exclude these reserves from my model for several reasons.
Estimate Standard Error t-stat R 2
Constant -22.7 7.2 -3.1 97.2%
CI 3.81 0.126 30.25
Table 3.2: The equation for the regression reported is CRes = a + # -CJ + e run over the
period from 1982 through 2009. CRes is aggregate claims reserves reported and CI is aggregate
claims incurred.
First, the data suggest that reserves are not very interesting dynamically. Econo-
metric analysis of reserves for claims shown in table 3.2 indicates that they can be
modeled in aggregate by a linear function of the claims expense.
The second reason is more operational. While reserves are treated as liabilities
by accountants, they are liabilities in an accrual sense only, and so they are still
contributing to the investment income of the insurance industry until they are realized
as negative cash flows. From the standpoint of my model the inclusion of reserves
would have been simple, but would have added nothing of causal importance.
3.6 Parametrization of the Statistical Properties
of the Exogenous Inputs
3.6.1 Gross Domestic Product
The model uses nominal GDP to drive the demand for insurance, as described in
section 3.5.6. In order to perform tests of the statistical properties of the feedback
structure in the model shown in section 3.8 I analyzed the statistical properties of
nominal GDP and designed a random process using this analysis that could stand in
for the historical time series.
De-trended" nominal GDP shows significant autocorrelation. Following the pro-
cess outlined by Oliva and Sterman (2001) I estimated the autocorrelation time of
the pink noise in nominal GDP by computing the autocorrelation spectrum of the
residuals from the trend removal procedure.
Figure 3-7 shows the autocorrelation spectrum of the residuals from the de-
trending procedure. The decrease in the autocorrelation falls roughly linearly with
the lag, consistent with the evidence that GDP often displays first-order 1/f noise over
long time horizons". To see why the linear decline in autocorrelation implies first-
order noise consider first that by the Wiener-Khinchin theorem, the power spectral
density of a random process is the Fourier transform of its autocorrelation function.
Over the domain we are interested in, the autocorrelation spectrum is well approx-
imated by a triangle function. Since the Fourier transform of a triangle is the sine
3 2The trend referenced was a best fit exponential curve of the quarterly nominal GDP recorded
from 1989 through 2009.
"See Baillie (1996)
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Figure 3-7: Autocorrelation Spectrum of the Residuals from De-trended Nominal GDP.
function squared, it follows that:
ln(Sectral Density) ' In sin(A) 2A 2 [ln(sin(A)) - ln(A)]
When the result of equation 3.34 is plotted against In(A) it is linear for large A
because sin (A) is bounded, showing that the spectrum of the noise in de-trended
nominal GDP is approximately first ordera4. Unreported tests show that the auto-
correlation of the noise in the residuals is not statistically different from zero after
nine years of lag. The model therefore uses nine years as the noise correlation time
in the pink noise generator function". I also calculated the standard deviation of the
residuals from the de-trending procedure to be four percent of the mean of the time
series, and use this value as the GDP noise standard deviation in my model. The
fitting process for de-trending nominal GDP showed an average of 3.7% growth per
year, so stochastic GDP is modeled in my simulations as an exponential growth path
at 3.7% per year multiplied by the output of the pink noise generator6.
"One definition of first orderl/f noise is that it has a power spectral density function that falls
linearly with frequency on a log-log plot.
uSterman 2000 Appendix B-2
"This simple formulation for GDP is a good tradeoff between complexity and realism. Because
the stochastic flow of DP is only used for long horizon tests of the correlation between the model
and random inflows the slower oscillation around the growth path for nominal GDP that is caused
by business cycles and inflation was excluded from this analysis.
(3.34)
Figure 3-8: The normal probability plot of investment returns to the insurance industry is
shown in this figure. The observed data depart from a normal distribution by tending to show
negative skew, and a discontinuous probability density function that has a component with low
variance (slope) and a separate component with high variance (slope).
3.6.2 Investment Returns
I created a historical time series of annual investment percentage returns for the
insurance industry by dividing the total invested capital of firms in SIC 6331 by the
sum of the reported investment income. Unreported regression tests to model the
time series of investment returns for the insurance industry showed that distribution
is highly correlated with the yield from corporate Baa rated bonds, however even
when considering a diverse set of other financial instruments37 the negative skew and
the high variance of the distribution of returns for the insurance industry could not
be matched by a linear model alone. Because of this, I model investment returns by
adopting an analysis that Webster et. al (2007) use for modeling ozone emissions
near Houston. In that study the authors break the observed output of the stochastic
process into several distinct patterns of behavior, each hypothesized to be driven by
a separate probability density function.
The normal probability plot of the data for insurance industry investment return
shown in figure 3-8 exhibits several interesting characteristics. First, the observations
form a function that tends to be concave, which along with the negative skewness
calculated from the data suggest a left skewed probability density function, even
when factoring in the non zero mean of the data. Second, a visual inspection of the
plot suggests that there are two distinct patterns of behavior for investment return
37Aaa rated bonds, returns on the S&P 500, treasury notes and fixed maturity treasury bonds, as
well as the interest rate carry were all tested as candidates for the linear ARIMA model.
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Normal Order Statistics
Low Variance Regime Section 1 Section 2 Estimated a 'hznsition to High Chance
Slope 9.15 6.79 2.82 22.73%
Intercept 6.66 5.85
High Variance Regime Section 1 Section 2 Estimated a Tansition to Low Chance
Slope 47.99 47.15 6.90 83.33%
Intercept -14.54 1.46
Vasicek Model Parameters Estimate Dimensions
Tau - Adj. Delay 1 year
b - Average 10.44% %/year
Table 3.3: The estimates obtained from the analysis of investment returns to the insurance
industry show two clear regions of behavior. The figure also summarizes the transition prob-
abilities for the Markov process modeled and the parameters used in the Vasicek model for
investment returns.
volatilityas. One pattern has relatively low variance while the other has relatively
high variance but does not persist for a long period of time. Specifically, I computed
linear estimates for different segments of the plot. These estimates suggest that
investment returns can be modeled as a random normal process that switches between
a standard deviation of 2.8% and a standard deviation of 6.9%. The low variance
regime transitions to high variance roughly 23% of the time that it is active, and the
high variance regime transitions back to low variance 83% of the time that it is active.
The details of these estimations are showii in table 3.3.
Because an implementation of a stochastic process identical in form to the one
employed by Webster et al. (2007) would require six separate probability density
functions, and because economists have developed many models of the evolution of
interest rate levels, I have chosen to use the technique described above to estimate
only the variance of the distribution and the likelihood of transition between the two
variance levels. In order to model the mean of the stochastic process for investment
returns I turn to the one-factor, short-rate Vasicek model (James and Webber 2000).
This model is described by the following equation:
dr { br) d
=(b ) d + adW (3.35)
dt T
Where r is the interest rate, b is the long term mean of the process generating
interest rates, T is the mean reversion time of the processa9, o is the standard devi-
ation", and dWt is a Wiener-type white noise process41 . This model formulation is
,"The indication of the number of random nonnal processes needed to model the data comes from
the number of best fit lines needed to estimate the plotted relationship. I depart from Webster et
al. 2007 here in that I do not model the evolution of the mean of the stochastic process through a
probability density function, but rather implement the Vasicek short-rate model, as discussed later.
3 9 0r the adjustment delay of the negative feedback loop, in system dynamics terminology.
4Itself a random variable in my implementation, and modeled as a Markov process
4 1 gBrownian Motion", implemented in discrete time as N(0,1)/ SQRT(dt) where dt is the time
step and N is a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.
p U Uc Ue Um
Modeled Random Process .1076 .033 0.89 0.08 0.03
-listorical Tnvestment Return 105 036, - - -
Percentage Difference 2.5% -9.3%
Table 3.4: Statistical measures of fit between the historical investment returns and my stochas-
tic formulation for returns are shown above. The values given for the modeled random process
are the average of five hundred model runs from a test that varied the random noise seed of
returns.
very similar to the "pink-noise" generator that is standard in the system dynamics
literature. I justify my decision to deviate from the standard partly so that I can
make a connection between the two approaches, and partly to highlight how I incor-
porate the Markov process for the variance of the investment returns over time. I
use the term Markov to describe the fact that the standard deviation of returns can
inhabit one of two discrete states, and that the transitions between these states occur
based on a draw from a uniform random variable. In the model the current "state"
of the variance of investment returns is a stock whose net flow is determined by a
comparison of a uniform random variable and a cutoff level for state transition that
is dependent the current state. The details of this formulation can be found in the
appendix.
Overall this formulation for investment returns has statistical behavior that is
close to the historical time series. Table 3.4 shows the statistics of fit to substantiate
that claim. On average, stochastic returns have a standard deviation within 0.04 of
the observed standard deviation, and a mean within 0.003 of that observed. Ninety-
five percent of the five hundred simulations in this sensitivity analysis showed that at
least three quarters of the error between the simulated and actual data was due to
differences in their covariance, rather than their mean or variance42, and the average
Theil Ue over the entire set of simulations was nearly 0.9.
3.7 Endogenous Model Parametrization
3.7.1 Parameters Estimated and their Interpretation
Table 3.5 documents the parameters estimated by my calibration of the model. I
arrived at these estimates through a multi-dimensional minimization of the root mean
square error (RMSE) scaled by the variance of each historical data series, using the
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell method. Explicitly, the objective function of the calibration
process was:
Minimize (PrIncH - PrInct) 2 [(CH - Ct) 2 (NIH - NIt) (3.36)Miiie 2  1+ 2 ]+ U2  (336
OHPr JI HC L HNI i
42i.e. 95% of the 500 simulations had a Theil inequality statistic Uc greater than 0.75.
..
Calibrated Model Parameters Lower Bound Estimate Upper Bound
Average Delay for Claim Investigation (years) 1.499 2.678 4.6
Claim Handling Costs per Dollar of Claims (dmnl) 0.01 0.036 0.12
Commission per Dollar of Premium Written (years) 0.148 0.25 0.29
Critical Claims Solvency Ratio (years) 0.799 1 1.788
Desired Insurance Adjustment Time (years) 2.352 5.11 9.181
Dividend Payout Ratio (dmni) 0 0.11 0.442
Income Elasticity of Demand (dmni) 0.436 0.453 0.465
Insurable Life of Capital (years) 8.149 14 16.37
Natural Casualty Rate (dmn/yw) 0.048 0.06 0.067
Normal Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance (dmni) 0.031 0.041 0.041
Other Cost per Dollar of Exposure (1y/w) 0.002 0.015 0.019
Price Elasticity of Demand (dmni) -2.3 -1.5 -0.908
Sensitivity of Expected Casualty Rate to Scope (dmni) 0.4 1 3.48
Sensitivity of Premiums to Capital (dmnl) -0.106 -0.088 -0.086
Sensitivity of Premiums to Net Income (dmni) -1.275 -1.03 -0.743
Sensitivity of Scope to Capital (dmni) 0 0.2 0.472
Sensitivity of Scope to Income (dmnl) 0 0.2 3.985
Time Horizon for Reference Costs (years) 1.4 3.2 6.7
Time to Adjust Net Income Perception (years) 1.18 2 2.03
Time to Change Dividend Policy (years) 1.282 4.5 5.36
Time to Change Insurance Scope(years) 0.62 1.2 1.795
Time to Change Premiums (years) 0.2 0.56 1.7
Time to Pay Commissions (years) 0.23 0.35 0.512
Time to Perceive Trend in Costs (years) 0.72 0.9 2.3
Table 3.5: The parameters estimated during my calibration of the insurance model to his-
torical data. The units of each parameter are shown next to its name, with dmnl used inter-
changeably with dimensionless, fraction and percent. The 95% confidence intervals employ the
non-parametric bootstrap procedure of Dogan (2007) with N=1000.
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Figure 3-9: A comparison of the historical path for premiums and the simulated path in the
model. The model fits the historical data well, and captures important cyclical dynamics.
This combines the work of Sterman (1984) with the technique of trading-off be-
tween dimensions when fitting large models by weighting more variable series less
than ones with lower variance that is used by weighted least squares estimation.
In order to calculate the 95% confidence intervals reported in the table I follow
the process outlined by Dogan (2007). Specifically, I use the residual between the
simulated and historical output of the model to create one thousand bootstrapped"4
data sets, and re-parametrize the model for each of these data sets starting from my
original parameter estimates. The output of that process is a sample (N=1000) of
the possible values for each of the parameters, when the largest and smallest 2.5% of
the sample are excluded for each parameter the remaining maximum and minimum
estimates form the confidence interval bounds.
3.7.2 Model Fit to Historical Data
The fit of simulated premiums with historical premiums is shown in figure 3-9. Overall
the model does a good job of tracking the path of premiums collected by the industry.
The Theil U statistics for the simulation show that over 91% of the estimation error in
premiums is due to random fluctuation"4 rather than differences between the mean
'The bootstrap sampling is non-parametric.
"Ue=0.919
Historical and Simulated Claims Incurred
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Figure 3-10: The simulated path of total claims incurred in the model, plotted with the
historical path of claims incurred.
or variance of the two time series. The RMSE of the simulation scaled by the mean
of the historical data series is 5.62% at the end of the model run.
The simulated path for claims, compared with the historical data, is shown in
figure 3-10. The simulation fits the growth of claims in the industry fairly well, and
very closely estimates the variance45 . The RMSE of the simulated claims, scaled by
the historical mean, provides some reason to be confident in the models output, at
15%.
The fit of the model to historical profits is shown in figure 3-11. Visual inspection
of the simulated course of profits for the insurance industry, shown in figure 3-11,
shows a regular cycle in reported profit for the simulated industry, with a cycle period
of very close to the 6-7 years measured from the historical data. The evolution of
profits in the model is statistically similar to the historical path history. In particular,
the simulated series for profit shows a 67.5% R2 with actual profit through 2008, and
has a Theil statistic Ue of 86.1% which indicates that relatively little of the estimation
error for profit comes from a misrepresentation of its mean or variance.
"Theil Um=0.045 U,=0.008
4R 2 is an appropriate metric to use for profits, as the time series has a high variance relative to
its mean. The R2 for claims and premiums are very high, but this is a mechanical result of their
exponential growth paths. On the other hand, RMSE over the mean of profits would artificially
inflate our perception of the error, since the mean of profits is very low over the length of the model
run. Sterman (1984)
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Figure 3-11: The simulated path of insurance industry profits plotted with the historically
observed path of profits. Many of the features of the historical path are emulated by the model.
SIC 6331 Variable R2  Slope It-stat
Assets 0.797 0.093 10.098
Claims paid 0.940 0.091 20.128
Dividends 0.049 0.049 0.112
Invested capital 0.553 0.043 5.668
Investment income 0.417 0.046 4.309
Total Liabilities 0.942 0.055 20.566
Stockholders equity 0.688 0.041 7.568
Commissions expense 0.822 0.080 10.956
Total Expense 0.946 0.077 21.345
Used in Calibration Ur m U, Uc R 2
Operating Income 0.772 0.095 0.044 0.861 0.675
Premiums Collected 0.056 0.005 0.076 0.919 0.994
Claims Incurred 0.150 0.045 0.008 0.947 0.957
Table 3.6: Statistics of fit for the insurance model are shown in the table above. The first
set of variables is not available at the level of aggregation needed to undertake point by point
estimates, therefore I report regression slopes, t-statistics and R2 . The second set of variables
reports the root mean square error over the mean, the Theil U statistics of fit and the R2 .
3.7.3 Comparison with Other Data Series
There is a considerable amount of publicly available financial data on the insurance
industry as a whole, however the types of data that are reported by the SEC specif-
ically for the "non-life" insurance industry are more limited. The model calibration
procedure was run using only the time series that were both important and reported
separately from the aggregate, namely the total premium income, total claims in-
curred and operating income.
The rest of the available data still has the potential to be of use in evaluating the
model's fit, if reasonable assumptions are made about the relationship between the
reported data and the concepts embodied in my model's formulations. Table 3.1 from
section 3.3 reports each of the data series I used during this modeling effort, as well
as their level of aggregation with respect to the property casualty insurance industry.
Table 3.6 reports the statistics of fit between my model's output and all of the data
series I employed. For SIC 6331 variables these tests assume that the uinobservable
time series for the property casualty insurance industry are correlated with the data
for the overall insurance industry, but are not point for point matches. Regression
slope statistics are reported, with standard errors, R2 and t-statistics, as a test of this
assumption. Each of these regressions is of the form Sim = a + # - Hist + e where
Sim is the simulated data and Hist is the historical data over the time period from
1982 through 2010.
Overall The simulated variables, excepting only dividends, show a high correla-
tion with their historical time series, have statistically significant regression slope
estimates, and are all on the same order of magnitude.
3.8 Stochastic Tests of Model Fit
In settings such as the insurance industry, where random variations in exogenous
variables are widely held to have a large effect on the time series of data available,
a comparison of the correlations between variables can help to validate the causal
relationships in the model, since random exogenous influences are more likely to effect
the value of the variables than their long term relationships between each other.
Additionally, such an analysis allows us to better understand how the exogenous
forcing in my model of the insurance industry compares to the effect of exogenous
variables in the historical data series.
Table 3.7 shows the correlation matrices from a series of tests on historical and
simulated model data. The first matrix shows the Pearson correlation coefficients
between the historically observed data series over the period from 1982 until 2009. The
second matrix shows the same set of correlations calculated from the simulated data,
but instead of only running the model from 1982 until 2009 I use the stochastic random
variables for nominal gross domestic product and investment return described in
section 3.6 to drive the model over a long time horizon. The correlations documented
are for one thousand years of simulated data using these exogenous inputs. The final
matrix in table 3.7 records the difference between the historically observed correlations
and the simulated ones, and reveals several insights on the relationship between the
historical variables and my simulation.
First, the correlations suggest that many of the relationships in my model closely
capture the statistical comovement between insurance industry variables. In fact the
only variable that shows a consistent difference between the simulated correlation
coefficients and the historically observed ones, is dividends.
The evidence from table 3.7 suggests that my parsimonious formulation of divi-
dends in the model may overestimate the degree to which dividends issued by insurers
correlate with important financial data. Future modelers in this space should poten-
tially consider more complex formulations for insurance dividends, however I chose
to leave the simpler formulation in my model. The overall effect of this decision is
minor, because the variable I am most interested in is income, which excludes divi-
dends, and in my estimation the face-validity benefits from expressing a feedback-rich
formulation for dividends are easily outweighed by the costs of a marginally poorer
model fit.
3.9 Examination of the Cause of the Insurance
Profit Cycle
One of the research questions left unsettled in the literature on the insurance profit
cycle is whether the cycle owes its cause primarily to the endogenous feedback pro-
cesses created by the decision rules of the industry's actors, or whether fluctuations in
4 7 See section 3.2 for a discussion of the role of exogenous time series in prior research on the
insurance industry.
Historical [| TA | CI |CE IDIV[Cap|Inv| TL Inc| P [SEIComITEIGDPJ
TA 1
CI 0.98 1
CE 0.96 0.97 1
DIV 0.47 0.46 0.50 1
Cap 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.40 1
Iv 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.52 0.82 1
TL 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.43 0.95 0.89 1
Inc 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.23 0.69 0.81 0.72 1
P 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.50 0.92 0.90 0.98 0.77 1
SE 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.56 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.76 0.98 1
Corn 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.39 0.93 0.74 0.95 0.61 0.93 0.90 1
TE 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.48 0.95 0.87 0.98 0.72 0.99 0.97 0.95 1
GDP 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.53 0.90 0.87 0.97 0.70 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.98 1
Simulated TA CI CE DIV Cap Inv TL Inc P SE Com TE GDP
TA 1
CI 0.99 1
CE 0.99 1.00 1
DIV 0.83 0.83 0.84 1
Cap 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.83 1
Inv 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.78 0.88 1
TL 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.88 1
Inc 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.95 0.78 0.70 0.78 1
P 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.88 1.00 0.78 1
SE 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.82 1.00 0.88 0.98 0.78 0.98 1
Corn 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.88 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.98 1
TE 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.99 0.89 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.98 1.00 1
GDP 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.99 0.85 0.98 0.76 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 1
Difference TA CI CE DIV Cap Inv TL Inc P SE Com TE GDP
TA 0
CI 0.01 0
CE 0.03 0.02 0
DIV 0.37 0.37 0.34 0
Cap 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.43 0
Inv -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.27 0.06 0
TL 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.42 0.04 -0.01 0
Inc 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.71 0.09 -0.11 0.06 0
P 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.35 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0
SE 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0
Com 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.46 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.08 0
TE 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.36 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0
GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0
Table 3.7: This figure shows the correlation matrices for the data obtained historically and
the data simulated, as well as the difference in measured correlation between the two sets.
The first matrix shows the correlations between the historical data from 1982 until 2009. The
second matrix shows the correlation between simulated variables driven by stochastic exogenous
inputs when simulated for 1000 years. The final matrix shows the difference in the two sets of
correlations calculated as (Simulated - Historical). TA is total assets, CI is claims incurred,
CE is claims expense, DIV is total dividends, Cap is investment capital, Inv is investment
income, TL is total liabilities, Inc is income, P is total premiums, SE is shareholders equity,
Com is commissions expense, TE is total expenses and GDP is nominal gross domestic product.
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Figure 3-12: Net Income and Exogenous Influences, plotted against time as percentages of
their mean values. GDP is de-trended nominal GDP and investment return is the percentage
return on total invested assets.
exogenous inputs are primarily to blame. The following subsections will attempt to
address this question through several tests that use both my model and the exogenous
data available.
3.9.1 Exogenous Influences on the Insurance Industry
Figure 3-12 shows the major exogenous influences on the insurance industry plotted
against time, as well as the aggregate net income for "non-life" insurance reported to
the SEC.
Visual inspection of the figure does not reveal an obvious correlation between
GDP and the net income of the insurance industry, though in 2001 and in 2009 dips
in net income occur contemporaneously with falling GDP. Argument by example
yields conflicting evidence however, as the drop in profitability in the early 1980's
occurs contemporaneously with rising GDP, and the drop in GDP in the early 1990's
is not nearly as large as the drop in the late 1990's yet both coincide with sizable drops
in insurance operating income. Basic statistical analysis of the time series also reveal
little of interest, as correlations between the exogenous time series and insurer profits
are negative and not statistically significant, with the correlation coefficient between
insurance net income investment return measured to be -0.109, and the coefficient
between GDP and insurance net income calculated to be -0.068.
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Figure 3-13: This figure shows the response of net income to a momentary increase in GDP
during the simulated year 10. The impulse response of net income displays a clear cyclical
mode, with a period very close to the one observed historically.
3.9.2 Test of the Model's Impulse Response
Because an examination of the exogenous inputs do not allow us to make definitive
conclusions about their role in the cycle, I built the model with the capability of
starting it in dynamic equilibrium. Starting from that state, I shock the model with
a momentary increase in GDP to test how income responds. When the exogenous
forcing of historical GDP in the model is removed and investment income is set to
a constant fraction, the model is shocked from equilibrium by a discrete time Dirac
delta function at the beginning of year 10. GDP immediately returns to its initial
level after this "pulse." The response of net income, shown in figure 3-13, provides
strong evidence for an endogenous source of the insurance profit cycle.
Figure 3-13 presents compelling evidence that the structure that generates net
income in the insurance industry adds cyclical component to signals from exogenous
influences such as GDP. Even though GDP is very important for the evolution of
profits in the insurance industry, the impulse response of my model indicates that
profit cycles in insurance would persist for many years even if the economy were
somehow brought into equilibrium.
The oscillation in figure 3-13 is not attenuated by changes to many of the parame-
ters in the model. In fact, my analysis of the system's impulse response revealed only
one policy that was successful in causing the impulse response of profit to stabilize, as
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Figure 3-14: When capital targets are much higher than estimated by my historical calibration
of the model, and the adequacy of capital is a much stronger input into the scope expansion
decisions of the industry, the impulse response shown in this figure results. This combined
policy was by far the most effective at damping the cycle produced by my model.
shown in figure 3-14. Interestingly this policy way inherently multivariate in nature.
Not only do capital requirements need to be increased, through increasing the critical
solvency ratio, but the importance of capital adequacy in the decisions controlling
premium setting and scope needs to be considerably larger than was estimated dur-
ing my model calibration. If only capital requirements are changed, the period of
the oscillations enlarges, but the damping is negligible. If capital is made a more
important input for decisions, but targets for the level of capital are held constant
the system's impulse response is actually made less stable by the change.
This type of test is one of the many benefits of feedback rich dynamic models. Not
only can they replicate historical data, but they can provide us with more general
information about the effect of the structures we are interested in. On the one hand,
my analysis in this section provides support for the hypothesis that insurance profit
cycles are driven by the characteristics of the industry rather than the idiosyncratic
path of the exogenous inputs to the industry. In addition however, the impulse
response tests indicate that profit cycle severity may be reduced more fully when
changes to the target level of capital are combined with increases in the importance
of capital in decision making. In the next section I will explore how the historical
path of profits might have been altered had policies informed by these insights been
implemented.
7/pL A%
Base-model scaled profit variability 1.47 N/A
Univariate Tests
Premiums Reactive to Capital 1.45 -2%
Scope Reactive to Capital 2.78 89%
Higher Reserve Target 1.18 -20%
Multivariate Tests
Target and Premiums 0.91 -38%
Target and Scope 1.59 8%
All Three Policies 0.83 -44%
Table 3.8: The results for tests of several policies for mitigating the insurance industry profit
cycle are shown in this table. The standard deviation of net income, scaled by its mean, is
shown in the column labeled a/p and is computed over the entire model run. "Premiums
Reactive to Capital" sets the importance of capital adequacy signals for premium setting equal
to the importance of profit signals. "Scope Reactive to Capital" increases the importance of
capital adequacy in the scope setting decision. "Higher Reserve Targets" simulates a situation
where reserve requirements are increased such that insurers now desire twice the level reserves.
Multivariate tests combine the indicated policies. Overall, policies that focus on both higher
and more salient reserves result in the largest decrease in the severity of the profit cycle.
3.10 Policies for Reducing the Cycle in Insurance
Industry Profits
Informed by the analysis of the impulse response of the model, sensitivity tests of both
the univariate and the multivariate effect of several policy levers on the scaled profit
variability, described in table 3.8, show that policies that combine higher reserve
targets with an increase in the importance of capital in determining the path of
the industry are the most effective at reducing the cycle. Higher reserve requirements
alone do reduce cycle severity somewhat. When these requirements are combined with
an increased willingness of decision makers in the industry to use capital adequacy
in their premium and scope setting decisions however, profit stability is increased
considerably more.
This result presents an interesting case for the implementation of reserve require-
ments by regulators. If industry actors view increased requirements as cumbersome
or puntitive they may continue to reguard short-term profit signals as the more im-
portant measure of the financial health of their companies. If this happens, the model
indicates that the full effect of capital for creating aggregate profit stability will not
4When testing policies for mitigating the profit cycle in the insurance industry I use a ratio of
the standard deviation of profit to the mean of profit as my primary statistical focus. This ratio,
which I call the scaled profit variability, is a good summary measure of the intensity of the profit
cycle in an industry because it captures how variable profits are without improperly labeling high
average profits as unappealing simply because of their mechanically higher standard deviation. The
variance scaled by the mean would be equally appealing, but is functionally equivalent.
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be felt. On the other hand, if the insurance industry views higher capital targets as
not only required, but inherently important for competitive decisions, then the model
suggests that the profit cycle can be reduced considerably.
3.11 Conclusion
This essay focused primarily on the documentation of a profit cycle model in the
property casualty insurance industry, a setting without a significant delay for adjust-
ing productive capacity. Tests of the model's output presented evidence that the key
determinants of the severity of the profit cycles in the industry are the level of capital
and the salience of capital adequacy signals in decision making.
Section 3.9 presented evidence that the cycle in profits of the insurance industry
is endogenously generated, rather than exogenously forced. The modeled industry
responded to a delta function in GDP with a long-lasting cyclical oscillation. The
cyclical nature of the model's impulse response can only be eliminated when capital
targets are combined with an increased importance of capital in decision making,
adding evidence that policies that do not address the high salience of insurer profit
signals may not fully address the cause of profit cycles in the insurance industry.
When viewed together with the results of chapter two's analysis of airline industry
profit cycles, these results begin to point towards the salience of profit signals as a
dynamic that exacerbates profit cycles across diverse settings. Two data points is
certainly not a large enough sample to draw conclusions, however, both airlines and
property-casualty insurance are industries with highly commodified products and
significant delays in adjusting their cost structure to changing market environments.
The suggestion that the cyclical profit common to both can be significantly reduced
through policies that mitigate the intensity competition over short term profits is
a potentially promising area for further research, challenging the belief that market
forces exclusively increase profit.
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Appendix A
Documentation of the Airline
Industry Model
A.1 Load Factor and Capacity
A.1.1 Airline Capacity (Seat)
=f(AirplaneManufacturingCompletion+OffMothballing
-AirplaneRetirements-Mothballing)dt+ [InitialAirlineCapacity]
Description: This is the number of seat miles per quarter that can be flown by
the airline
Airplane Manufacturing Completion (Seat/Year)
=AirlineCapacitySupplyLine/TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane*
SwitchforPartialModelTests+Completion*(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)
Description: This is the completion rate for aircraft that are coming off of the
assembly line
Airline Capacity Supply Line is a stock that is covered in A.1.2
Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane (years) 2
Description: This is the average lag before aircraft orders are delivered
Switch for Partial Model Tests (dmnl) 0
Completion (Seat/Year)
= CapacityonOrder3/(TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane/3)
Description: This is the flow of completed aircraft
Capacity on Order 3 is a flow covered in A.2.7
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Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane is covered in A.1.1
Off Mothballing (seats/Year)
= ReturntoService
Description: The flow of planes off mothballing
Return to Service (seats/Year) is a variable covered in A.2.3
Airplane Retirements (Seat/Year)
=Retired*(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)+(AirlineCapacity/
AverageServiceLife)*SwitchforPartialModelTests
Description: This is the rate at which airplanes are retired from the fleet
Retired is a variable covered in A.2.3
Switch for Partial Model Tests is a varaible covered in A.1.1
Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
Average Service Life 30
Description: The average life of an airplane is approximately 30 years
Mothballing (seats/Year)
= IntoStorage
Description: the flow of planes into mothballing
Into Storage is a variable covered in A.2.3
Initial Airline Capacity (Seat)
=HistoricalAirlineDemand/NumberofMilesFlownperSeat/
NormalLoadFactor*(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)
+InitialCapacityforPartialModelTest*SwitchforPartialModelTests
Description: This is the initial capacity of seat miles per quarter
Historical Airline Demand is a variable covered in A.5.2
Number of Miles Flown per Seat is a variable covered in A.4.1
Normal Load Factor is a variable covered in A.4.3
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Switch for Partial Model Tests is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Capacity for Partial Model Test is a variable covered in A.1.2
A.1.2 Airline Capacity Supply Line (Seat)
=f(OrdersofAirplanes-AirplaneManufacturingCompletion-Cancellation)
dt+ [InitialCapacityonOrder]
Description: This is the capacity on order at the airlines
Orders of Airplanes (Seat/Year)
= Max(IndicatedCapacityAdjustment-ReturntoService,O)
Description: Airlines first reduce orders for new capacity by the amount of ca-
pacity returned to service from any mothballed fleet, then order what they need to
replace retirements and adjust capacity to target levels. Orders are constrained to be
nonnegative.
Indicated Capacity Adjustment (seats/Year)
=DesiredCapacityAcquisitionRate+AdjustmentfortheSupplyLine
+SupplyLineAdjustmentforGrowthinDemand
Description: The indicated order for seats for the industry is equal to the desired
capacity acquisition rate plus an adjustment for the supply on order and a further
adjustment for the expected growth rate of the industry
Desired Capacity Acquisition Rate (Seat/Year)
=PlannedReplacementOrders
+CapacityAdjustmentforGrowthinDemand+AdjustmentForCapacity
Description: The desired rate of addition of new seats to the industry is their
planned retirements plus an addition to correct for the gap between capacity and its
desired level
" Planned Replacement Orders (seats/Year)
= AirplaneRetirements
Description:
- Airplane Retirements is a variable covered in A.1.1
" Capacity Adjustment for Growth in Demand (Seat/Year)
=AirlineCapacity*ExpectedGrowthRateforDemand
*WeightonDemandForecastOrders
Description: Decision makers must make sure to grow the total number of
planes at the expected growth rate of demand if they are going to accommodate
demand in the long run.
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- Airline Capacity is a stock covered in A.1.1
- Expected Growth Rate for Demand is a stock covered in A.3.1
- Weight on Demand Forecast Orders (fraction)
* 1
* Description: this is the weight that the industry places on forward
looking demand forecasts
Adjustment For Capacity (Seat/Year)
= (DesiredCapacity-AirlineCapacity)/TimetoAdjustCapacity
Description: This is the additional capacity desired based on the current de-
mand, current capacity and the desired load factor
- Desired Capacity (Seat)
=DesiredSeatMiles/NumberofMilesFlownperSeat*
(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)+
InitialCapacityforPartialModelTest*
Exp(ExpectedGrowthRateforDemand
*(Time-INITIALTIME))*SwitchforPartialModelTests
* Desired Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
- = EstimatedCurrentDemand/NormalLoadFactor
- Description: This is the desired number of seat miles given the
desired load factor
Estimated Current Demand (Seat*miles/Year)
- =PerceivedDemand*(1+ExpectedGrowthRateforDemand *
TimetoPerceiveChangesinDemand)
- Description: The current percieved demand must first be projected
into the future by the "Time to Perceive Changes in Demand"
to get a projection of instantaneous demand. Then if demand
forecasts are going to be added over a time horizion other than
one year, the structure above allows the modeler to achieve this
as well
Perceived Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Expected Growth Rate for Demand is a variable covered in A.3.1
Time to Perceive Changes in Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Normal Load Factor is a variable covered in A.4.3
* Number of Miles Flown per Seat is a variable covered in A.4.1
* Switch for Partial Model Tests is a variable covered in A.1.1
* Initial Capacity for Partial Model Test (seats)
- 100
- Description: The number of seats of capacity needs to be initialized
for the partial model test so that we can see that the stock of
capacity track the desired capacity without steady state error
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* Expected GrowthRate for Demand is a variable covered in A.3.1
- Airline Capacity is a stock covered in A. 1.1
- Time to Adjust Capacity (Year)
* 0.594
* Description: This is the horizion over which the capacity adjustment
is evaluated
Adjustment for the Supply Line (Seat/Year)
=WeightonSupplyLineAdjustment*(DesiredAircraftSupplyLine
-AirlineCapacitySupplyLine)/SupplyLineAdjustmentTime
Description: Aircraft ordering is adjusted for the gap between seats on order and
the desired supply line
" Weight on Supply Line Adjustment
1
Description: Allows for the industry to weight future supply adjustments
" Desired Aircraft Supply Line (Seat)
= DesiredCapacityAcquisitionRate*TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane
Description: In order to achieve the capacity acquisition rate given the delay in
aircraft manufacture the industry needs this many seats on order
- Desired Capacity Acquisition Rate is a variable covered in A.1.2
- Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane is a variable covered in A.1.1
" Airline Capacity Supply Line is a variable covered in A.1.2
" Supply Line Adjustment Time (Year)
0.1
Description: Decisions to adjust the supply line are smoothed over this time
period
Supply Line Adjustment for Growth in Demand (Seat/Year)
=WeightonDemandForecastOrders*ExpectedGrowthRateforDemand
*(AirlineCapacitySupplyLine)
Description: Decision makers must make sure to grow the supply line of planes at
the expected growth rate of demand if they are going to accomodate demand in the
long run.
" Weight on Demand Forecast Orders is a variable covered in A.1.2
" Expected Growth Rate for Demand is a variable covered in A.3.1
" Airline Capacity Supply Line is a variable covered in A.1.2
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Return to Service is a flow covered in A.2.3
Airplane Manufacturing Completion is a flow covered in A.1.1
Initial Capacity on Order (Seat)
=(InitialAirlineCapacity/AverageServiceLife+InitialAirlineCapacity
*InitialExpectedGrowthRateinDemand*WeightonDemandForecastOrders)
*TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane
Description: The initial value of capacity on order to get the capacity to balance
expected retirements
Initial Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
Average Service Life is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Expected Growth Rate in Demand is a variable covered in B.6.1
Weight on Demand Forecast Orders is a variable covered in A.1.2
Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane is a variable covered in A.1.1
Cancellation (seats/Year)
= CancelledOrders
Description: This is the rate of airline order cancellations
Cancelled Orders (seats/Year)
=IFTHENELSE(IndicatedCapacityAdjustment<0,
Min(-IndicatedCapacityAdjustment,CapacityonOrderl/TimetoCancel),0)
Description: This is the rate of airline order cancelations
Indicated Capacity Adjustment is a variable covered in A.1.2
Capacity on Order 1 is a variable covered in A.2.5
Time to Cancel (years)
* 0.1
* Description: This time constant controls how quickly orders of airplanes can be
canceled
A.1.3 Mothballed Capacity (seats)
= f(Mothballing-OffMothballing)dt+[0]
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Mothballing is a flow covered in A.1.1
Off Mothballing is a flow covered in A.1.1
Description: The stock of planes currently mothballed. This stock is equivalent to
the stock shown in the third order description of the stock and flow structure, and as
such is not used by the model equations.
A.2 Third Order Delay Structure
A.2.1 Capacity 1 (seats)
= f(NewCapacity-Caplto2)dt+[InitialAirlineCapacity/3]
New Capacity (seats/Year)
= AirplaneManufacturingCompletion
Airplane Manufacturing Completion is a variable covered in A.1.1
Cap 1 to 2 (seats/Year)
= Capacity1/(AverageServiceLife/3)
Capacity 1 is a variable covered in A.2.1
Average Service Life is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
A.2.2 Capacity 2 (seats)
= f(Cap1to2-Cap2to3)dt+ [InitialAirlineCapacity/3]
Cap 1 to 2 is a variable covered in A.2.1
Cap 2 to 3 (seats/Year)
= Capacity2/(AverageServiceLife/3)
Capacity 2 is a variable covered in A.2.2
Average Service Life is a variable covered in A.1.1
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Initial Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
A.2.3 Capacity 3 (seats)
= f(Cap2to3+ ReturntoService-IntoStorage-Retired)dt+ [InitialAirlineCapacity/3]
Cap 2 to 3 is a variable covered in A.2.2
Return to Service (seats/Year)
=IFTHENELSE(IndicatedCapacityAdjustment>O,
CapacityonMothball/TimetoUnMothball,0)
Description: this is the flow of planes off of mothballing and back into the stock
of capacity
Indicated Capacity Adjustment is a variable covered in A.1.2
Capacity on Mothball is a variable covered in A.2.4
Time to UnMothball (years) 0.5
Description: The length of time needed to take a mothballed airplane and return
it to service
Into Storage (seats/Year)
=IFTHENELSE(Time>1980, IFTHENELSE (((1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables) *Op-
eratingMargin +(SwitchforHistoricalVariables) * HistoricalAirlineOperatingMargin)
<= MarginThresholdtolnitiateMothballing, IFTHENELSE(IndicatedCapacityAdjustment
< 0, Min( -IndicatedCapacityAdjustment , Capacity3/TimetoMothball ),0),0),0)
Description: This is the flow of planes into mothballing
Switch for Historical Variables (dmnl ) 0
Description: Set this variable to zero in order to use historical inputs for all of the
model sectors
Operating Margin is a varaiable covered in A.10.2
Historical Airline Operating Margin is a variable covered in A.10.4
Margin Threshold to Initiate Mothballing (fraction) 0
Description: this is the operating margin threshold that will cause airlines to
mothball capacity
Indicated Capacity Adjustment is a variable covered in A.1.2
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Capacity 3 is a variable covered in A.2.3
Time to Mothball (years) 0.25
Description: this is how long it takes airlines to mothball capacity
Retired (seats/Year)
= Capacity3/(AverageServiceLife/3)
Capacity 3 is a variable covered in A.2.3
Average Service Life is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
A.2.4 Capacity on Mothball (seats)
= f(IntoStorage-ReturntoService)dt+[O]
Description: This is the stock of planes waiting on mothball
Into Storage is a variable covered in A.2.3
Return to Service is a variable covered in A.2.3
A.2.5 Capacity on Order 1 (Seat)
= f(Ordering- 1to2-CancelledOrders)dt+ [InitialCapacityonOrder/3
Description: this is the first stock of airline capacity on order
Ordering (Seat/Year)
= OrdersofAirplanes
Description: this lower structure represents the fact that airplane ordering is a
higher order delay process than would be indicated by the one stock representation
above
Orders of Airplanes is a variable covered in A.1.2
1 to 2 (Seat/Year)
= CapacityonOrderl/(TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane/3)
Description: This is the flow of material from the first third of the delay to the
second
Capacity on Order 1 is a variable covered in A.2.5
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Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane is a variable covered in A.1.1
Cancelled Orders is a variable covered in A.1.2
Initial Capacity on Order is a variable covered in A.1.2
A.2.6 Capacity on Order 2 (Seat)
= f(1to2-2to3)dt+ [InitialCapacityonOrder/3]
Description: This is the stock of Capacity on Order in the second stage of pro-
duction
1 to 2 is a varaible covered in A.2.5
2 to 3 (Seat/Year)
= CapacityonOrder2/(TimeRequiredtoManufactureanAirplane/3)
Description: This is the flow of airplanes from the second stock to the third
Capacity on Order 2 is a variable covered in A.2.6
Time Required to Manufacture an Airplane is a varaible covered in A.1.1
Initial Capacity on Order is a varaiable covered in A.1.2
A.2.7 Capacity on Order 3 (Seat)
= f(2to3-Completion)dt+[InitialCapacityonOrder/3]
Description: This is the stock of airplanes ordered that is nearing delivery
2 to 3 is a variable covered in A.2.6
Completion is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Capacity on Order is a variable covered in A.1.2
A.3 Forecasting
A.3.1 Expected Growth Rate for Demand (dmnl/Year)
=f(ChangeinExpectedGrowthRate)dt
+[InitialExpectedGrowthRateinDemand]
Change in Expected Growth Rate (dmnl/Year/Year)
=(IndicatedGrowthRate-ExpectedGrowthRateforDemand)/
TimetoPerceiveTrendinDemand*(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)
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Indicated Growth Rate (dmnl/Year)
=(PerceivedDemand-ReferenceDeiand)/
(ReferenceDenand*TimeHorizionforReferenceDemand)
Perceived Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Reference Demand is a varaible covered in A.3.3
Time Horizion for Reference Demand is a varaible covered in A.3.3
Expected Growth Rate for Demand is a variable covered in A.3.1
Time to Perceive Trend in Demand (Year) 0.3
Switch for Partial Model Tests is a variable covered in A.1.1
Initial Expected Growth Rate in Demand (dmnl/Year)
=FirstExpectedGrowthRate*(1-SwitchforPartialModelTests)
+PartialModelGrowthRate*SwitchforPartialModelTests
First Expected Growth Rate (dmnl/Year) 0
Description:
Switch for Partial Model Tests is a variable covered in A.1.1
Partial Model Growth Rate (dmnl/Year) 0.05
Description:
A.3.2 Perceived Demand (Seat*miles/Year)
= f(ChangeinDemandPerception)dt+[ActualDemandForSeatMiles]
Description: This is the industry's perception of the total demand for seat miles
Change in Demand Perception (Seat*miles/Year/Year)
= GapinDemandPerception/TimetoPerceiveChangesinDemand
Gap in Demand Perception (Seat*miles/Year)
=(HistoricalAirlineDemand*SwitchforHistoricalVariables+
(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)*ActualDemandForSeatMiles)
-PerceivedDemand
Historical Airline Demand is a variable covered in A.5.2
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Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
Actual Demand For Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.5.1
Perceived Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Time to Perceive Changes in Demand (Year) 0.125
Description: This is how long it takes the industry to percieve changes in demand
and for their calculation of desired capacity
Actual Demand For Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.5.1
A.3.3 Reference Demand (Seat *miles/Year)
=f(ChangeinReferenceDemand)dt
+[PerceivedDemand/(1+InitialExpectedGrowthRateinDemand
*TimeHorizionforReferenceDemand)]
Change in Reference Demand (Seat*miles/Year/Year)
= (PerceivedDemand-ReferenceDemand)/TimeHorizionforReferenceDemand
Perceived Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Reference Demand is a variable covered in A.3.3
Time Horizion for Reference Demand (Year) 5
Description:
Perceived Demand is a variable covered in A.3.2
Initial Expected Growth Rate in Demand is a variable covered in B.6.1
Time Horizion for Reference Demand is a variable covered in A.3.3
A.4 Available Seat Miles
A.4.1 Load Factor (fraction)
= TablefortheLoadFactorExperienced(IndicatedLoadFactor)
Description: Load factor is defined as the revenue paasenger miles divided by the
available seat miles, however since the model aggregates over all of the routes in the
industry, we calculate load factor as the output of that ratio in a table function
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Figure A-1: Table for the Load Factor Experienced
Table for the Load Factor Experienced (dmnl)
= [(0,0)-(1.3,1)],(0,0),(0.9,0.9),(0.925,0.9175),(0.95,0.93),(1,0.95),(1.05,0.9675),
(1.1,0.98),(1.15,0.99),(1.2,0.9975),(1.25,1),(1.3,1)
Description:
Indicated Load Factor (dmnl)
= ActualDemandForSeatMiles/AvailableSeatMiles
Description: The indicated load factor is the load factor that the industry would
experience if there were only one route and one time slot that everyone wanted to
fly. Muliple routes cause some to be oversubscribed relative to others and the overall
load factor to be different.
Actual Demand For Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.5.1
Available Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
= AirlineCapacity*NumberofMilesFlownperSeat
Description: The number of seat miles the airlines fly in a given year is the number
of seats of capacity they operate multiplied by the number of miles flown by each seat
Airline Capacity is a variable covered in A.1.1
Number of Miles Flown per Seat (miles/Year)
= DaysperYear*Milestraveledperhourflown*NormalNumberofHoursFownperDay
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Figure A-2: Table for Historical Airline Available Seat Miles
Description: This is the number of miles the airlines would like to use each seat
every year
" Days per Year (days/Year)
365
Description: The number of days in a year
" Miles traveled per hour flown (miles/hour)
160
Description: This is the average number of miles flown per hour
" Normal Number of Hours Flown per Day (hours/day)
9
Description: This is the normal number of flying hours each plane gets per day,
found from the constant part of the regression of plane utilization on load factor
A.4.2 Historical Available Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
= TableforHistoricalAirlineAvailableSeatMiles(Time-l)*le+006
Table for Historical Airline Available Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
=[(1970,0)-(2009,2e+006)],(1970,280000),(1971,294344),(1972,300245)
,(1973,325160) ,(1974,309422),(1975,314873),(1976,337529),(1977,360141)
,(1978,379781),(1979,418114),(1980,431980),(1981,420058),(1982,434670)
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Figure A-3: Table Function for Normal Load Factor
,(1983,466069),(1984,515628),(1985,552619),(1986,604505),(1987,653612)
,(1988,682250),(1989,694087),(1990,740851),(1991,717562),(1992,755986)
,(1993,777360),(1994,792632),(1995,815571),(1996,844037),(1997,871964)
,(1998,882173),(1999,927892),(2000,962464),(2001,931858),(2002,883071)
,(2003,886798),(2004,968696),(2005,999688),(2006,1.00119e+006)
,(2007,1.03161e+006),(2008,1.01234e+006),(2009,950656)
Description: The available seat miles of the airline industry, as given by the air
transport association
A.4.3 Normal Load Factor (fraction)
= TableFunctionforNormalLoadFactor(Time)
Description: This is the desired load factor of the industry as a whole, it increases
with time due to improvements in techonolgy, load management and mechanisation.
Table Function for Normal Load Factor (dmnl)
= [(1970,0)-(2010,1)],(1970,0.5114),(2010,0.7554)
Description: I estimate the best fit line around historically observed load factors
as the current normal load factor in the model
A.5 Demand
A.5.1 Actual Demand For Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
= Population*DemandforSeatMilesperCapita
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Figure A-4: Historical Population Data and Projections
Description: This is the real demand for seat miles seen by the airlines
Population (people)
= InitialPopulation*HistoricalPopulationDataandProjections(Time-1)
Description: This is the population of the United States
Initial Population (people) 203302000
Description: This is the population of the US at the begining of the model run
Historical Population Data and Projections (dmnl) =[(1930,0)-(2060,3)]
,(1940,0.65),(1950,0.74434),(1960,0.88205),(1970,1),(1980,1.1143)
,(1990,1.223),(2000,1.3842),(2010,1.5157),(2020,1.6476)
,(2030,1.7843),(2040,1.9235),(2050,2.06)
Description: This is the historical data on US population normalized to the pop-
ulation at the begining of the model run. Includes government projections of future
population for the life of the model run
Demand for Seat Miles per Capita is a variable covered in A.5.2
A.5.2 Demand for Seat Miles per Capita
(Seat*mile/Year/people)
=EffectofCongestiononDemand*EffectofAffordabilityonDemand
*EffectofNewCapacityonDemand*
TotalSeatMilesDesiredfromGDPperCapita*9/1lEffectOnDemand
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Description: This is the yearly demand for seat miles per person
Effect of Congestion on Demand (dmnl)
= smoothi(IndicatedEffectofCongestiononDemand,CongestionPerceptionTime,l)
Description: It will take a certain amount of time for passengers to change their
attitudes about how congested flights will be.
Indicated Effect of Congestion on Demand (dmnl)
= (Congestion) SensitivityofDemandtoCongestion
Description: When load factor is very high people will be dissapointed with their
flying experience and choose alternative modes of transportation if possible.
Congestion (dmnl) =(SwitchforHistoricalVariables*
HistoricalAirlineLoadFactor+IndicatedLoadFactor*
(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables))/NormalboadFactor
Description: The measure of congestion is the current load factor divided by the
normal load factor the airlines can handle
" Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
" Historical Airline Load Factor (fraction)
= HistoricalAirlineDemand/HistoricalAvailableSeatMiles
Description: The load factors experienced by the industry
- Historical Airline Demand (Seat*miles/Year)
= TableforHistoricalAirlineDemad(Time-1)*le+006
* Table for Historical Airline Demad (Seat*miles/Year)
=[(1970,0)-(2009,le+006)],(1970,131710),(1971,135658)
,(1972,152406),(1973,161957),(1974,162919),(1975,162810)
,(1976,178988),(1977,193219),(1978,226781)7(1979,262023)
,(1980,255192),(1981,248888),(1982,259644)7(1983,281829)
,(1984,305116),(1985,336403),(1986,366546),(1987,404471)
,(1988,423302),(1989,432714),(1990,457926)7(1991,447955)
,(1992,478554),(1993,489684) ,(1994,519382),(1995,540656)
,(1996,578663),(1997,603419),(1998,618087),(1999,652047)
,(2000,692757),(2001,651700),(2002,641102),(2003,656909)
,(2004,733680),(2005,779004),(2006,809755) ,(2007,840759)
,(2008,822435),(2009,779511)
- Historical Available Seat Miles is a varaible covered in A.4.2
" Indicated Load Factor is a variable covered in A.4.1
" Normal Load Factor is a varaiable covered in A.4.3
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Figure A-5: Table for Historical Airline Demad
Sensitivity of Demand to Congestion (dmnl) -0.726
Description: Demand is lower when people feel that flights are too congested, this
will manifest as a negative sensitivity of demand to congestion.
Congestion Perception Time (Year) 0.75
Description: The perception of the airline industry's congestion takes a while to
change
Effect of Affordability on Demand (dmnl)
=(ReferenceTicketPrice/((SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*HistoricalAirlineTicketPrices+(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*TicketPrice)) ^StrengthofAffordabiltyEffectonDemand
Description: This measures the change in demand due to changes in ticket price
charged by the airlines
Reference Ticket Price (dollars/ (Seat*mile)) = InitialTicketPrice*CPI
Description: This is the GDP per capita adjusted ticket price relative to the initial
price
Initial Ticket Price is a variable covered in A.6.1
CPI (dmnl) = f(CPl*CPPercentageChange)dt+[1]
Description: With 1977 as a value of 1
e CPI Percentage Change is a variable covered in A.8.1
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Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
Historical Airline Ticket Prices is a varaible covered in A.6.2
Ticket Price is a variable covered in A.6.1
Strength of Affordabilty Effect on Demand (dmnl) 0.106
Description: This controls how steep or shallow the response of demand is to
changes in the price of airfare compared to a basket of representative goods
Effect of New Capacity on Demand (dmnl)
- 1+Max(OneYearPercentChangeinCapacity*StrengthofNewCapacityEffectonDemand,0)
Description: New Capacity will effect how many seat miles the average person
demands because new capacity represents new routes and schedules that will spur
demand
One Year Percent Change in Capacity (dmnl)
= AvailableSeatMiles/SMOOTH(AvailableSeatMiles,LagforMeasuringChanges)-1
Description: The recent change in seat miles made avaialble by the airlines
Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
Lag for Measuring Changes (Year) 1
Description:
Strength of New Capacity Effect on Demand (dmnl) 0.25
Description: The number of seat miles demanded per capita for every increase of
one seat mile offered by the airlines
Total Seat Miles Desired from GDP per Capita (Seat*mile/Year/people)
= WorldSeatMilesDesiredfromGDPperCapita+SeatMilesDesiredfromGDPperCapita
Description:
World Seat Miles Desired from GDP per Capita (Seat*miles/person/Year)
= WorldGDPperCapita*WorldMilesperPersonperDollarofGDP
Description: This variable adjusts demand based on the affect of changes in con-
sumer income compared to a reference level
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Figure A-6: World Historical GDP Data
World GDP per Capita (dollars/person)
= WorldHistoricalGDPData(Time-1)
Description: this is the GDP per capita in america
e World Historical GDP Data (dollars/person)
=[(1968,0)-(2008,6000)],(1969,2351),(1970,2444),(1971,2492),(1972,2574)
,(1973,2683),(1974,2682),(1975,2674),(1976,2749),(1977,2801)
,(1978,2861),(1979,2939),(1980,2964),(1981,2959)7(1982,2948)
,(1983,2962),(1984,3015),(1985,3061),(1986,3108),( 1987,3170)
,(1988,3262),(1989,3327),(1990,3375),(1991,3393),(1992,3394)
,(1993,3391),(1994,3441),(1995,3496),(1996,3558),(1997,3628)
,(1998,3634),(1999,3679),(2000,3789),(2001,3811),(2002,3838)
,(2003,3891),(2004,4002),(2005,4094),(2006,4215),(2007,4334)
Description: This is the historical world GDP per capita expressed in real 2000
dollars
World Miles per Person per Dollar of GDP ((Seat*miles)/(Year*$))
0.05
Description: The number of miles demanded per dollar of GDP per capita
Seat Miles Desired from GDP per Capita (Seat*miles/person/Year)
= GDPperCapita*MilesperPersonperDollarofGDP+ConstantDemandAdjustment
Description: This variable adjusts demand based on the affect of changes in con-
sumer income compared to a reference level
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Figure A-7: Historical GDP Data
GDP per Capita (dollars/person) = Historical GDP Data(Time-1)
Description: this is the GDP per capita in america
e Historical GDP Data (dollars/person)
=[(1968,0)-(2008,80000)],(1969,18578),(1970,18395),(1971,18774),(1972,19557)
,(1973,20488),(1974,20199),(1975,19962),(1976,20826),(1977,21570),(1978,22531)
,(1979,22987),(1980,22666),(1981,23011),(1982,22350),(1983,23148),(1984,24598)
,(1985,25386),(1986,26028),(1987,26668),(1988,27519),(1989,28226),(1990,28435)
,(1991,28011),(1992,28559),(1993,28943),(1994,29744),(1995,30131),(1996,30886)
7(1997,31891),(1998,32837),(1999,33908),(2000,34770),(2001,34701),(2002,34931)
,(2003,35479),(2004,36433),(2005,37206),(2006,37928),(2007,38340)
Description: This is the historical GDP per capita expressed in real 2000 dollars
Miles per Person per Dollar of GDP ((Seat*miles)/(Year*$))
0.093
Description: The number of miles demanded per dollar of GDP per capita
Constant Demand Adjustment (Seat*miles/person/Year)
-1087.68
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9/11 Effect On Demand is a variable that is covered in A.11.1
A.6 Price Setting
A.6.1 Ticket Price (dollars/(Seat*mile))
= f(ChangeinTicketPrice)dt+[InitialTicketPrice]
Description: This is the expected ticket price or the airlines
Change in Ticket Price (dollars/(Seat*mile)/Year)
= (IndicatedTicketPriceperSeatMile-TicketPrice)/TimetoAdjustTicketPrices
Description: This is the process of adjustment in the airlines expected ticket price
Indicated Ticket Price per Seat Mile (dollars/(Seat*mile))
=TicketPrice*EffectofDemandSupplyBalanceonPrice
*EffectofMarginonPrice*EffectofCostsonPrice
Description: This is the ticket price per seat mile
Ticket Price is a varaible covered in A.6.1
Effect of Demand Supply Balance on Price (dmnl)
= CurrentDemandSupplyBalance^SensitivityofPricetoDemandSupplyBalance
Description: When load factors are high the industry can raise prices because
demand is robust compared to the supply of seats. When load factors are below the
target prices feel a downward pressure because there is little demand relative to the
number of seats being offered in the industry
" Current Demand Supply Balance (dmnl)
=(HistoricalAirlineLoadFactor*SwitchforHistoricalVariables+
(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)*LoadFactor)/NormalLoadFactor
Description: Computes the ratio of total airline demand to "normal" demand
- Historical Airline Load Factor is a varaible covered in A.5.2
- Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
- Load Factor is a variable coverd in A.4.1
- Normal Load Factor is a variable covered in A.4.3
" Sensitivity of Price to Demand Supply Balance (dmnl)
=OriginalSensitivityofPricetoDemandSupplyBalance
+EffectofYieldManagementonSensitivity*
IFTHENELSE(Time>YieldManagementIntroductionYear,1,O)
Description: Once yield management is indtroduced the sensitivity of price to
the demand supply balance is instantly increased by the indicated level.
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- Original Sensitivity of Price to Demand Supply Balance (dinnl [0,3])
0.25
Description: The sensitivity of airline prices to load factors before the
introduction of yield management
- Effect of Yield Management on Sensitivity (dmnl [0,3])
2.25
Description: Yield Management increases the sensitivity of prices to load
factors because load factors are the main component determining the price
of seats
- Yield Management Introduction Year (Year)
1987
Description: American Airlines introduction of ultimate super saver fares
occured on January 17th 1985, 1 add one year for thereporting process and
one year for widespread adoption
Effect of Margin on Price (dmnl)
= (PressurefromMargin) ^SensitivityofPricetoMargin
Description:
" Pressure from Margin (dmnl)
=(1+TargetMargin)/(1+HistoricalAirlineOperatingMargin
*SwitchforHistoricalVariables+(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*OperatingMargin)
Description: The ratio of actual (historical) margin and the target margin
- Target Margin (dmnl [0,0.1])
0.05
Description: The level of oerating margin where pressures on ticket price
change from being positive to being negative
- Historical Airline Operating Margin is a variable covered in A.10.4
- Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
- Operating Margin is a variable covered in A.10.2
" Sensitivity of Price to Margin (dmnl)
0.4
Description:
Effect of Costs on Price (dmnl)
= PressurefromCosts^SensitivityofPricetoCosts
Description:
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* Pressure from Costs (dmnl)
= (CurrentOperatingCostsperSeatMile-
ExpectedAncillaryFeeRevenueperRevenuePassengerMile)
*(1 +TargetPercentageAboveCost)/TicketPrice
Description: The current level of pressure from costs on ticket price, before the
sensitivity is taken into account
- Current Operating Costs per Seat Mile (dollars/(Seat*mile))
=((SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*HistoricalOperatingCostperAvailableSeatMile
+(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)*CostperAvailableSeatMile)
Description: The operating costs of the airline industry per available seat
mile. This equation allows for switching between historical and simulated
time series'.
* Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
* Historical Operating Cost per Available Seat Mile
Historical Airline Passenger Operating Costs is a variable covered in
A.10.4
Historical Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.2
* Cost per Available Seat Mile is a variable coverd in A.7.1
- Expected Ancillary Fee Revenue per Revenue Passenger Mile
(dollars/(Seat*mile))
= HistoricalAncillaryFeeRevenue/HistoricalAvailableSeatMiles
Description: The expected ancillary fee revenue per seat mile sold
* Historical Ancillary Fee Revenue (dollars/Year)
= TableforAncillaryFees(Time-1)*1000
Description: Fees in the table are recorded in thousands of dollars per
year
Table for Ancillary Fees (dollars/Year)
=[(1969,0)-(2010,le+008)],(1977,0),(1995,1.07815e+007)
,(1996,1.11052e+007),(1997,1.33417e+007),(1998,1.57061e+007)
,(1999,1.67841e+007),(2000,1.67335e+007),(2001,1.62059e+007)
,(2002,1.52043e+007),(2003,1.95053e+007),(2004,2.60094e+007)
,(2005,3.10 487e+007),(2006,3.48475e+007),(2007,3.67713e+007)
,(2 008,4.08706e+007),(2009,3.78906e+007)
Description: Ancillary fees have only recently been added to the
income stream of airlines, they are an important cause of the rel-
atively low yield per revenue passenger mile in the past decade
* Historical Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.2
- Target Percentage Above Cost (dmnl)
0.54
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Figure A-8: Table for Ancillary Fees
Description: this is the level of profitability where airlines will no longer
raise fares
- Ticket Price is a variable covered in A.6.1
* Sensitivity of Price to Costs (dmnl)
0.3
Description:
Ticket Price is a varaible covered in A.6.1
Time to Adjust Ticket Prices (Year) 0.05
Description: This is how long it takes airlines to adjust prices to the level sugested
by the indicated price
Initial Ticket Price (dollars/(Seat*mile))
0.0797
Description: The initial ticket price
A.6.2 Historical Airline Ticket Prices (dollars/(Seat*mile))
= TableforHistoricalAirlineTicketPrices(Time-1)
Description: The actual ticket prices charged by the industry in nominal dollars
(cents)
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Figure A-9: Table for Historical Airline Ticket Prices
Table for Historical Airline Ticket Prices (dollars/(Seat*mile))
= [(1970,0)-(2009,0.2)], (1970,0.0579)7(1971,0.0606), (1972,0.0608),(1973,0.0634)
,(1974,0.0729),(1975,0.0759),(1976,0.0797) ,(1977,0.0842),(1978,0.0829)7(1979,0.087)
,(1980,0.1099),(1981,0.1234),(1982,0.1177),(1983,0.1162),(1984,0.1211),(1985,0.1166)
,(1986,0.1093),(1987,0.1111),(1988,0.1188),(1989,0.1243),(1990,0.1276),(1991,0.1274)
,(1992,0.1251),(1993,0.1313),(1994,0.1265)7(1995,0.1292)(1996,0.1305),(1997,0.1318)
(1998,0.1311)7(1999,0.1294),(2000,0.1351),(200170.1242),(2002,0.1145),(2003,0.1178)
,(2004,0.1167) ,(2005,0.12),(2006,0.1273),(2007,0.1298),(2008,0.1373),(2009,0.1187)
Description:
A.7 Operating Costs
A.7.1 Cost per Available Seat Mile (dollars/(Seat*mile))
=OperatingCostsfromPassengers/(HistoricalAvailableSeatMiles
*SwitchforHistoricalVariables+ (1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*AvailableSeatMiles)
Description: this is the current cost the airlines see per seat mile they fly. It will
serve as the at cost ticket price for the airlines
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Operating Costs from Passengers is a variable covered in A.7.2
Historical Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.2
Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
A.7.2 Total Operating Costs (dollars/Year)
= OperatingCostsfromPassengers
Description:
Operating Costs from Passengers (dollars/Year)
= VariableCostfromOperations+CostsfroinWages
Description: This is the sum of all costs of the airlines
Variable Cost from Operations (dollars/Year)
=(HistoricalAvailableSeatMiles*SwitchforHistoricalVariables
+(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)*AvailableSeatMiles)
*VariableCostsperSeatMile
Description: This is the variable cost of operations the airlines see
Historical Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.2
Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
Variable Costs per Seat Mile (dollars/(Seat*mile))
= VariableCostsfromJetFuel+OtherVariableCosts
Description: This is the variable cost of running a seat for an hour
* Variable Costs from Jet Fuel ($/(Seat*mile))
= FuelCostperGallon*GallonsperSeatMile
Description: This is the variable cost seen per dollar of jet fuel costs
- Fuel Cost per Gallon ($/gallon)
= HistoricalJetFuelCost(Time-1)
Description: This is the fuel cost per gallon backsolved from ATA cost
tables to remove the effects of hedging
* Historical Jet Fuel Cost (dollars/gallon)
=[(1970,0)-(2010,3)],(1971,0.11),(1972,0.12),(1973,0.13),(1974,0.25)
,(1975,0.3),(1976,0.32),(1977,0.36),(1978,0.39),(1979,0.57),(1980,0.89)
,(1981,1.04),(1982,0.99),(1983,0.88),(1984,0.83),(1985,0.89)
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Figure A-10: Historical Jet Fuel Cost
,(1986,0.65),(1987,0.65),(1988,0.62),(1989,0.7)7(1990,0.77)
,(1991,0.69),(1992,0.63),(1993,0.59),(1994,0.54),(1995,0.55)
,(1996,0.65) ,(1997,0.63),(1998,0.5),(1999,0.52),(2000,0.79)
,(2001,0.77),(2002,0.71),(2003,0.85),(2004,1.13),(2005,1.62)
,(2006,1.91),(2007,2.03),(2008,2.98),(2009,1.83)
Description: The historical cost of jet fuel is taken from a calculation
performed by the ATA in the cost index tables available for download
from their website
- Gallons per Seat Mile (gallons/(Seat*mile) [0,0.06])
= TableforHistoricalGallonsperSeatMile(Time-1)
Description: This is the number of gallons of jet fuel used ber seat mile
* Table for Historical Gallons per Seat Mile (gallons/(Seat*mile))
=[(1970,0.01)-(2010,0.03)],(1970,0.03),(1977,0.0286788)
,(1978,0.0276285),(1979,0.0256997),(1980,0.0237357)
,(1981,0.0249184),(1982,0.0236304),(1983,0.0229709)
,(1984,0.0231163),(1985,0.023007),(1986,0.0225247)
,(1987,0.0223215),( 1988,0.0224301),(1989,0.0225935)
,(1990,0.0220211),(1991,0.0213198),(1992,0.0208258)
,(1993,0.020828),(1994,0.0214526),(1995,0.021464)
,(1996,0.0213699)7(1997,0.0217202),(1998,0.020843)
,(1999,0.0215229),(2000,0.0198821),(2001,0.0194169)
,(2002,0.0188882),(2003,0.0188717),(2004,0.0186776)
,(2005,0.018264),(2006,0.01776) ,(2007,0.0174199)
,(2008,0.0173081),(2009,0.0166634)
Description: Historical data from the BTS on the number fo gallons
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Figure A-11: Table for Historical Gallons per Seat Mile
of fuel used systemwide per available seat mile
* Other Variable Costs (dollars/(Seat*mile))
= ProducerPricelndex*1977OtherVariableCosts
Description: These are all the variable costs other than jet fuel that the airline
experiences. Does not include costs from labor expenses or transport related
costs. These costs scale with PPI ex food and energy in order to keep them
current. There is also an effect on costs from congestion.
- Producer Price Index (dmnl)
= TableforPPlexenergy(Time-1)/66.88
Description: An Index that measures the average cost of goods for pro-
ducers inthe economy. With 1977 set equal to 1
* Table for PPI ex energy (dmnl)
=[(1970,0)-(2010,200)],(1970,50),(1974,53.608),(1975,59.742)
,(1976,63.117)(1977,66.883)7(1978,71.9),(1979,78.342)
,(1980,87.083),(1981,94.6),(1982,99.983),(1983,102.992)
,(1984,105.558),(1985,108.108),(1986,110.608),(1987,113.292)
,(1988,116.992),(1989,122.1),(1990,126.583),(1991,131.05)
,(1992,134.175),(1993,135.792),(1994,137.108),(1995,139.942)
,(1996,141.992),(1997,142.442),(1998,143.717),(1999,146.083)
,(2000,147.958),(2001,150.033),(2002,150.133),(2003,150.4)
,(2004,152.7) ,(2005,156.342),(2006,158.708), (2007,161.867)
,(2008,167.417),(2009,171.7),(2010,173.767)
- 1977 Other Variable Costs (dollars/(Seat*mile))
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Figure A-12: Table for PPI ex energy
0.0245
Costs from Wages (dollars/Year)
= TotalWorkerSalary
Description: This is the quaterly cost of wages for the airlines
Total Worker Salary ($/Year)
=(AverageWorkerCompensation*(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
+HistoricaAirineSalaries*SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*TotalWorkforce
" Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
" Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
" Historical Airline Salaries is a variable covered inA.8.2
" Total Workforce is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.7.3 Historical Airline Passenger Operating Costs ($/Year)
=HistoricalAirlineTicketPrices*HistoricalAirlineDemand
+HistoricalAncillaryFeeRevenue-HistoricalAirlineOperatingProfit
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Historical Airline Ticket Prices isa variable covered in A.6.2
Historical Airline Demand is a variable covered in A.5.2
Historical Ancillary Fee Revenue is a variable covered in A.6.1
Historical Airline Operating Profit is a variable covered in A.10.3
A.8 Wages
A.8.1 Average Worker Compensation (dollars/Year/person)
- f(ChangeinWorkerCompensation)dt+[InitialWorkerCompensation]
Description: This is the level of compensation including salary, bonus and benefits
for the average airline industry worker
Change in Worker Compensation (dollars/Year/person/Year)
= GapForWorkerCompensation/TimetoChangeWorkerCompensation
Description:
Gap For Worker Compensation (dollars/person/Year)
= IndicatedCompensation-AverageWorkerCompensation
Description: Worker compensation will move toward the indicated level with some
delay
Indicated Compensation (dollars/Year/person)
=AverageWorkerCompensation*EffectoflnflationinWorkerCompensation
*EffectfOperatingMarginonWorkerCompensation
*EffectofOutsideOpportunitiesonWorkerCompensation
*EffectofUnemploymentonWorkerCompensation
*EffectofWorkerTenureonCompensation
Description: Average worker compensation is pressured to change by a certain
percentage. Each of the five effects modeled will indicate a certian percentage change,
and their sum total effect will be the indicated change in compensation
" Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
" Effect of Inflation in Worker Compensation (dmnl)
= 1+CPIPercentageChange*StrengthoflnflationonWorkerCompensation
Description: The normal change in compensation per year all else equal This
can be thought of as arising from inflation and other constant effects that would
change compensation
- CPI Percentage Change (dnml/Year)
= CPIData(Time-1)/100
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Figure A-13: CPI Data
Description: Data from the BLS on the Consumer Price Index, reported
as the percentage change year on year of hte average CPI during the year
* CPI Data (dmnl/Year)
=[(1950,-2)-(2008,15)],(1952,1.9),(1953,0.8),(1954,0.7),(1955,-0.4)
,(1956,1.5),(1957,3.3),(1958,2.8),(1959,0.7),(1960,1.7),(1961,1),(1962,1)
,(1963,1.3),(1964,1.3),(1965,1.6),(1966,2.9),(1967,3.1),(1968,4.2)
,(1969,5.5),(1970,5.7),(1971,4.4),(1972,3.2),(1973,6.2),(1974,11)
,(1975,9.1),(1976,5.8),(1977,6.5),(1978,7.6),(1979,11.3),(1980,13.5)
,(1981,10.3),(1982,6.2)7(1983,3.2)7(1984,4.3),(1985,3.6),(1986,1.9)
,(1987,3.6),(1988,4.1),(1989,4.8),(1990,5.4),(1991,4.2),(1992,3)
,(1993,3),(1994,2.6),(1995,2.8)7(1996,3),(1997,2.3),(1998,1.6)
,(1999,2.2),(2000,3.4),(2001,2.8),(2002,1.6) ,(2003,2.3)
,(2004,2.7),(2005,3.4) ,(2006,3.2),(2007,2.8)
- Strength of Inflation on Worker Compensation (Year)
1
Description:
* Effect of Operating Margin on Worker Compensation (dmnl)
=((1+PerceivedMargin)/
(1+NormalMargin)) ^StrengthofMarginonWorkerCompensation
Description:
- Perceived Margin (dmnl)
=smoothi(((SwitchforHistoricalVariables)
*HistoricalAirlineOperatingMargin+
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(1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables)*OperatingMargin)
,MarginPerceptionDelay,lnitialPercievedMargin)
Description: The margin currently affecting airline salaries is not the cur-
rent margin, but rather recent margin, since it takes some time for the
margin the airlines are experiencing to be percieved.
* Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
* Historical Airline Operating Margin is a variable covered in A.10.4
* Operating Margin is a variable covered in A.10.2
* Margin Perception Delay (years)
1
Description: It takes this long for maring to be percieved by unions
and used in wage negotiations
* Initial Percieved Margin (dmnl)
0.04
- Normal Margin (dmnl)
0.068
Description:
- Strength of Margin on Worker Compensation (dmnl)
0.425
Description: A measure of how responsive average worker compensation is
to the presures from profit margin
* Effect of Outside Opportunities on Worker Compensation (dmnl)
=1+Max(WageRelativetoAverage
*StrengthofOutsideOpportunitiesonWorkerCompensation,-0.99)
Description: Outside opportunities and rising wages in other fields will force
the airline industry to change its wages as well in order to attract the level of
worker it needs
- Wage Relative to Average (dmnl)
=(NationalAverageWage-AverageWorkerCompensation)/
NationalAverageWage+WagePremiumforSkill
Description: The percentage difference between the national average wage
and the wages of airline employees, adjusted up by the wage premium for
skill
* National Average Wage (dollars/person/Year)
= NationalAverageWageData(Time-1)
Description: data from the social security administration on the na-
tional average wage
National Average Wage Data (dollars/person/Year) shown in fig-
ure A-14
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Figure A-14: National Average Wage Data
* Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
* Wage Premium for Skill (dmnl)
1.2
Description: Each class of worker has particular skills or training that
enable it to command higher wages than the average. Wages will still
react to changes relative to the national average, but without this
renormalization of the average wage our model would not have an
equilibrium where pilots (for instance) made more than the average
wage nationally.
- Strength of Outside Opportunities on Worker Compensation (dmnl)
0.75
Description:
* Effect of Unemployment on Worker Compensation (dmnl)
=1+(HistoricalUnemployment-NormalUnemployment)
*StrengthofUnemploymentEffectonWages
Description: Higher Unemployment will enable airlines to offer lower wages to
their employees on average
- Historical Unemployment (dmnl)
= HistoricalUnemploymentData(Time-1)/100
Description: This is historical data on the unemployment rate in percent-
age of the labor force looking for work.
* Historical Unemployment Data (dmnl) shown in figure A-15
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Figure A-15: Historical Unemployment Data
- Normal Unemployment (dmnl)
0.048
Description: There is some normal level of unemployment at which there
will be no effect of unemployment on wages
- Strength of Unemployment Effect on Wages (dnl [0,40])
10
Description: While the Strength of the unemployment effect is an empirical
matter these coeficients only make sense if they are negative.
* Effect of Worker Tenure on Compensation (dmnl)
=(AverageWorkerTenure/NormalWorkerTenure) ^ StrengthofTenureEffectonWages
Description: The pressure on wages from the length of service of the workforce
- Average Worker Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.9
- Normal Worker Tenure (years)
14
Description: A normalizing constant for the tenure effect on wages
- Strength of Tenure Effect on Wages (dmnl)
0.425
Description: The strength of the effect of tenure on wages
Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
Time to Change Worker Compensation (years) 1
Description: Workers only negotiate their wages sporadically, and so it take time
to wages to adjust to new conditions in the industry
Initial Worker Compensation (dollars/(person*Year))
23090
Description: The initial average airline worker salary in 1977
A.8.2 Historical Airline Salaries (dollars/person/Year)
= HistoricalAirlineSalaryData(Time-1)
Description: Historical data on worker salaries
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Figure A-16: Historical Airline Salary Data
Historical Airline Salary Data (dollars/person/Year) shown in figure
A.8.3 Historical Real Wage (dollars/Year/person)
= HistoricalAirlineSalaries/CPI
Historical Airline Salaries is a variable covered in A.8.2
CPI is a variable covered in A.5.2
A.8.4 Historical Average Real Wage (dollars/Year/person)
= NationalAverageWage/CPI
National Average Wage is a variable covered in A.8.1
CPI is a variable covered in A.5.2
A.8.5 Simulated Real Wage (dollars/Year/person)
= AverageWorkerCompensation/CPI
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Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
CPI is a variable covered in A.5.2
A.9 Employees
A.9.1 Rookie Employees (people)
= f(Hiring-RookieLayoffs-SomeYearsofExperience)dt+[InitialEmployees/4]
Description: The stock of newly hired employees
Hiring (people/Year)
= IndicatedHiring/TimetoHire
Description: The flow of new hires into the air transportation industry
Indicated Hiring (people)
= Max(IndicatedAdjustmenttoWorkforce,0)
Description: Hiring is non-negative, so the max function ensures that only positive
workforce adjustments cause hiring
Indicated Adjustment to Workforce (people)
= IndicatedTotalWorkforce-TotalWorkforce
Description: The total change in the workforce indicated by airline capacity
e Indicated Total Workforce (people)
=(HistoricalAvailableSeatMiles*SwitchforHistoricalVariables
+ (1-SwitchforHistoricalVariables) *AvailableSeatMiles)/
AvaialbeSeatMilesperEmployee
Description: The airline industry employs this many workers. This formulation
assumes that there is a certain historically determined number of workers for
every avalilable seat mile of capacity.
- Historical Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.2
- Switch for Historical Variables is a variable covered in B.1.2
- Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
- Avaialbe Seat Miles per Employee ((Seat*mile/Year)/person)
= TableforASMperEmployee(Time)*1000
Description: The available seat miles per employee is read from the ob-
served historical data
* Table for ASM per Employee ((Seat*mile/Year)/person)
=[(1970,0)-(2010,4000)],(1970,1025),(1971,1035.3),(1972,1017.9)
,(1973,1066.4),(1974,1034.3),(1975,1097.7),(1976,1163.9),(1977,1168)
,(1978,1211.7),(1979,1232.1),(1980,1253.1),(1981,1253.6)
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Figure A-17: Table for ASM per Employee
,(1982,1374.7),(1983,1485),(1984,1597.6),(1985,1627),(1986,1650.3)
,(1987,1682.2),(1988,1680.9),(1989,1636.4),(1990,1585)
,(1991,1598.8),(1992,1664.4),(1993,1722.9),(1994,1785.6)
,(1995,1846),(1996,1868),(1997,1876.1),(1998,1808.5)
,(1999,1824.8),(2000,1760.6),(2001,1748.2),(2002,1855)
,(2003,2010.1),(2004,2208.3),(2005,2373.7),(2006,2477)
,(2007,2497.5),(2008,2483.4),(2009,2463.6),(2010,2570.3)
Description: The historical values for seat miles per employee in thou-
sands
* Total Workforce (people)
=RookieEmployees+EmployeeswithSomeExperience
+ExperiencedEmployees+VeryExperiencedEmployees
Description: The total workforce is the sum of each workforce stock.
- Rookie Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
- Employees with Some Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
- Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.3
- Very Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.4
Time to Hire (Year)
0.25
Description: The delay between when hiring is indicated and implemented.
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Rookie Layoffs (people/Year)
= IndicatedLayoffs/TimetoExecuteLayoffs/4
Description: The rate of layoffs from the indicated employee stock.
Indicated Layoffs (people) = -Min(IndicatedAdjustmenttoWorkforce,0)
Description: Layoffs should only occur when the indicated adjustment to the
workforce is negative. The additional sign change ensures that a negative indicated
adjustment becomes a postive outflow from the stocks
Indicated Adjustment to Workforce is a variable covered in A.9.1
Time to Execute Layoffs (Year)
0.125
Description: The delay between when layoffs are indicated and they begin to
occur. Includes time to consider whether layoffs are justified.
Some Years of Experience (people/Year)
= RookieEmployees/DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks
Description: An ageing flow of employees
Rookie Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks (years)
8
Description:
Initial Employees (people)
288980
Description:
A.9.2 Employees with Some Experience (people)
=f (Some Years of Experience-More Years of Experience
-Some Experience Layoffs) dt + [Initial Employees/4]
Description: The stock of employees with some experience
Some Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.1
More Years of Experience (people/Year)
= EmployeeswithSomeExperience/DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks
Description: An ageing flow of employees
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Employees with Some Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
Some Experience Layoffs (people/Year)
= IndicatedLayoffs/TimetoExecuteLayoffs/4
Description: The rate of layoffs from the indicated employee stock.
Indicated Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Time to Execute Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.3 Experienced Employees (people)
=f(MoreYearsofExperience-ExperiencedLayoffs
-ManyYearsofExperience)dt+[InitialEmployees/4]
Description: The stock of employees with more experience
More Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
Experienced Layoffs (people/Year)
= IndicatedLayoffs/TimetoExecuteLayoffs/4
Description: The rate of layoffs from the indicated employee stock.
Indicated Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Time to Execute Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Many Years of Experience (people/Year)
= ExperiencedEmployees/DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks
Description: An ageing flow of employees
Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.3
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
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Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.4 Very Experienced Employees (people)
=f (Many Years of Experience-Retirement-Very Experiencd Layoffs) dt
+ [Initial Employees/4]
Description: The stock of employees with a large ammount of experience
Many Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.3
Retirement (people/Year)
= VeryExperiencedEmployees/DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks
Description: An ageing flow of employees
Very Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.4
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocksis a variable covered in A.9.1
Very Experienced Layoffs (people/Year)
= Indicated Layoffs/Time to Execute Layoffs/4
Description: The rate of layoffs from the indicated employee stock.
Indicated Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Time to Execute Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.5 Total Years of Rookie Tenure (person*years)
=f(TenureGain-LayoffLossl-TenureTransferl)dt
+[(0.5)*DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks*InitialEmployees/4
Description: A coflow stock of total experience
Tenure Gain 1 (person*Year/Year)
= RookieEmployees*YearsofTenureGainedperEmployeeperYear
Description: The rate of flow of experience from normal work
Rookie Employeesis a variable covered in A.9.1
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Years of Tenure Gained per Employee per Year
(person*Year/person/Year)
1
Description: The rate of experience gain from one years work is one person year
per person per year, which is dimensionless
Layoff Loss 1 (person*years/Year)
= AverageTenurel*RookieLayoffs
Description: The loss of tenure from layoffs for the indicated stock
Average Tenure 1 (years)
= Total Years of Rookie Tenure/Rookie Employees
Description: The average experience of rookies
Total Years of Rookie Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.5
Rookie Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
Rookie Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.1
Tenure Transfer 1 (person*Year/Year)
= Average Tenure 1*Some Years of Experience
Description: A flow of experience through the coflow
Average Tenure 1 is a variable covered in A.9.5
Some Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.1
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.6 Total Years of Some Experience Tenure (person*years)
=f(TenureGain2+TenureTransfer-LayoffLoss2-TenureTransfer2)dt+
(1.5)*DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks*InitialEmployees/4
Description: A coflow stock of total experience
Tenure Gain 2 (person*Year/Year)
= EmployeeswithSoneExperience*YearsofTenureGainedperEmployeeperYear
Description: The rate of flow of experience from normal work
Employees with Some Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
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Years of Tenure Gained per Employee per Year is a variable covered in
A.9.5
Tenure Transfer 1 is a variable covered in A.9.5
Layoff Loss 2 (person*years/Year)
- AverageTenure2*SomeExperienceLayoffs
Description: The loss of tenure from layoffs for the indicated stock
Average Tenure 2 (years)
= TotalYearsofSomeExperienceTenure/EmployeeswithSomeExperience
Description: The average experience of employees with some experience
Total Years of Some Experience Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.6
Employees with Some Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
Some Experience Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.2
Tenure Transfer 2 (person*Year/Year)
= MoreYearsofExperience*AverageTenure2
Description: A flow of experience through the coflow
More Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.2
Average Tenure 2 is a variable covered in A.9.6
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.7 Total Years of Experienced Tenure (person*years)
=f(TenureGain3+TenureTransfer2-LayoffLoss3-TenureTransfer3)dt+ (2.5)*DelayBe-
tweenEmployeeExperienceStocks*InitialEmployees/4]
Description: A coflow stock of total experience
Tenure Gain 3 (person*Year/Year)
= ExperiencedEmployees*YearsofTenureGainedperEmployeeperYear
Description: The rate of flow of experience from normal work
Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.3
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Years of Tenure Gained per Employee per Year is a variable covered in
A.9.5
Tenure Transfer 2 is a variable covered in A.9.6
Layoff Loss 3 (person*years/Year)
= AverageTenure3*ExperiencedLayoffs
Description: The loss of tenure from layoffs for the indicated stock
Average Tenure 3 (years)
= TotalYearsofExperiencedTenure/ExperiencedEmployees
Description: The average experience of experienced employees
Total Years of Experienced Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.9
Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.3
Experienced Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.3
Tenure Transfer 3 (person*Year/Year)
= AverageTenure3*ManyYearsofExperience
Description: A flow of experience through the coflow
Average Tenure 3 is a variable covered in A.9.7
Many Years of Experience is a variable covered in A.9.3
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.8 Total Years of Very Eperienced Tenure (person*years)
=f(TenureGain4+TenureTransfer3-LayoffLoss4-
RetirementTenureLoss)dt
+(3.5)*DelayBetweenEmployeeExperienceStocks*InitialEmployees/4
Description: A coflow stock of total experience
Tenure Gain 4 (person*Year/Year)
= VeryExperiencedEmployees*YearsofTenureGainedperEmployeeperYear
Description: The rate of flow of experience from normal work
Very Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.4
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Years of Tenure Gained per Employee per Year is a variable covered in
A.9.5
Tenure Transfer 3 is a variable covered in A.9.7
Layoff Loss 4 (person*years/Year)
- AverageTenure4*VeryExperiencdLayoffs
Description: The loss of tenure from layoffs for the indicated stock
Average Tenure 4 (years)
= TotalYearsofVeryEperiencedTenure/VeryExperiencedEmployees
Description: The average expereince of the most experienced employees
Total Years of Very Eperienced Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.8
Very Experienced Employees is a variable covered in A.9.4
Very Experienced Layoffs is a variable covered in A.9.4
Retirement Tenure Loss (person*Year/Year)
= AverageTenure4*Retirement
Description: A flow of experience through the coflow
Average Tenure 4 is a variable covered in A.9.8
Retirement is a variable covered in A.9.4
Delay Between Employee Experience Stocks is a variable covered in A.9.1
Initial Employees is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.9.9 Average Worker Tenure (years)
= Total Years of Experience/Total Workforce
Description: The average experience of all workers in the industry
Total Years of Experience (person*years)
=Total Years of Rookie Tenure+Total Years of Some Experience Tenure
+Total Years of Experienced Tenure+Total Years of Very Eperienced Tenure
Description: The sum total of all person years of worker experience in the industry
Total Years of Rookie Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.5
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Total Years of Some Experience Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.6
Total Years of Experienced Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.9
Total Years of Very Eperienced Tenure is a variable covered in A.9.8
Total Workforce is a variable covered in A.9.1
A.10 Operating Profit
A.10.1 Operating Profit (dollars/Year)
= OperatingRevenue-TotalOperatingCosts
Description:
Operating Revenue (dollars/Year)
= PassengerRevenue+HistoricalAncillaryFeeRevenue
Description: Revenue from passenger travel added to revenue from all other fees
is the models total operating revenue
Passenger Revenue (dollars/Year)
= RevenueSeatMiles*TicketPrice
Description:
Revenue Seat Miles (Seat*miles/Year)
= AvailableSeatMiles*LoadFactor
Description: These are the revenue generating seat miles that the airlines fly
" Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
" Load Factor is a variable covered in A.4.1
Ticket Price is a variable covered in A.6.1
Historical Ancillary Fee Revenue is a variable covered in A.6.1
Total Operating Costs is a variable covered in A.7.2
A.10.2 Operating Margin (fraction)
= ZIDZ(OperatingProfit,PassengerRevenue)
Description: The percentage profit of the airline industry
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Figure A-18: Table for Historical Airline Operating Profit
Operating Profit is a variable covered in A.10.1
Passenger Revenue is a variable covered in A.10.1
A.10.3 Historical Airline Operating Profit (dollars/Year)
= TableforHistoricalAirlineOperatingProfit(Time-1)* 1000
Description: The actual airline industry operating profit
Table for Historical Airline Operating Profit (dollars/Year)
=[(1940,-4e+007)-(2010,le+007)],(1950,75990),(1951,127624),(1952,195167)
,(1953,106336),(1954,124375),(1955,142624),(1956,134890),(1957,65005)
,(1958,107512),(1959,122349),(1960,77591),(1961,20059),(1962,189999)
,(1963,279787),(1964,470097),(1965,671928),(1966,775497),(1967,708194)
,(1968,504888),(1969,391931),(1970,43031),(1971,328475),(1972,584470)
,(1973,585266),(1974,725740),(1975,127879),(1976,721933),(1977,908040)
,(1978,1.36486e+006),(1979,199055),(1980,-221615),(1981,-454800)
,(1982,-733435),(1983,310410),(1984,2.15151e+006),(1985,1.42626e+006)
,(1986,1.3231e+006),(1987,2.46889e+006),(1988,3.4365e+006)
,(1989,1.81127e+006),(1990,-1.91234e+006),(1991,-1.78474e+006)
,(1992,-2.44446e+006),(1993,1.43817e+006),(1994,2.71346e+006)
,(1995,5.85952e+006),(1996,6.20907e+006),(1997,8.58679e+006)
,(1998,9.32781e+006),(1999,8.40331e+006) ,(2000,6.99893e+006)
,(2001,-1.03259e+007),(2002,-8.56641e+006),(2003,-2.092e+006)
,(2004,-1.489e+006) ,(2005,447000),(2006,7.639e+006) ,(2007,9.343e+006)
,(2008,-3.35e+006),(2009,2.33e+006)
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Description: This is the data for actual airline operating profits by year since 1950
in reported thousands of dollars
A.10.4 Historical Airline Operating Margin (fraction)
=HistoricalAirlineOperatingProfit/
(HistoricalAirlineDemand*HistoricalAirlineTicketPrices)
Description: The operating margin experienced by the industry historically
Historical Airline Operating Profit is a variable covered in A.10.3
Historical Airline Demand is a variable covered in A.5.2
Historical Airline Ticket Prices is a variable covered in A.6.2
A.11 September 11th Shock
A.11.1 9/11 Effect On Demand (dmnl)
=f(Reductionof9/1lEffectonDemand-DecreaseinDemandfrom9/11)dt+1
Description: The adjustment of total demand arising from the 9/11 attacks
Reduction of 9/11 Effect on Demand (1/Year)
=(Normal9/1lEffectonDemand-9/1lEffectOnDemand)/
PublicPerceptionofTerrorismDecayTime
Description: The readjustment of the effect of 9/11 on demand results from the
public adjusting their conception of the liklihood of terrorism
Normal 9/11 Effect on Demand (dmnl)
1
Description: Normally there is no effect of 9/11 on demand, so the goal for the
stock should be 1.
9/11 Effect On Demand is a variable covered in A.11.1
Public Perception of Terrorism Decay Time (years)
4.25
Description: The length of the delay in the public's adjustment of their perception
of terrorism
Decrease in Demand from 9/11 (1/Year)
= 9/11ExogenousTerrorismShock/Lengthof9/1lEffect
Description: A decrease in the terrorism effect on demand corresponding to the
effect of the 9/11 attacks.
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9/11 Exogenous Terrorism Shock (dmnl)
=(IFTHENELSE(Tiie > 2001.13,1,0)+
IFTHENELSE(Time > (2001.13+Lengthof9/1 1Effect),-1,0))*Sizeof9/11 Effect
Description: A formulation that causes the 9/11 effect to start on 9/11 and stop
a set number of years later
Length of 9/11 Effect (years) 0.5
Description: The period of time over which the 9/11 effect on demand acts
Size of 9/11 Effect (dmnl) 0.185
Description: The total percentage reduction in demand due to the 9/11 attacks,
as estimated from historical data.
Length of 9/11 Effect is a variable covered in A.11.1
A.12 Data Reporting
A.12.1 Reported Variable (dollars/Year)
= DrainedReportedVariable[Data]*TIMESTEP/ReportingPeriod
Drained Reported Variable (dollars/Year)
=IFTHENELSE(checkreporting[Data] =0,
AccumulatedReportedVariable[Data]/TIMESTEP,0)
Check reporting (Year)
Checkreporting[Data]=MODULO(Time,ReportingPeriod)
Reporting Period (Year) 1
Accumulated Reported Variable (dollars)
= f(NewReportedVariable[Data]-DrainedReportedVariable[Data])dx+0
Description: The reporting process creates a delay between when the money was
actually made by the industry and when the profits are reported to investors
New Reported Variable (dollars/Year)
" NewReportedVariable[Profit]=OperatingProfit
Operating Profit is a variable covered in A.10.1
" NewReportedVariable[Costs]=TotalOperatingCosts
Total Operating Costs is a variable covered in A.7.2
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" NewReportedVariable[Prices]=TicketPrice*UnitEquiv2
Ticket Price is a variable covered in A.6.1
Unit Equiv 2 ((Seat*miles)/Year)
- 1
- Description: converts $/seat mile into $/year
" NewReportedVariable[Demand]
=ActualDemandForSeatMiles*UnitEquiv1
Actual Demand For Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.5.1
Unit Equiv 1 ($/(Seat*mile))
- 1
- Description: converts seat miles per year into dollars per year
" NewReportedVariable[Capacity]=AvailableSeatMiles*UnitEquiv1
Available Seat Miles is a variable covered in A.4.1
Unit Equiv 1 is a variable covered in A.12.1
" NewReportedVariable[Salary]
=AverageWorkerCompensation*UnitsEquiv3
Average Worker Compensation is a variable covered in A.8.1
Units Equiv 3 (person)
- 1
- Description: converts dollars per person per year into dollars per year
Description: Reported Variables fill a stock that avreages their values over the re-
porting period
Drained Reported Variable is a variable covered in A.12.1
Reporting Period is a variable covered in A.12.1
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Appendix B
Documentation of the Insurance
Industry Model
B.1 Demand for Insurance
B.1.1 New Underwriting (dollars/Year)
= MAX(Underwriting Renewal + Adjustment for Desired Insurance,O)
Description: The flow of new underwriting in the industry
Underwriting Renewal ($/Year)
= Underwriting Outflow
Underwriting Outflow is covered in section B.2.3.
Adjustment for Desired Insurance (dollars/Year)
= Gap in Desired Insurance / Desired Insurance Adjustment Time
Description: The rate at which desired insurance is being underwritten, may be
negative if the level of insurance desired is lower than the current level
Gap in Desired Insurance (dollars)
= Desired Insurance - Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: The difference between the amount of insurance desired after con-
sidering the preferences of the consumer, the desires of the industry and the level of
assets in the economy.
Desired Insurance (dollars)
= Consumer Desired Insurance
* Consumer Desired Insurance (dollars)
= (Proxy for Insurable Assets)*Effect of Premiums on Demand for Insurance
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Description: The level of underwriting desired by the consumer after considering
the value of assets in the economy, the fraction of those assets normally insured
and the effect of current premiums on the demand for insurance.
- Proxy for Insurable Assets (dollars)
= Stock of Capital*Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance
* Stock of Capital (dollars)
= f(GDP Investment-Abandonment of Capital)dt + [GDP Invest-
ment*Insurable Life of Capital]
* GDP Investment is covered in section B.1.2.
* Abandonment of Capital (dollars/Year)
= Stock of Capital/Insurable Life of Capital
* Insurable Life of Capital (years)
14
* Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance (dmnl)
= Income Effect on Insurance Demand*Normal Fraction of Assets De-
siring Insurance
* Income Effect on Insurance Demand (dmnl)
= (GDP Simulated/Reference Income)^ Income Elasticity of Demand
GDP Simulated is covered in B.1.2.
Reference Income (dollars/Year)
= Initial(GDP Simulated)
Income Elasticity of Demand (dmnl)
0.453
* Normal Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance (dmnl)
0.0408
- Effect of Premiums on Demand for Insurance (dmnl)
= (Current Premium per unit Exposure/Initial Premium)^ Price Elasticity
of Demand
* Current Premium per unit Exposure is covered in section B.7.1
* Initial Premium is covered in section B.7.1
* Price Elasticity of Demand (dmnl)
-1.5
Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3
Desired Insurance Adjustment Time (Year)
5.11
Description: The time it takes consumers and insurance companies to adjust the
level of insurance towards the current stock of insurance
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Figure B-i: Table for Historical GDP
B.1.2 GDP Investment (dollars/Year)
= GDP Simulated*GDP Investment Fraction
GDP Simulated (dollars/Year)
= GDP*IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Impulse Response=1, 1 , (1-Switch for Historical
GDP) )+IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Impulse Response=1, 0 , Switch for Historical
GDP)*Historical GDP
Description: The current GDP being used in the simulation
Switch for Historical GDP (dmnl) 1
Description: Controls whether the model uses historical or stochastic GDP
Switch for Impulse Response (dmnl) 0
Historical GDP (dollars/Year)
= Table for Historical GDP(Time)* 1000000000
Description: The nominal GDP experienced historically
Table for Historical GDP (dollars/Year)
=[(1960,0)-(2010,20000)],(1960,527),(1960.25,526.2),(1960.5,529),
(1960.75,523.7),(1961,528),(1961.25,539),(1961.5,549.5),(1961.75,562.6),
(1962,576.1),(1962.25,583.2),(1962.5,590),(1962.75,593.3),(1963,602.5),
(1963.25,611.2),(1963.5,623.9),(1963.75,633.5),(1964,649.6),
(1964.25,658.9),(1964.5,670.5),(1964.75,675.6),(1965,695.7),
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(1965.25,708.1),(1965.5,725.2), (1965.75,747.5), (1966,770.8),
(1966.25,779.9),(1966.5,793.1),(1966.75,806.9),(1967,817.8),
(1967.25,822.3),(1967.5,837),(1967.75,852.7),(1968,879.8),
(1968.25,904.1),(1968.5,919.3),(1968.75,936.2),(1969,960.9),
(1969.25,976.1),(1969.5,996.3),(1969.75,1004.5) ,(1970,1017.1),
(1970.25,1033.1),(1970.5,1050.5),(1970.75,1052.7),(1971,1098.1),
(1971.25,1118.8),(1971.5,1139.1),(1971.75,1151.4),(1972,1190.1),
(1972.25,1225.6),(1972.5,1249.3),(1972.75,1286.6),(1973,1335.1),
(1973.25,1371.5),(1973.5,1390.7),(1973.75,1431.8),(1974,1446.5),
(1974.25,1484.8) ,(1974.5,1513.7),(1974.75,1552.8),(1975,1569.4),
(1975.25,1605),(1975.5,1662.4) (1975.75,1713.9)7(1976,1771.9),
(1976.25,1804.2),(1976.5,1837.7) ,(1976.75,1884.5),(1977,1938.5),
(1977.25,2005.2) ,(1977.5,2066),(1977.75,2110.8),(1978,2149.1),
(1978.25,22747) ,(1978.5,2335.2),(1978.75,2416),(1979,2463.3),
(1979.25,2526.4) ,(1979.5,2599.7) ,(1979.75,2659.4),(1980,2724.1),
(1980.25,2728),(1980.5,2785.2),(1980.75,2915.3),(1981,3051.4),
(1981.25,3084.3) ,(1981.5,3177),(1981.75,3194.7),(1982,3184.9),
(1982.25,3240.9) ,(1982.5,3274.4),(1982.75,3312.5),(1983,3381),
(1983.25,3482.2) ,(1983.5,3587.1) ,(1983.75,3688.1),(1984,3807.4),
(1984.25,3906.3),(1984.5,3976),(1984.75,4034),(1985,4117.2),
(1985.25,4175.7),(1985.5,4258.3),(1985.75,4318.7),(1986,4382.4),
(1986.25,4423.2),(1986.5,4491.3),(1986.75,4543.3),(1987,4611.1),
(1987.25,4686.7) ,(1987.5,4764.5) ,(1987.75,4883.1),(1988,4948.6),
(1988.25,5059.3) ,(1988.5,5142.8) ,(1988.75,5251),(1989,5360.3),
(1989.25,5453.6),(1989.5,5532.9) ,(1989.75,5581.7),(1990,5708.1),
(1990.25,5797.4) ,(1990.5,5850.6) ,(1990.75,5846) ,(1991,5880.2),
(1991.25,5962),(1991.5,6033.7),(1991.75,6092.5) ,(1992,6190.7),
(1992.25,6295.2) ,(1992.5,6389.7) ,(1992.75,6493.6),(1993,6544.5),
(1993.25,6622.7),(1993.5,6688.3),(1993.75,6813.8)7(1994,6916.3),
(1994.25,7044.3) ,(1994.5,7131.8) ,(1994.75,7248.2),(1995,7307.7),
(1995.25,7355.8),(1995.5,7452.5),(1995.75,7542.5),(1996,7638.2),
(1996.25,7800),(1996.5,7892.7),(1996.75,8023),(1997,8137),
(1997.25,8276.8),(1997.5,8409.9),(1997.75,8505.7),(1998,8600.6),
(1998.25,8698.6) ,(1998.5,8847.2),(1998.75,9027.5),(1999,9148.6),
(1999.25,9252.6),(1999.5,9405.1),(1999.75,9607.7),(2000,9709.5),
(2000.25,9949.1),(2000.5,10017.5),(2000.75,10129.8),(2001,10165.1),
(2001.25,10301.3) ,(2001.5,10305.2),(2001.75,10373.1) ,(2002,10498.7),
(2002.25,10601.9),(2002.5,10701.7) ,(2002.75,10766.9),(2003,10888.4),
(2003.25,11008.1),(2003.5,11255.7),(2003.75,11416.5),(2004,11597.2),
(2004.25,11778.4),(2004.5, 11950.5),(2004.75,12144.9)7(2005,12379.5),
(2005.25,12516.8) ,(2005.5,12741.6),(2005.75,12915.6), (2006,13183.5),
(2006.25,13347.8) ,(2006.5,13452.9) ,(2006.75,13611.5), (2007,13789.5),
(2007.25,14008.2) ,(2007.5,14158.2),(2007.75,14291.3) ,(2008,14328.4),
(2008.25,14471.8),(2008.5,14484.9) ,(2008.75,14191.2)7(2009,14049.7),
(2009.25,14034.5) ,(2009.5,14114.7),(2009.75,14277.3) ,(2010,14446.4),
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(2010.25,14578.7),(2010.5,14745.1),(2010.75,14870.4)
Description: Historical Nominal GDP
GDP (dollars/Year)
= Function for GDP*GDP Random Noise Output*(1-Switch for Impulse Response)+Switch
for Impulse Response*GDP Pulse
Description: The US gross domestic product
Function for GDP (dollars/Year)
= Initial GDP*EXP(Growth Rate of GDP*(Time-Initial Time))
* Initial GDP (dollars/Year)
1
Description: The size of GDP at the beginning of the long horizon stochastic
model run
" Growth Rate of GDP (dmnl/Year)
0.057
Description: The fractional percentage growth rate of GDP for long horizion
tests
GDP Random Noise Output
GDP Pulse (dollars/Year)
= (1+Pulse(Initial Time+10, 0)/Time STEP)*One Dollar
* One Dollar (dollar)
1
Description: One dollar is used as the level of GDP for the impulse response
tests.
GDP Investment Fraction (dmnl)
0.125
B.2 Underwriting
B.2.1 Premium per Dollar of Underwriting (dmnl/Year)
= Total Premiums/Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: The fraction of every underwritten dollar collected as premiums each
year
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B.2.2 Total Premiums (dollars/Year)
= Recent Premiums+Older Premiums+Oldest Premiums
Description: The sum of all premiums paid to the industry each year
Recent Premiums (dollars/Year)
= f (Premium Inflow-Recent to Older Premium Flow) dt + [Initial Premium*Initial
Dollars Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The first stock of total premiums collected by the industry
Premium Inflow (dollars/Year/Year)
= Current Premium per unit Exposure*Underwriting Inflow
Description: total premiums collected each year enter the aging chain at the
current premium per dollar of underwriting
Current Premium per unit Exposure is covered in section B.7.1.
Underwriting Inflow is covered in section B.2.3.
Recent to Older Premium Flow (dollars/Year/Year)
= Average Recent Premiums*Recent to Older Underwriting Flow
Description: The flow of premiums from one stock in the aging chain to another
is assumed to occur at the average level of the stock.
Average Recent Premiums (dmnl/Year)
= Recent Premiums/Recent Dollars Underwritten
Description: The average cents on the dollar of premiums paid for recent under-
writing
* Recent Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
Recent to Older Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Initial Premium is covered in section B.7.1.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage is covered in section B.2.3.
Older Premiums (dollars/Year)
= f (Recent to Older Premium Flow-Older to Oldest Premium Flow) dt + [Initial
Premium*Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The second stock of total premiums collected by the industry
Recent to Older Premium Flow is covered in section B.2.2.
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Older to Oldest Premium Flow (dollars/Year/Year)
= Average Older Premiums*Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow
Description: The flow of premiums from one stock in the aging chain to another
is assumed to occur at the average level of the stock.
Average Older Premiums (dmnl/Year) = Older Premiums/Older Dollars
Underwritten
Description: The average cents on the dollar of premiums paid for older under-
writing
* Older Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Oldest Premiums (dollars/Year)
= f (Older to Oldest Premium Flow-Premium Outflow) dt + [Initial Premium*Initial
Dollars Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The third stock of total premiums collected by the industry
Older to Oldest Premium Flow is covered in section B.2.2.
Premium Outflow (dollars/(Year*Year))
= Average Oldest Premiums*Underwriting Outflow
Description: The flow of premiums from one stock in the aging chain to another
is assumed to occur at the average level of the stock.
Average Oldest Premiums (dmnl/Year)
= Oldest Premiums/Oldest Dollars Underwritten
Description: The average cents on the dollar of premiums paid for the oldest
underwriting
* Oldest Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
Underwriting Outflow is covered in section B.2.3.
B.2.3 Total Underwriting Exposure (dollars)
= Recent Dollars Underwritten+Oldest Dollars Underwritten+Older Dollars Under-
written
Description: The sum of each underwriting stock in the aging chain
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Recent Dollars Underwritten (dollars)
= f (Underwriting Inflow-Recent to Older Underwriting Flow) dt + [Initial Dollars
Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The first stage of underwriting
Underwriting Inflow (dollars/Year)
= New Underwriting
New Underwriting is covered in section B.1.1.
Recent to Older Underwriting Flow (dollars/Year)
= Recent Dollars Underwritten/per Stage Underwriting Term
Description: aging of underwriting flow
Per Stage Underwriting Term (years)
= Average Underwriting Term/Underwriting Delay Order
Description: Each stage of the underwriting stock flow chain will have an equal
delay length
" Average Underwriting Term (years)
1
Description: The average term of an insurance policy
" Underwriting Delay Order (dmnl)
3
Description: The number of stocks in the disaggregate underwriting structure.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage (dollars)
= Initial Dollars Underwritten/Underwriting Delay Order
Description: Each stage of the underwriting stock flow chain will start with an
equal share of the initial underwriting
Initial Dollars Underwritten (dollars)
= Initial(Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance*GDP Simulated*Insurable Life of
Capital*GDP Investment Fraction)
Description: The initial level of underwriting is set so that the model will start in
dynamic equilibrium
" Fraction of Assets Desiring Insurance is covered in section B.1.1.
* GDP Simulated is covered in section B.1.2.
* Insurable Life of Capital is covered in section B.1.1.
" GDP Investment Fraction is covered in section B.1.2.
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Older Dollars Underwritten (dollars)
= f (Recent to Older Underwriting Flow-Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow) dt +
[Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The second stage of underwriting
Recent to Older Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow (dollars/Year)
= Older Dollars Underwritten/per Stage Underwriting Term
Description: The second aging chain flow of underwriting
Per Stage Underwriting Term is covered in section B.2.3.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage is covered in section B.2.3.
Oldest Dollars Underwritten (dollars)
= f (Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow-Underwriting Outflow) dt + [Initial Dollars
Underwritten per Stage]
Description: The last stage of underwriting
Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Underwriting Outflow (dollars/Year)
= Oldest Dollars Underwritten/per Stage Underwriting Term
Description: The expiration of underwriting contracts.
Per Stage Underwriting Term is covered in section B.2.3.
B.3 Underwriting Loss Aging Chain
B.3.1 Normal Claims Incurred (dollars/Year)
= Expected Casualty Rate of Recent Underwriting+ Expected Casualty Rate of Older
Underwriting+Expected Casualty Rate of Oldest Underwriting
Description: Only a small fraction of all policies generate a claim each year
B.3.2 Expected Casualty Rate of Recent Underwriting (dol-
lars/Year)
= f (Expected Casualty Rate Inflow-Recent to Older Expected Casualty Rate Flow)
dt + [Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate*Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage]
165
Description: A measure of the total claims generated by the recent pool of under-
writing per year
Expected Casualty Rate Inflow (dollars/Year/Year)
= New Underwriting*Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate
Description: The inflow of claim generating underwriting policies.
New Underwriting is covered in section B.1.1.
Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate is covered in section B.4.1.
Recent to Older Expected Casualty Rate Flow (dollars/(Year*Year))
= Average Expected Casualty Rate of Recent Underwriting*Recent to Older Under-
writing Flow
Description: The aging of claim generating policies
Average Expected Casualty Rate of Recent Underwriting (dmnl/Year)
= Expected Casualty Rate of Recent Underwriting/Recent Dollars Underwritten
Description: The fraction of all recent underwriting that will generate a claim this
year
Recent Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
Recent to Older Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate is covered in section B.4.1.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage is covered in section B.2.3.
B.3.3 Expected Casualty Rate of Older Underwriting (dol-
lars/Year)
= f (Recent to Older Expected Casualty Rate Flow-Older to Oldest Expected Casu-
alty Rate Flow) dt + [Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate*Initial Dollars Under-
written per Stage]
Description: A measure of the total claims generated by the older pool of under-
writing per year
Recent to Older Expected Casualty Rate Flow is covered in section B.3.2.
Older to Oldest Expected Casualty Rate Flow (dollars/(Year*Year))
= Average Expected Casualty Rate of Older Underwriting*Older to Oldest Under-
writing Flow
Description: An aging flow of claim generating policies
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Average Expected Casualty Rate of Older Underwriting (dmnl/Year)
= Expected Casualty Rate of Older Underwriting/Older Dollars Underwritten
Description: The fraction of all older underwriting that will generate a claim this
year
Older Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
Older to Oldest Underwriting Flow is covered in section B.2.3.
Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate is covered in section B.4.1.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage is covered in section B.2.3.
B.3.4 Expected Casualty Rate of Oldest Underwriting (dol-
lars/Year)
= f (Older to Oldest Expected Casualty Rate Flow-Expected Casualty Rate Expi-
ration) dt + [Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate*Initial Dollars Underwritten per
Stage]
Description: A measure of the total claims generated by the oldest pool of under-
writing per year
Older to Oldest Expected Casualty Rate Flow is covered in section B.3.3.
Expected Casualty Rate Expiration (dollars/(Year*Year))
= Underwriting Outflow*Average Expected Casualty Rate of Oldest Underwriting
Description: The outflow of claim generating policies
Underwriting Outflow is covered in section B.2.3.
Average Expected Casualty Rate of Oldest Underwriting (dmnl/Year)
= Expected Casualty Rate of Oldest Underwriting/Oldest Dollars Underwritten
Description: The fraction of all oldest underwriting that will generate a claim this
year
Oldest Dollars Underwritten is covered in section B.2.3.
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Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate is covered in section B.4.1.
Initial Dollars Underwritten per Stage is covered in section B.2.3.
B.4 Scope
B.4.1 Underwriting Expected Casualty Rate (dmnl/Year)
= Natural Casualty Rate*(Current Scope of Insurance^ Sensitivity of Expected Ca-
sualty Rate to Scope)
Description: When reserves are high the industry will attempt to capture market
share from each other causing them to insure more risky clients overall as they branch
out into areas of business that they have not previously insured
Natural Casualty Rate (dmnl/Year)
0.0597
Description: The normal fraction of the underwritten policies that are insured
Current Scope of Insurance (dmnl)
= f (Change in Insurance Scope) dt + [Reference Scope]
Description: The current percentage of GDP insured
Change in Insurance Scope (dmnl/Year)
= Indicated Change in Scope/Time to Change Insurance Scope
Description: The rate of change of the scope of insurance
Indicated Change in Scope (dmnl)
= Indicated Scope-Current Scope of Insurance
Description: The change in the scope of insurance that is desired given the current
capital and income situation.
* Indicated Scope (dmnl)
= Reference Scope*Effect of Capital on Scope*Effect of Income on Scope
Description: The fraction of total GDP that is insured is indicated through
pressure from capital and profitability
- Effect of Capital on Scope (dmnl)
= Capital Adequacy^ Sensitivity of Scope to Capital
* Capital Adequacy is covered in section B.8.1.
* Sensitivity of Scope to Capital (dmnl)
0.2
Description: strength of the power function for the relationship be-
tween capital adequacy and the scope of underwriting
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- Effect of Income on Scope (dmnl)
= (Income Adequacy) ^Sensitivity of Scope to Income
* Sensitivity of Scope to Income (dmnl)
0.2
* Income Adequacy is covered in section B.9.2.
Time to Change Insurance Scope (years)
4.5
Description: The delay in adjusting the types of clients insured
Reference Scope (dmnl) 1
Sensitivity of Expected Casualty Rate to Scope (dmnl)
1
Description: The capital adequacy is raised to this power when determining the
net effect on underwriting quality.
B.5 Claims and Costs
B.5.1 Claims Expense (dollars/Year)
= Total Claims Settled*Fraction of Claims Paid
Description: The flow of claims being settled by the insurance industry and also
being paid out to policy holders
Total Claims Settled (dollars/Year)
= Pending Claim Pool/Average Delay for Claim Investigation
Description: The total value of all claims currently being settled whether they are
paid or denied.
Pending Claim Pool (dollars)
= f (Claims Incurred-Claims Denied-Claims Expense) dt + [Initial Claims]
Description: The stock of claims waiting to be settled
Claims Incurred (dollars/Year)
= Normal Claims Incurred*Claims Random Noise Output
Description: Total claims generated are computed in the underwriting quality
view
" Normal Claims Incurred is covered in section B.3.1.
" Claims Random Noise Output is covered in section B.12.1.
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Claims Denied (dollars/Year)
= Total Claims Settled*(1-Fraction of Claims Paid)
Description: The total dollar value of claims that are denied for payment by the
industry
Initial Claims (dollars)
= Normal Claims Incurred*Average Delay for Claim Investigation
Description: The initial value of claims is set up in balanced equilibrium
* Normal Claims Incurred is covered in section B.3.1.
Average Delay for Claim Investigation (years)
2.678
Description: The length of time on average that it takes for a claim to be settled
can be very short for certain kinds of insurance and very long for others
Fraction of Claims Paid (dmnl)
0.847
Description: This number was estimated by a linear regression of reported total
claims on reported claims paid
B.5.2 Non-Claims Costs per unit Exposure (dmnl/Year)
= Other Operating Costs/Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: A calculation for ease of comparison with other variables
Other Operating Costs (dollar/Year)
= (Claims Handling Costs+Other Costs)+Commission Costs
Description: The total flow of non-claim expenses, used for financial reporting
Claims Handling Costs (dollars/Year)
= Total Claims Settled*Claims Handling Costs per Dollar of Claims
Description: Costs arising from handling claims will tend to be proportional to
the flow of claims being generated.
Total Claims Settled is covered in section B.5.1.
Claims Handling Costs per Dollar of Claims (fraction)
0.036
Description: The costs from adjusting and handling claims will vary directly with
the size of the flow of claims for the industry
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Other Costs (dollars/Year)
= Other Costs per Dollar of Underwriting Exposure*Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: The flow of assorted other costs
Other Costs per Dollar of Underwriting Exposure (dmnl/Year)
0.015
Description: The assorted other costs of the industry are assumed to scale directly
with the size of the book of business
Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3.
Commission Costs (dollars/Year)
= Deferred Commission Costs/Time to Pay Commissions
Description: The current flow of commissions costs
Deferred Commission Costs (dollars)
= f (Commission Costs Accrued-Commission Costs) dt + [Initial Commissions]
Description: The stock of commission liabilities
" Commission Costs Accrued (dollars/Year)
= Premium Inflow*Commission per Dollar of Premium Written
Description: The inflow of commissions
" Initial Commissions (dollars)
= Initial Premium*Underwriting Inflow*Commission per Dollar of Premium
Written*Time to Pay Commissions
Description: The initial value of the commissions to be paid
- Initial Premium is covered in section B.7.1.
- Underwriting Inflow is covered in section B.2.3.
- Commission per Dollar of Premium Written (years)
0.25
Description: Insurance companies pay agents a commission on policies
written, the units of year represent the fact that the commission can be
conceptualized as the years of premium flow the companies pay in order
to secure the business
Time to Pay Commissions (Year)
0.56
Description: Commissions are paid to agents mostly over the course of the first
year
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Figure B-2: Table for Historical Non-Life Claims
Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3.
B.5.3 Total Expenses per unit Exposure (dmnl/Year)
= (Claims Expense+Other Operating Costs)/Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: The total expenses of the insurance industry per dollar of underwrit-
ing
Claims Expense is covered in section B.5.1.
Other Operating Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3.
B.5.4 Historical Non-Life Claims Incurred (dollars/Year)
= Table for Historical Non-Life Claims(Time-1)*1000000
Description: The total non-life claims incurred historically
Table for Historical Non-Life Claims (dollars/Year)
=[(1981,0)-(2010,150000)],(1982,10621.1),(1983,12509),(1984,15118.1),
(1985,20977),(1986,21018.6),(1987,22524.7),(1988,22582.5),(1989,24738.3),
(1990,24843.7),(1991,26055.6),(1992,37530.5),(1993,36183.2),(1994,37549.8),
(1995,45251),(1996,48866.4),(1997,46225.3),(1998,56046.4),(1999,65384),
(2000,73582.9),(2001,86308),(2002,95928.8),(2003,101898),(2004,107405),
(2005,120347),(2006,107624),(2007,107181),(2008,109145),(2009,102394)
Description: The flow of non life claims incurred by the industry
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B.6 Cost Forecasting
B.6.1 Expected Future Costs (dmnl/Year)
= Expected Current Costs*(1+Expected Percent Change in Costs*Switch for Fore-
casting)
Description: The current projection of expected growth in costs given current
perceived costs.
Expected Current Costs (dmnl/Year)
= Perceived Costs*(1+ Expected Growth Rate for Costs*Time to Perceive Changes
in Costs)
Description: Since decision makers do not have access to the actual current costs,
they must project their perception of current costs into the future by over the forecast
horizion indicated by the time to perceive changes in costs.
Perceived Costs (dmnl/Year)
= f (Change in Cost Perception) dt + [Total Expenses per unit Exposure]
Description: This is the industry's perception of the total demand for seat miles
Change in Cost Perception (dmnl/Year/Year)
= Gap in Cost Perception/Time to Perceive Changes in Costs
Total Expenses per unit Exposure
* Gap in Cost Perception (dmnl/Year)
= Total Expenses per unit Exposure-Perceived Costs
- Total Expenses per unit Exposure is covered in section B.5.3.
Expected Growth Rate for Costs (dmnl/Year)
= f (Change in Expected Growth Rate) dt + [Initial Expected Growth Rate in
Costs]
Change in Expected Growth Rate (dmnl/Year/Year)
= (Indicated Growth Rate-Expected Growth Rate for Costs)/Time to Perceive
Trend in Costs
* Indicated Growth Rate (dmnl/Year)
= (Perceived Costs-Reference Costs)/(Reference Costs*Time Horizon for Ref-
erence Costs)
- Reference Costs (dmnl/Year)
= f (Change in Reference Costs) dt + [Perceived Costs/(1+Lnitial Ex-
pected Growth Rate in Costs*Time Horizon for Reference Costs)]
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* Change in Reference Costs (dmnl/Year/Year)
= (Perceived Costs-Reference Costs)/Time Horizon for Reference Costs
- Time Horizon for Reference Costs (Year)
3.2
e Time to Perceive Trend in Costs (Year)
0.9
Initial Expected Growth Rate in Costs (dmnl/Year)
0
Time to Perceive Changes in Costs (Year)
0.35
Description: This is how long it takes the industry to perceive changes in costs
Expected Percent Change in Costs (dmnl)
= Expected Growth Rate for Costs*Average Underwriting Term
Description: The total growth of costs during the average underwriting term
Switch for Forecasting (dmnl)
1
B.7 Premiums
B.7.1 Current Premium per unit Exposure (dmnl/Year)
= f (Change in Premium) dt + [Initial Premium]
Description: The actual premium per year per dollar of underwriting written.
Units are dollars/year per dollar.
Change in Premium (dmnl/Year/Year)
= Gap Between Target and Actual Premiums/Time to Change Premiums
Description: Premium reductions will occur more quickly when indicated than
will premium increases.
Gap Between Target and Actual Premiums (dmnl/Year)
= Indicated Premium-Current Premium per unit Exposure
Description: A measurement of the distance between current premiums and the
target premiums
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Indicated Premium (dmnl/Year)
= MAX(Minimum Premium,Target Premium per Dollar of Underwriting)
Description: Insurers will not charge a premium higher than the actual replace-
ment cost of the object insured
* Minimum Premium (dmnl/Year)
= Non-Claims Costs per unit Exposure
Description: This formulation assumes that insurers will not price below the
marginal cost of servicing a policy, excluding claims.
* Target Premium per Dollar of Underwriting (fraction/Year)
= (Current Premium per unit Exposure)*Effect of Profit on Premiums*Effect
of Capital on Premiums*Effect of Costs on Premium
Description: The average premium indicated is adjusted from the current level
by several effects.
- Effect of Capital on Premiums (dmn)
= (Capital Adequacy) ^Sensitivity of Premiums to Capital
Description: The multiplicative effect of capital on premiums
* Sensitivity of Premiums to Capital (dnml)
-0.0875
Description: The aggressiveness of the power function for the effect of
capital on premiums
* Capital Adequacy is covered in section B.8.1.
- Effect of Costs on Premium (dmni)
= Expected Future Costs/Perceived Costs
* Expected Future Costs is covered in section B.6.1.
* Perceived Costs is covered in section B.6.1.
- Effect of Profit on Premiums (dmnl)
= (Income Adequacy) ^Sensitivity of Premiums to Net Income
Description: The multiplicative change in premiums indicated by the cur-
rent financial situation
* Sensitivity of Premiums to Net Income (dmnl)
-1.03
Description: Controls the slop of the power function for the effect of
capital and earnings on premiums
* Income Adequacy is covered in section B.9.2.
Time to Change Premiums (years)
1.2
Description: The length of time it takes agents to understand and adjust to new
underwriting standards.
175
Initial Premium (dmnl/Year)
= Initial((Other Costs+Claims Expense+Clains Handling Costs+(Target Return on
Assets-Investment Return)*Total Capital)/(Total Underwriting Exposure* (1-Commission
per Dollar of Premium Written/Average Underwriting Term)))
Description: Initialized to be in dynamic equilibrium so that given total under-
writing and initial costs premiums would ensure that the return on assets was exactly
equal to the target return.
Other Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
Claims Expense is covered in section B.5.1.
Claims Handling Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
Target Return on Assets is covered in section B.9.2.
Investment Return is covered in section B.8.2.
Total Capital is covered in section B.8.1.
Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3.
Commission per Doflar of Premium Written is covered in section B.5.2.
Average Underwriting Term is covered in section B.2.3.
B.7.2 Historical Premiums (dollars/Year)
= Table for Historical Premiums(Time-1)*1000000
Description: Total non-life premiums collected
Table for Historical Premiums (dollars/Year)
= [(1981,0)-(2010,200000)],(1982,15008.3),(1983,15364.2),(1984,17132.1),
(1985,23494.9),(1986,30946.7),(1987,34171.4),(1988,35042.1),(1989,35375.2),
(1990,35113.1),(1991,36323.5),(1992,51401.5),(1993,51184),(1994,56684.3),
(1995,71601.8),(1996,79878.9),(1997,82968.3),(1998,89622.5),(1999,94276.7),
(2000,96525.1),(2001,99620.5),(2002,114778),(2003,131325),(2004,151297),
(2005,164747),(2006,168448),(2007,169468),(2008,165686),(2009,162433)
Description: Total non-life premiums for the insurance industry
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Figure B-3: Table for Historical Non-Life Claims
B.8 Investment and Capital
B.8.1 Capital Adequacy (dmnl)
= ZIDZ(Total Capital,Desired Capital)
Description: A measure of how much of the future expected liabilities of the
industry can be covered by their current capital
Total Capital (dollars)
= Total Invested Capital
Description: The total reserves of the industry
Total Invested Capital (dollars)
= f (Investment Income+Insurance Cash Flows-Payments to Shareholders) dt +
[Initial Invested Capital]
Description: The total capital of the insurance industry that is invested
Investment Income (dollars/Year)
= MAX(Total Capital*Investment Return,Minimum Cash Flow)
Description: Investments are assumed to generate returns on average at the given
interest rate
" Investment Return is covered in section B.8.2.
" Minimum Cash Flow (dollars/Year)
= -Total Invested Capital/Time to Drain Capital
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Description: The absolute minimum rate at which operating cash flow can drain
reserves, maintains first order control over the capital stock
- Time to Drain Capital (years)
= TIME STEP
Description: The time it takes to liquidate assets should the entire stock
of invested capital need to be spent. Set to be the time step to preserve
first order control. If all of the assets of the industry are drained there is
no mechanism in the model for the industry to emerge from bankruptcy.
Insurance Cash Flows (dollars/Year)
= MAX(Total Premiums-Total Costs,Minimumn Cash Flow)
Description: The cash flows to the insurance industry from collecting premiums
minus the cash flows from administrative and adjustment expenses
* Total Premiums is covered in section B.2.2.
* Total Costs
= Total Expenses per unit Exposure*Total Underwriting Exposure
Description: The total costs of the insurance industry
- Total Expenses per unit Exposure is covered in section B.5.3.
- Total Underwriting Exposure is covered in section B.2.3.
Payments to Shareholders (dollars/Year)
= Dividends Declared
Description: Payments to shareholders must be positive
e Dividends Declared is covered in section B.10.1.
Initial Invested Capital (dollars) = Desired Capital
Desired Capital (dollars)
= Critical Claims Solvency Ratio*Claims Incurred
Description: The level of desired capital
Critical Claims Solvency Ratio (years)
1
Description: The desired capital of the industry is determined through a desire to
have surplus capital over and above the reserve for claims
Claims Incurred is covered in section B.5.1.
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B.8.2 Investment Return (dmnl/Year)
= Interest Rate*Switch for Impulse Response+Rate of Return*( 1-Switch for Impulse
Response)
Description: Controls whether the simulation is conducting an interest rate test
or using a more complex path for investment income
Interest Rate (dmnl/Year)
= Test Pattern for Interest Rates
Description: The rate of return on insurance industry investments if they need to
be held constant for testing.
Test Pattern for Interest Rates (dmnl/Year)
= 0.02
Switch for Impulse Response is covered in section B.1.2.
Rate of Return (dmnl/Year)
= (Return Stochastic Output*Switch for Stochastic Return+(1-Switch for Stochastic
Return)*Historical Rate of Return)/100
Description: The rate of return being experienced by the simulated industry
Return Stochastic Output is covered in section B.13.1.
Switch for Stochastic Return (dmnl)
0
Description: This controls whether the simulated industry experiences stochastic
returns or historical returns
Historical Rate of Return (dmnl/Year)
= Table for Insurance Rate of Investment Return(Time-1)
Description: The actual rate of return for the industry
Table for Insurance Rate of Investment Return (dmnl/Year)
= [(1960,0)-(2010,20)],(1960,4),(1961,4),(1962,3.95),(1963,4),(1964,4.19),
(1965,4.28),(1966,4.93),(1967,5.07),(1968,5.64),(1969,6.67),(1970,7.35),
(1971,6.16),(1972,6.21),(1973,6.85),(1974,7.56),(1975,7.99),(1976,7.61),
(1977,7.42),(1978,8.41),(1979,9.43),(1980,11.43),(1981,13.92),(1982,14.1882),
(1983,15.6557),(1984,15.4378),(1985,14.7913),(1986,13.4245),(1987,12.8833),
(1988,12.5062),(1989,12.8363),(1990,11.4925),(1991,12.4303),(1992,12.6901),
(1993,8.51171),(1994,8.34505),(1995,8.89398),(1996,8.95692),(1997,8.15162),
(1998,6.92274),(1999,6.4248),(2000,6.55457),(2001,3.56514),(2002,2.99837),
(2003,8.12083),(2004,6.78911),(2005,8.21829),(2006,14.7384),(2007,15.4114),
(2008,8.1393) ,(2009,13.2622)
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Figure B-4: Table for Historical Insurance Rate of Investment Return
Description: The annual rate of return on investments by the insurance industry
as observed historically and expressed in percentages. Data before 1981 is the yield
on treasury securities.
B.9 Profitability Measures
B.9.1 Combined Ratio (dmnl)
= Loss Ratio+Expense Ratio
Description: The current ratio is the ratio of total expenses to total premiums.
Loss Ratio (dmnl)
= Claims Expense/Total Premiums
Description: The loss ratio measures the profitability of the underwriting business
excluding administrative costs.
Claims Expense is covered in section B.5.1.
Total Premiums is covered in section B.2.2.
Expense Ratio (dmnl)
= Other Operating Costs/Total Premiums
Description: The expense ratio measures the fraction of premium income that is
spent on general expenses other than the payment of claims.
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Other Operating Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
Total Premiums is covered in section B.2.2.
B.9.2 Income Adequacy (dmnl)
= MAX((1+Return on Assets)/(1+Target Return on Assets),O)
Return on Assets (dmnl/Year)
= ZIDZ(Perceived Net Income,Total Capital)
Perceived Net Income (dollars/Year)
= f (Change in Net Income Perception) dt + [Net Income]
Description: The currently perceived return on equity varies from the actual due
to delays in measuring and reporting the return on equity as well as delays in accepting
that changes in return on equity will last long enough to take action based on them
Change in Net Income Perception (dollars/Year/Year)
= Gap in Net Income Perception/Time to Adjust Net Income Perception
Description: The rate of change in return on equity perceptions
" Gap in Net Income Perception (dollars/Year)
= Net Income-Perceived Net Income
Description: The difference between the perceived level of return on equity and
the actual level
" Time to Adjust Net Income Perception (years)
2
Description: Time passes before perceptions about net income are solidified.
Net Income is covered in section B.11.1.
Total Capital is covered in section B.8.1.
Target Return on Assets (dmnl/Year)
0
Description: The target return on equity for the industry
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Figure B-5: Table for Historical Insurance Rate of Investment Return
B.9.3 Reported Net Income (dollars/Year)
= Report Variable(Net Income,Reporting Period)
Description: The net income of the industry as reported over the indicated report-
ing period. This formulation uses the macro for data reporting described in appendix
A and chapter 2.
Reporting Period (Year)
1
Description: The length of time between reported periods
Historical Income (dollars/Year)
= Table for Historical Operating Income(Time-1)*1000000
Description: The reported operating income of the industry
Table for Historical Operating Income
=[(1982,-5000)-(2010,20000)],(1982,18.561),(1983,-162.779),(1984,-1186.08),
(1985,-1419.76),(1986,692.928),(1987,1900.8),(1988,2907.26),(1989,2086.24),
(1990,1486.02),(1991,2511.9),(1992,-2518.27),(1993,2573.28),(1994,2497.26),
(1995,6427.15),(1996,5824.66),(1997,5617.14),(1998,7098.19),(1999,4655.15),
(2000,4126.88),(2001,-3812.23),(2002,3167.88),(2003,10019.5),(2004,14887.9),
(2005,10928.4),(2006,18586),(2007,9586.66),(2008,4567.13),(2009,8007.02)
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B.10 Dividends
B.10.1 Dividends Declared (dollars/Year)
= MAX(Indicated Dividend,0)
Description: The dividend paid by the industry must be greater than zero.
Indicated Dividend (dollars/Year)
= Perceived Net Income*Dividend Payout Ratio
Description: The dividend indicated by the payout ratio and the net income.
Perceived Net Income is covered in section B.9.2.
Dividend Payout Ratio (dmnl)
0.11
Description: For dynamic equilibrium either set the target return on assets to zero
or set this to 1.
B.11 Financial Statements
B.11.1 Earnings Retained (dollars/Year)
- Net Income-Dividends Declared
Description: The total earnings retained (annualized)
Net Income (dollars/Year)
= Total Revenue-Claims Expense-Other Operating Costs
Description: The instantaneous flow of net income into the industry
Total Revenue (dollars/Year)
= Investment Income+Total Premiums
Description: The total flow of revenue into the industry
Investment Income is covered in section B.8.1.
Total Premiums is covered in section B.2.2.
Claims Expense is covered in section B.5.1.
Other Operating Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
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Dividends Declared is covered in section B.10.1.
B.11.2 Shareholder's Equity (dollars)
= Total Assets-Total Liabilities
Total Assets (dollars)
= Total Capital
Total Capital is covered in section B.8.1.
Total Liabilities (dollars)
= Deferred Commission Costs
Deferred Commission Costs is covered in section B.5.2.
B.12 Random Noise Generation
B.12.1 Claims Random Noise Output (dmnl)
= Claims Noise Mean+Claims Pink Noise*Switch for Claims Random Noise
Description: The final output of the claims random noise generation process
Claims Noise Mean (dmnl)
1
Description: Ensures that the noise value will cause the variable it is modifying
to be unchanged on average
Claims Pink Noise (dmnl)
= f (Claims Change in Pink Noise) dt + [0]
Description: A dimensionless quantity that modifies another with a stream of
correlated noise
Claims Change in Pink Noise (dmnl/Year)
= Claims Gap Between Pink and White Noise/Claims Noise Correlation Time
Description: The change in the pink noise value occurs with an average delay of
the noise correlation time
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Claims Gap Between Pink and White Noise (dmnl)
= Claims Scaled White Noise-Claims Pink Noise
Description: The gap that the pink noise process is trying to close
* Claims Scaled White Noise (dmnl)
= Claims Noise Standard Deviation*SQRT(24*Claims Noise Correlation Time/TIME
STEP )*Claims White Noise
Description: The white noise should be scaled so that it exhibits the proper
characteristics
- Claims Noise Standard Deviation (dmnl)
0.05
Description: The standard deviation of the random noise
- TIME STEP (Year)
0.015625
Description: The time step for the simulation.
- Claims White Noise (dmnl)
= Random UNIFORM(-0.5, 0.5, Claims Noise Seed)
* Claims Noise Seed (dmnl)
1
Description: The seed value allows for repeatable tests using the same
random inputs
Claims Noise Correlation Time (years)
1
Description: A measure of the inverse of the largest frequency the noise exhibits
Switch for Claims Random Noise (dmnl)
0
Description: Allows the user to switch the claims noise on or off (value set to 1 or
0 respectively)
B.12.2 GDP Random Noise Output (dmnl)
= GDP Noise Mean+GDP Pink Noise*Switch for GDP Random Noise
Description: Final noise output for GDP
GDP Noise Mean (dmnl)
1
Description: Ensures that the noise value will cause the variable it is modifying
to be unchanged on average
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GDP Pink Noise (dmnl)
= f (Change in GDP Pink Noise) dt + [0]
Description: A dimensionless quantity that modifies another with a stream of
correlated noise
Change in GDP Pink Noise (dmnl/Year)
= GDP Gap Between Pink and White Noise/GDP Noise Correlation Time
Description: The change in the pink noise value occurs with an average delay of
the noise correlation time
GDP Gap Between Pink and White Noise (dmnl)
= GDP Scaled White Noise-GDP Pink Noise
Description: The gap that the pink noise process is trying to close
e GDP Scaled White Noise (dmnl)
= GDP Noise Standard Deviation*SQRT(24*GDP Noise Correlation Time/Time
STEP )*GDP White Noise
Description: The white noise should be scaled so that it exhibits the proper
characteristics
- GDP Noise Standard Deviation (dmnl)
0.04
Description: The standard deviation of the random noise, estimated from
an autocorrelation spectrum of the historical data
- GDP White Noise (dmnl)
= Random UNIFORM(-0.5, 0.5, GDP Noise Seed)
* GDP Noise Seed (dmnl)
1
Description: The seed value allows for repeatable tests using the same
random inputs
GDP Noise Correlation Time (years)
9
Description: A measure of the inverse of the largest frequency the noise exhibits,
estimated from an autocorrelation spectrum of the historical data
Switch for GDP Random Noise (dmnl)
0
Description: Allows the user to switch the pink noise on or off by setting the value
to 1 or 0 respectively.
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B.13 Stochastic Return
B.13.1 Return Stochastic Output (dmnl/Year)
= Stochastic Return*Switch for Return Random Noise
Description: Final noise output for Return
Stochastic Return (dmnl/Year)
= f (Change in Stochastic Return) dt + [Return Noise Long Run Mean]
Description: A dimensionless quantity that modifies another variable with corre-
lated noise
Change in Stochastic Return (dmnl/Year/Year)
= Gap Between Mean and Current Level/Return Mean Reversion Delay+Scaled
Change in Gaussian Noise
Description: The change in the pink noise value occurs with the average delay
indicated.
Gap Between Mean and Current Level (dmnl/Year)
= Return Noise Long Run Mean-Stochastic Return Description: The gap that the
pink noise process is trying to close
Return Mean Reversion Delay (years)
2
Description: A measure of the inverse of the largest frequency the noise exhibits,
estimated from a parametrization of a financial model
Scaled Change in Gaussian Noise (dmnl/Year/Year)
= Return Noise Standard Deviation*Change in Return Gaussian Noise
Description: The noise should be scaled so that it exhibits the proper character-
istics
* Return Noise Standard Deviation (dmnl)
= Variance State*High Standard Deviation for Return+(1-Variance State)*Low
Standard Deviation for Return
Description: The standard deviation of the random noise
- Variance State is covered in section B.13.2.
- High Standard Deviation for Return (dmnl)
6.9
Description: The estimated standard deviation of the normal random vari-
able when the variance is high.
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- Low Standard Deviation for Return (dmnl)
2.8
Description: The estimated standard deviation of the normal random vari-
able when the variance is low.
e Change in Return Gaussian Noise (dmnl/Year/Year)
= RANDOM NORMAL(-100, 100 , 0 , 1 , Return Noise Seed )/SQRT(TIME
STEP/Wiener Unit Fix)/(Wiener Unit Fix)^2
Description: A discretization of a continuous Wiener process. The unit fix
variables are set to 1, and allow the output to have the correct units, given that
the SQRT function will only accept dimensionless inputs.
- Return Noise Seed (dmnl)
3
Description: The seed value allows for repeatable tests using the same
random inputs
- Wiener Unit Fix (Year)
1
Return Noise Long Run Mean (dmnl/Year)
10.5
Description: As the "goal" of the negative feedback loop, the long run mean of
the stochastic process will serve as the anchor of the mean reversion
Switch for Return Random Noise (dmnl)
0
Description: Allows the user to switch the pink noisein returns on or off
B.13.2 Variance State (dmnl)
= f (Increment Variance State-Drain Variance State) dt + [0]
Description: Implements a Markov process for the current variance state of the
random variable
Increment Variance State (dmnl/Year)
= (1-Variance State) *IF THEN ELSE( Random Variable for Markov > Transition to
High, 1 , 0 )/TIME STEP
Description: The transition from a state of low variance to a state of high variance
should only occur if the current state is equal to zero. The time step scalar ensures
that the flow will be sufficient to make the state receive a full unit over one model
time step.
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Random Variable for Markov (dmnl)
= Random UNIFORM(0, 1, Return Noise Seed)
Description: A uniform random variable valued between zero and one
Transition to High (dmnl)
0.77
Description: The percentage chance that the variance state will transition from
low to high
Drain Variance State (dmnl/Year)
= Variance State*IF THEN ELSE( Random Variable for Markov >Transition to Low
S1, 0 )/TIME STEP
Description: The transition from a state of high variance to a state of low variance
should only occur if the current state is equal to one. The time step scalar ensures
that the flow will be sufficient to make the state lose a full unit over one model time
step.
Transition to Low (dmnl)
0.17
Description: The percentage chance that the state of the Markov process will
transition from high to low
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Appendix C
Implementing a Hand Calculation
of Skewness in a System Dynamics
Model
C.1 Skewness
Skewness, or the third standardized moment of a random variable, is a useful calcula-
tion for analyzing data that is known to depart from a normal distribution. However,
the usual calculation of skew is inconvenient for implementation in the time domain
because it requires a memory of the difference between all of the past observations X
and the current sample mean y, which changes with each observation:
skewness = E X P)3 (C.1)
By expanding the discrete time version of that definition I implement a calculation
of current sample skewness using the previously observed data only. The following
equations document this transformation:
skewness = X -i] (C.2)
N
=N. 3  [(X -tp)3] (C.3)
N 3 (X 3 - 3M - X 2 + 3p2 X - p3) (C.4)
__1
- 3 (E [X3] - 3p - E [X2 ] + 2pa) (C.5)
Where N is the number of samples drawn so far, X is the observed value of
the variable, p is the current sample mean, E is the expectation operator, and a
is the current sample standard deviation. The calculations that remain are easy
to accomplish with minor additions to the summary statistics model published in
Business Dynamics (Sterman 2000).
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